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PREFACE 
n November 2000, the European Commission announced its intention to undertake a 
review of the Investment Services Directive (ISD). The review is the latest example in a 
long series of attempts by the EU to forge its segmented national securities markets into 
a unified market. Since the 1960s, the EU had launched various initiatives aimed at creating 
a common regulatory regime for investment services. Not until the end of the 1980s, 
however, as part of the Single Market Programme, did these efforts achieve any result: the 
1993 ISD. All debates on the shape of an EU regulatory regime have been characterised by 
profound divergences of views on how to handle competition in the securities trading field. 
In the 1960s, this took the form of debating the pros and cons of concentration rules, i.e. 
requiring all trade orders to be routed to a stock exchange. This debate and the ensuing 
division between member states were repeated in the discussions leading up to the 1993 
Directive. 
Following a decade of profound market change, the debate during the current review has 
focused on transparency requirements. By linking fragmented markets together, these offer 
the prospect of reconciling the benefits of competition with the benefits of informative 
central prices. The debates on their content and allocation mirror those of earlier decades, 
however, with some member states stressing the value of competition, and hence hesitating 
to extend a comprehensive regime to all market participants, and other members 
emphasising the importance of market integrity and investor protection, and accordingly 
promoting wide-ranging transparency rules.  
The purpose of this paper is not to make a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the 2002 ISD 
proposal, which is probably the most important part of the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP). Instead, it focuses on the ISD’s attempts to create a regulatory framework adapted 
to more a contestable trading sector. Therefore, the report focuses on the new transparency 
regime, in particular the much-debated issue of whether to extend pre-trade requirements to 
investment firms and concentrates essentially on issues related to cash-equity markets. The 
aim is to put in perspective what at first sight may seem a mere technical debate by 
providing a, historical overview of Community investment services legislation (ch. 1), 
explaining how securities markets work (ch. 2), outlining the conflicting forces shaping 
market structures (ch. 3), providing an overview of changes to market structure over recent 
decades (ch. 4), explaining the instruments at regulators’ disposal for dealing with dynamic 
markets (ch. 5), evaluating the regulatory concerns that the market changes give rise to (ch. 
6) and assessing the appropriateness and feasibility of the Commission’s proposed 
regulatory framework (ch. 7).  
The result is a fairly lengthy report. A few remarks to assist potential readers: for the reader 
with precious little time but a keen interest in the ISD debate, there is a box on p. viii 
summarising the policy recommendations. For those with more time, but constraints in 
terms of their interest, the 4-page executive summary should suffice. For the reader with no 
time constraints and an abundance of curiosity, the following 100 pages could be rewarding. 
These are divided into three parts. Part I provides an historical perspective on EU 
investment services legislation. Part II portrays the changes to securities markets in the EU 
over recent decades. Part III contains the core part on regulatory concerns and an 
assessment of the current ISD proposal and presents recommendations for a regulatory 
framework for dealing with fragmentation. 
Mattias Levin 
Brussels, April 2003 
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COMPETITION, FRAGMENTATION &TRANSPARENCY 
PROVIDING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FAIR, 
EFFICIENT AND DYNAMIC EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 
MATTIAS LEVIN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his report assesses the regulatory issues faced, and choices made, by the 
European Commission in the context of the review of the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD). The ISD is one of the most important parts of the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) and as such covers much ground. Not surprisingly, this 
report does not cover all issues raised in the context of the review. Instead, it 
concentrates on the questions relating to the new transparency regime and focuses 
essentially on cash-equity markets, issues that have been the most controversial during 
the consultative process preceding the Commission’s proposal. These issues are of 
fundamental importance, as they relate to the more general matter of competition. 
Transparency can therefore not be seen in isolation but rather needs to be understood in 
the general context of changes to securities market structures.  
Regulatory déjà-vu 
Attempts to create a pan-European investment services regime have been on the EU 
agenda for several decades. The current Investment Services Directive (ISD) proposal is 
only the latest attempt in a process that has always been marked by significant 
controversy due to wide differences in industry structure and regulatory culture. The 
heated debate surrounding the current review has, just like discussions in the 1960s, 
centred on the costs and benefits of a fragmented vs. consolidated marketplace. From 
the 1960s through to the 1993 ISD, this perennial combat focused on concentration 
rules; today its centre of attention has shifted to transparency rules. 
The importance attached to this issue in the past and the current contentiousness of the 
ISD review should not be surprising. The ISD is important because it regulates traders 
and execution venues in the EU, and hence shapes market structure. It is contentious, 
since regulatory choices on market structure determine who trades profitably. 
More contestable markets 
While the regulatory discussions today have an element of déjà-vu, markets have 
changed. Following a rapid evolution in the technologies underpinning financial 
markets, the balance between the forces shaping securities markets has been altered. 
The hitherto dominant centralising forces, with strong network externalities (i.e. a user’s 
utility of any trading system increases with the amount of other users trading on the 
same system) providing stock exchanges with nearly perfect protection against 
competition, have not disappeared, but have been mitigated. The trading landscape has 
accordingly become more conducive to competition, or “contestable” as the academic 
jargon goes (although not seriously contested, as only a handful of the most liquid 
stocks are traded on more than one exchange). Securities markets, which have always 
been characterised by a variety of traders with different needs, today therefore offer a 
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range of trading systems, methods and organisations more capable of satisfying these 
differing needs.  
The effects of the changes in the balance between the forces of centralisation and the 
forces of fragmentation have been far-reaching. The execution of client orders can now 
take place on an exchange (with several trading methods existing), on an alternative 
trading system (Multilateral Trading Facility according to the Commission) or by an 
intermediary against its own proprietary positions or by matching client orders (a.k.a. 
internalisation). In the US since the 1970s, a significant portion of the order flow of 
listed securities has been diverted from their principal exchanges, with ATS-trading and 
intermediary in-house matching gaining large shares in particular. In Europe, since the 
mid-1980s, markets have evolved primarily as a result of competition for blue-chip 
order flow between exchanges. Bearing in mind large differences between member 
states and wholesale vs retail segments of the markets, the extent of off-exchange order 
execution in general and internalisation in particular is shrouded in doubt, but most 
likely remains lower than in the US. 
Overall, the trading landscape has become more contestable in recent decades. All 
functions of the trading chain (e.g. finding, arranging and executing trades) are today 
subject to more or less fierce competition. Accordingly, the parts of the trading chain 
that were previously beyond the reach of some actors are now up for grabs. The result is 
fierce competition and a blurring of the previously clear institutional lines.  
The impact of a more contestable trading landscape on regulation 
There are substantial benefits associated with this increase in contestability: 
•  Price decrease. Increased competition between exchanges and intermediaries should 
put downward pressure on commissions and fees. Competition therefore reduces the 
potential rents earned by central markets and thus leads to a wider profit-sharing.  
•  Improved services. With the advent of more intermediaries, specialisation and 
catering for different investor needs have developed. Moreover, the competitive 
threat is likely to lead to more customer- (investor-) friendly behaviour. New, less 
expensive technology has enabled exchanges to provide a wider range of services 
more efficiently and at a lower cost. 
•  Innovation. A competitive system is more likely to adapt to the ever-increasing 
pace of financial innovation. Indeed, the dynamics of financial innovation appear to 
confirm the picture that the competitive advantage of launching a new service based 
on new technology, while giving ground for some first-mover advantage, is rapidly 
eroded, as other firms adopt the technology in question and start offering similar 
services. 
Nevertheless, the change in balance gives rise to regulatory concerns, all of which are 
related to the perils of fragmentation. A more contestable trading landscape by 
definition means that liquidity, once centred in the dominant stock exchange, becomes 
spread out on competing trading venues. This may have a number of negative effects: 
•  Deteriorating market quality. The existence of several competing order books 
fragments liquidity. One concern is that the ability of markets to provide stable 
prices may suffer as a result. Moreover, the ability of prices to aggregate 
information, i.e. the price discovery process, may be reduced. This would make it  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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more difficult to assess best price and market depth and could have negative effects 
on the overall allocation of capital in the economy. In addition, in opaque markets 
price priority may no longer be ensured, which could dampen clients’ incentives to 
post limit orders. This could reduce overall liquidity provision. Yet another concern 
relates to the effect of competition between intermediaries. If more orders are settled 
internally, there will be fewer orders to compete for in the public domain. This could 
further deteriorate market quality, as collusion could result if there are already few 
intermediaries.  
•  Deteriorating execution quality. Off-exchange execution venues often look to 
exchanges’ prices when executing client orders by ensuring that their clients receive 
no worse price than those prevailing in the central market. If fewer orders are 
executed in the public domain, however, central prices become less informative. 
Hence, clients risk receiving a lower quality of execution in terms of price. 
•  Cream-skimming. As in any other business that has been opened to competition, the 
incumbent operator faces the risk that new entrants target the more profitable part of 
the market while leaving the incumbent to cater for the rest. In trading terms, this 
could mean that new entrants target the execution of uninformed retail order flow.  
•  Conflicts of interest. In the execution process, intermediaries may have interests 
that do not necessarily coincide with those of its clients. For example, intermediaries 
may have an interest in timing the execution of their clients’ orders in order to fit 
their own proprietary trading interests or inventory positions. In that sense, their 
advice to clients to execute their orders in-house may not be disinterested. 
Regulators have access to a number of tools in order to quell these potential threats to 
market quality. First among these are tools to promote competition. A high level of 
competition is the best regulator, as market pressure is the best way to ensure that 
consumer needs are catered for. However, while policies aimed at boosting competition 
are crucial, they are seldom sufficient and other instruments are needed as well.  
One such tool is transparency rules, which have become increasingly used in recent 
years. The aim of transparency rules in the context of the ISD is to ensure that trading 
information reaches a maximum of participants. As a result, its proponents claim, the 
effect is to link together what otherwise could develop into disconnected liquidity pools. 
There are two major arguments favouring a high level of transparency. First, 
transparency could enable the co-existence of competing venues while ensuring that the 
dangers from fragmentation are minimised. Second, transparency is also an effective 
way of redressing information asymmetries by giving retail investors more information 
about trading opportunities. These benefits are amplified when taking into account its 
administrative benefits. Relying on transparency is an attractive regulatory strategy: it 
requires low resources on the part of regulators and it “leans with the market”, as it 
enables market forces to play. Hence, there is a natural presumption in favour of more 
transparency, and indeed, there has been a trend towards more transparency in recent 
years. Accordingly, any future regulatory framework is likely to have a significant 
transparency component. 
However, regulators possess a number of other instruments as well, notably conduct of 
business, best-execution and order-handling rules. Therefore, when devising a 
regulatory strategy to deal with these concerns, regulators have access to several  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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instruments. Where to put the emphasis becomes a matter of judgement and choice.  
Uncertainty regarding harm of fragmentation and regulatory effects 
Before devising a regulatory response to the challenges posed by a more contestable 
trading landscape, it is important to determine the level of harm some market practices 
may give rise to.  
Accordingly, whether fragmentation is harmful or not has been the subject of much 
debate and empirical testing, with so far inconclusive results. On the central issue of 
market quality and execution quality, some studies find that the increase in off-
exchange order execution results in harmful fragmentation, other studies fail to 
document any harmful effects while yet other studies find beneficial effects on market 
quality. Research therefore provides support for both those who fear the negative effects 
of off-exchange order execution and those who claim it is supplementary to exchange 
trading. In short, research on the potential harm of fragmentation is not conclusive. 
The effects of transparency requirements have also been the focus of much research 
attention. While there is agreement on the general benefits of transparency, there is no 
consensus on how far it should extend. There is wide agreement on the merits of 
widening the coverage of post-trade requirements to all actors dealing in securities. 
However, views differ on the effects of pre-trade requirements, with an important body 
of opinion claiming that too much transparency may under some circumstances harm 
market quality. While benefiting some traders, pre-trade requirements are likely to 
inhibit traders sitting on large blocks from entering the market. These traders are 
important from a liquidity-supply point of view, as they represent large trades or 
providers of capital. If they decide to retreat to a more accommodating environment, the 
effect of pre-trade requirements may prove detrimental to overall liquidity. There is a 
multitude of studies supporting the theoretical risks, but equally abundant research 
casting doubt on the practical effect of those theoretical risks.  
Fundamentally, when designing pre-trade rules, regulators have to make a choice 
between maximising network efficiency and promoting more service competition. The 
former would imply setting high pre-trade requirements so that the overall price 
mechanism is maximised. However, while transparency overall plays an important part 
in enabling competition between trading venues, pre-trade transparency may have 
detrimental effects on part of the market and may prevent some investors from 
satisfying their legitimate needs. If regulators choose to satisfy these needs and hence 
limit pre-trade requirements, this comes at a certain cost in terms of economic 
efficiency. It remains to be decided which is the most important. 
Transparency offers no panacea 
Overall, transparency is no panacea and there is “disquieting evidence” that too much 
transparency may harm market quality, as it effectively disables some liquidity 
provision. In addition, some of the concerns voiced above, namely that an insufficient 
level of transparency puts some investors at risk, can also be addressed by other means. 
Alternatives to the disputed pre-trade requirements exist that somewhat mitigate the 
effects of not having pre-trade rules. In order to integrate markets and protect retail 
investors, more emphasis could be put on best-execution rules. By forcing investment 
firms to screen and have access to several trading venues and by requiring them to  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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regularly review their execution practices, dynamism and change are introduced. 
Trading venues will have incentives to attract them as customers and hence are likely to 
compete more aggressively. By requiring investment firms to disclose their execution 
arrangements and costs, retail clients will have effective tools of disciplining their 
service providers. Order priority rules are also effective in structuring the discretion of 
brokers concerning the way they can execute client orders. Conflict-of-interest rules 
offer an additional cushion. Although not perfect substitutes, these rules in combination 
with post-trade transparency will offer a rigorous regime for achieving the twin goals of 
integrated markets and protecting retail investors. 
Having rules in place is one thing, but enforcing them is another. Key in any future 
regulatory framework is therefore enforcement. A problem with the current ISD is a 
lack of enforcement of the agreed rules and wide differences in the way it has been 
implemented. The future regulatory framework, which is likely to be more ambitious 
and demanding, will only be effective if regulatory authorities ensure that the rules are 
enforced.  
Regulating in the face of uncertainty 
In sum, regulators are faced with significant uncertainty regarding the harmfulness of 
fragmentation and the effects of pre-trade transparency. This uncertainty forces 
regulators to make difficult choices based on imperfect information.  
A complicating factor for regulators is that they cannot pursue all their objectives at the 
same time, as some objectives are mutually exclusive. Regulators hence face difficult 
trade-offs. On a general level, EU rule-makers face the choice between promoting EU 
market integration, and hence putting a highly harmonised regulatory framework in 
place with little discretion given to national authorities, or adapting rules to local needs, 
with a more minimal central regulatory framework. For example, the risk of putting in 
place a harmonised regime on transparency is that some markets will be forced to 
increase their levels of transparency while others will be forced to decrease theirs. On a 
more specific level, when allocating transparency obligations, regulators have to weigh 
the benefits of an ambitious regime (more informative prices) against the costs (the risk 
of discouraging large liquidity providers from entering the market). Informative central 
prices are certainly a laudable aim. There are other aims as well, however.  
Regarding best-execution rules, regulators have to weigh the benefit of a better price 
(resulting from intermediaries forced to shop around) against the cost of higher 
commissions and fees (intermediaries charging for the search). Fundamentally, 
regulators have to choose whether they want to stimulate a dynamic service climate 
(competing, if fragmented, markets) or a cost-reducing climate (high levels of 
transparency disabling some service provision).  
In choosing which path to follow, regulators have to carefully weigh the associated 
costs and benefits. While these choices require careful analysis and judgement, it should 
be stressed that competition is a precious good in securities trading. The securities 
trading sector has traditionally lacked competition due to the historically prevailing 
centralising forces of network externalities. This would suggest that a lack of 
competition rather than fragmentation is the likely long-term concern. This inherent 
need for more competition should be kept in mind when devising a regulatory 
framework.  viii 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Securities trading has become more conducive to competition in recent decades. Previously the 
monopoly of a stock exchange, trading orders can today be executed in a multitude of venues in a 
myriad of ways. More competition is beneficial but it does present regulators with difficult 
questions, the most pressing being the risk of fragmentation, i.e. liquidity becoming dispersed in 
disconnected venues. While there is an agreement that transparency requirements should form a 
substantial part of a regulatory strategy dealing with fragmentation, there is no consensus on how 
transparency affects market quality and hence how far it should be extended. Some claim that it is 
essential for central prices to be informative. Others claim that if too extensive, it harms liquidity 
provision. Faced with this uncertainty, regulators have to make difficult choices. In this light, a 
number of comments can be made on the solutions put forward by the Commission, as follows: 
Competition the best regulator. Overall, the EU is facing a number of trade-offs. For example, when 
allocating transparency obligations, regulators have to weigh the benefits of an ambitious regime 
(e.g. more informative prices) against the costs (e.g. risk that large liquidity providers will hesitate to 
enter the market). While these choices require careful analysis and judgement, it should be stressed 
that competition is a precious good in securities markets that has traditionally been lacking due to the 
centralising forces of network externalities. This would suggest that a lack of competition rather than 
fragmentation is the likely long-term concern. Therefore, when facing these difficult choices, EU 
regulators should stress the overarching aim of promoting fair competition.  
Less detail. Considering the inherent difficulties, and need for frequent changes, of e.g. any 
transparency regime, further delegation of powers to implementing committees should have been 
called for. Comitology is no panacea, however, and such a course of action would probably have 
been impossible in light of the political realities, rules of comitology and dangers to the acquis. 
Nevertheless, the risk posed by excessive detail in a directive that will last for at least 15 years calls 
for further discussions on the appropriate level of delegation.  
Pre-trade transparency for investment firms appear premature. Considering the uncertainties 
regarding i) the harmfulness of the underlying feature (fragmentation, internalisation), ii) the effect 
on market quality of imposing pre-trade requirements and iii) the current extent of the potentially 
harmful activity, the Commission’s decision to impose pre-trade transparency requirements on 
investment firms appears premature.  
Minimising harm on liquidity provision. It may be that in the absence of concentration rules, off-
exchange order execution may rapidly gain market share. If kept for precautionary reasons, the pre-
trade requirements should at a minimum be redrafted so that they do not harm liquidity provision. 
Accordingly, if kept, the rules ought to exclude transactions of larger sizes and actors dealing 
primarily in these sizes and hence cover retail orders and their service providers only. While this in 
part is the intent of the current rules, it ought to be more explicitly stated. In that respect, Art. 25 
should only apply to investment firms that execute retail orders on a continuous or regular basis. 
Moreover, Art. 20.4 should be changed so that it targets only the type of orders normally associated 
with retail trading. 
Alternative means, although not perfect substitutes, exist. Should regulators decide to address the 
twin goals of integrated markets and protecting retail investors differently, other instruments remain 
at regulators’ disposal. Although not perfect substitutes, they partially achieve the same aim as pre-
trade disclosure. These rules – best-execution (Art. 19), order-handling (Art. 20), conduct of 
business (Art.18) and conflict of interest (Art. 16) – in combination with post-trade transparency 
(Art. 26) will offer a rigorous regime for protecting investors and integrating markets while 
preserving the multitude of venues and user choice. 
The importance of educated investors. The more educated an investor, the lighter the regulatory 
touch required. An educated view is also crucial in re-establishing investor confidence, which has 
been shattered by the virulence of the current downturn and corporate scandals. According to the 
subsidiarity principle, the task of educating investors is the responsibility of member states, but the 
Commission or CESR could coordinate a process of benchmarking and spreading best practice.   1 
PART I. THE HISTORY OF REGULATING INVESTMENT SERVICES IN THE EU 
The current ISD proposal is only the latest in a long history of attempts to 
create an EU investment services regime. That history has been marked by 
significant controversy due to wide differences in industry structure and 
regulatory culture. 
 
1.  The EU investment services regime
1 
As is characteristic of all single market legislation, the dominant objective of legislation 
in the field of investment services is market integration. The focus of investment 
services legislation in the EU has traditionally been more macro (freedom of movement, 
soundness of intermediaries and stability of the financial system) rather than micro (e.g. 
investor confidence or protection). Likewise, as in all single market legislation, there is 
an inherent tension in the EU’s investment services legislation between the 
dismantlement of obstacles and the desire to regulate the marketplace.  
1.1  Origins of the EU regime 
The basis of the EU’s investment services regime is the freedom of movement provided 
by the Treaty. EC Arts. 43-48 grant the freedom of establishment, while Arts. 49-55 
delineate the freedom to provide services across the Community. Apart from these basic 
freedoms, little harmonised law existed in the field of investment services. Not 
surprisingly, member states’ approaches to investment services legislation differed 
widely, especially in the field of supervision. Nevertheless, as the habit of the member 
states to impose additional requirements on providers of foreign investment services 
flourished in the 1970s and accelerated during the 1980s, there was a realisation that 
more harmonised regulation was necessary to uphold the freedoms.  
The first official sign of the economic importance of an integrated market for 
investment services came much earlier, however. In 1966, the Segré Report
2 identified 
obstacles to the free movement of investment services, which were alleged to impede 
the efficient allocation of capital in the Community, but it was not until two decades 
later that a first attempt to act on these obstacles was made. The Commission’s 1985 
White Paper reiterated the economic importance of financial integration and made the 
realisation of a single financial services market part of its 1992 programme. As a result 
of the Single European Act (SEA) and the switch to qualified majority voting, a first 
generation of EU legislation in the field of investment services came into being. The 
1989 2
nd Banking Directive provided a first step towards an EU investment services 
regime. Modelled along Europe’s universal banking legislation, the directive included 
some investment activities, but it did not provide a passport for stand-alone investment 
firms. Moreover, there were some particular concerns that needed to be addressed in a 
special directive related e.g. to prudential and conduct of business matters.  
                                                 
1 This chapter builds extensively on Moloney (2002), which must be the definitive overview of 
Community financial legislation.  
2 A report by a Group of Experts appointed by the EEC Commission, the Segré report was one of the first 
studies to make the link between capital market integration and economic growth and to point to the need 
for European rule harmonisation in order to achieve integration.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
 2 
1.2  The 1993 ISD 
Hence, in 1989 the Commission put forward a proposal for an Investment Services 
Directive (ISD). Following comments from the European Parliament (EP) and the 
Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) a revised proposal ensued in 1990. 
Following lengthy and difficult negotiations, the Council adopted the ISD in May 1993, 
but member states did not fully implement it until more than three years later.  
The final proposal was considerably more extensive and detailed than the initial 
proposal, owing to the addition of politically motivated amendments and refinements. 
Following the 2
nd Banking Directive, the ISD provided a passport for investment firms 
and the right of remote access to regulated markets. 
1.2.1 Investment  firms 
The directive was to apply to all investment firms pursuing those services and active in 
those instruments listed in annexes to the directive. Following the new approach of the 
single market, the ISD provided for minimum harmonisation of the key rules relating to 
passport and authorisation. It provided rules for the various ways by which investment 
firms could exercise the passport, i.e. via setting up a branch or via the so-called 
notification procedure, whereby a foreign firm wishing to provide its services across the 
border notifies the host supervisor.
3  
The main responsibility of enforcement and supervision was given to the home-country 
authority, with host authorities playing a complementary role. A lack of agreement 
reached in the course of negotiations, however, limited the extent of the harmonised 
regime. Hence, there remained multiple regulatory regimes and significant room for 
interpretation in e.g. conduct of business rules, advertising and exceptions to rules 
related to the general good. 
1.2.2 Regulated  markets 
The ISD only granted regulated markets a limited passport. Instead, investment firms 
were given the right of remote access to markets in other member states. Overall, 
harmonisation provisions for regulated markets were limited, largely as a result, once 
again, of a lack of agreement reached during the negotiations. This lack of agreement 
was a reflection of significant differences in market structure between member states.  
These differences had already been highlighted in the 1977 Wymeersch study,
4 which 
divided Europe into a Northern, Central and Southern bloc:  
•  In Northern Europe (UK, IE, NL), markets were given substantial freedom in 
organising themselves. These markets were quote-driven dealer markets and did not 
require trades to be concentrated in the central market. 
                                                 
3 Critically, however, the ISD did not extend passport rights to subsidiaries. This proved to be problematic 
as many firms found it simpler to use this form of incorporation for tax reasons. Moreover, the 
notification procedure proved to be cumbersome, especially for the wholesale segment of the market 
(Moloney, 2002). 
4 As described in Moloney (2002), pp. 650-651.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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•  In Southern Europe (FR, IT), on the other hand, public authorities intervened more 
heavily in the organisation of markets. Here, markets were order-drive auction 
markets and concentration rules were more likely.  
•  Between these two poles fell Central Europe (DE, BE, LU) where markets were 
subject to an intermediate level of intervention. For example, supervisory 
responsibility was often delegated to the markets themselves.  
Another important factor shaping opinions in the ISD negotiations was the 1977 Code 
of Conduct. That year, the Commission had tried to forge a consensus on core principles 
of regulation. The Code took the form of non-binding recommendations. Even so, it 
somewhat influenced the ISD, with some of the principles featuring prominently in the 
negotiations. For example, the Code had endorsed the concentration principle 
(Supplementary Principle 4), promoted policies of “openness” in order to prevent 
fragmentation (Supplementary Principle 10) and argued for post-trade transparency 
(Supplementary Principle 11). Also shaping the market structure debate at the time was 
the then commonly held view that further consolidation, if not centralisation, of 
securities trading was desirable. For example, a 1981 EP resolution called for the 
creation of a European stock exchange. Moreover, the 1985 White Paper outlined the 
need to “create a Community-wide trading system for securities of international 
interest”.
5 
These divisions proved important during the ISD negotiations. The provisions regarding 
regulated markets were accordingly the result of compromises. The passport was limited 
to conditional rights of remote access. Rules on transparency granted significant 
discretion to member states to impose rules beyond the minimum defined. The right to 
impose a concentration rule was established under certain conditions. These conditions 
were designed to ensure that if a member state decided to impose a concentration rule, it 
would only apply to domestic transactions. Moreover, a general waiver was introduced 
that ensured that investors wishing to execute orders off the exchange could do so 
(provided that certain conditions were met).  
1.2.3  Prudential and protective rules 
The ISD also contained rules of a prudential character, primarily related to asset 
protection, conflicts of interest (Art. 10), ownership controls (Art. 4), ongoing 
prudential supervision, operational prudential controls and minimum capital (Art. 8 
referring to the Capital Adequacy Directive). The aim of these prudential rules was to 
provide for a stable financial system by ensuring the individual and overall systemic 
soundness of investment firms.  
It has been argued that the 1993 ISD contained less explicit protective rules. At the 
time, this was a field where there was deemed to be less ground for harmonisation, as 
investor protection in the name of subsidiarity was primarily the responsibility of 
member state authorities. Instead, the protective dimension featured more indirectly. 
Investors were supposed to be protected by the integrity of the marketplace and the 
soundness of individual investment firms.  
                                                 
5 European Commission (1985), p. 29.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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In line with this thinking, the original proposal did not contain any rules on the conduct 
of businesses. It was not until negotiations in the Council started that some member 
states’ concern over insufficient investor protection triggered the development of such 
rules. As a result, the ISD (Art. 11) provided that member states should draw up conduct 
of business rules that were to match at least the principles set out in the directive. 
However, member states were granted significant discretion when implementing the 
principles, which covered issues such as anti-fraud, client relationship, adequate 
disclosure and conflicts of interest.  
1.2.4  Achievements and shortcomings 
The ISD is widely regarded as a success. The most cited evidence substantiating this 
claim is that following the passport, the amount of investment firms providing their 
services across the border has increased substantially. The graph below illustrates the 
number of investment firms that have followed the Art. 18 procedure since the 
implementation of the ISD of notifying host authorities of their intention to provide 
services across the border.
6 
Figure 1. 
 
Source: European Commission (2000).  
As can be seen from Figure 1, a significant amount of investment services are provided 
across borders. For example, the Belgian authorities have received 843 notifications of 
service providers wanting to provide their services in Belgium from their home base. 
Indeed, passporting has been so successful in some countries that the number of 
passporting firms exceeds the number of domestically authorised firms. The low 
number for UK (171) may be explained by the fact that most service providers have 
such a volume of business there that they have actually set up an establishment 
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(subsidiary/branch). However, differing interpretations of the reporting requirements 
may also explain this marked difference. 
Nevertheless, the ISD has also been the subject of criticism. First, it has been claimed 
that despite the ISD, markets remain fragmented. Hence, the market integration devices 
contained in the directive are not sufficient as other obstacles obviously remain. 
However, the Commission has also been blamed for insufficiently enforcing the ISD, 
when many of the obstacles could potentially have been dealt with in this way. 
Furthermore, the home country control principle is diluted, as illustrated e.g. by the 
significant authority Arts. 11 and 13 grant to the host country. In addition, the scope of 
the ISD passport is limited. For example, non-core services do not benefit from its 
provisions and a significant number of actors, services and instruments are excluded. In 
addition, clearing and settlement is only dealt with indirectly, by granting investment 
firms the right to become members or to have access to the clearing and settlement 
facilities of a regulated market. Overall, lack of enforcement coupled with unclear and 
vague provisions have contributed towards uneven implementation and interpretation of 
the directive.  
1.3  Plus ça change 
Since markets have changed, the Commission has concluded that the ISD has become 
outdated and is in need of an overhaul. As has been illustrated above, the ISD is a 
cornerstone of the EU’s investment services regulatory regime, and any change is hence 
likely to have a profound impact on the way that investment services are provided in the 
EU.  
The history of law-making in the field of investment services has been fraught with 
conflict and differences of opinion between member states. Since the 1960s, the deepest 
conflicts have primarily centred on the relative pros and cons of three issues: 1) 
concentration rules, 2) fragmentation and 3) transparency requirements. 
The stakes have not become lower over time. On the contrary, the current review of the 
ISD has been the subject of lengthy and divisive consultations between the Commission 
and market participants. Moreover, the principal battlefield remains the same: 
concentration, fragmentation and transparency.   6 
PART II. THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES TRADING 
Securities markets are characterised by a variety of traders, systems and 
modes of organisation. The structure of securities markets is shaped by 
conflicting forces. Following a rapid evolution in the technologies 
underpinning financial markets, the balance between these forces has been 
altered and the structure of securities markets has accordingly changed. 
This has particularly been the case in Europe. 
 
2.  Fundamentals of the trading industry
7 
Financial systems provide a number of important economic functions. They provide 
means by which transactions are executed, cleared and settled. Financial systems also 
offer a way to transfer economic resources through time. Furthermore, they provide 
sophisticated ways of managing risks. Financial systems may also help mitigate 
pernicious incentive problems associated with financial transactions (e.g. asymmetric 
information and principal-agent problems).
8 In light of these underlying functions, this 
chapter will sketch the fundamentals of securities markets: motivations for trading, main 
actors, functionalities provided by securities markets, main instruments and market 
design and rules. It will also assess the public good resulting of deep and liquid markets. 
2.1  Traders, services and instruments 
Different traders trade for different reasons. Some traders trade to invest or borrow, 
others trade to speculate or gamble, while others yet trade to reduce risks or obtain an 
asset of particular use to them. Most traders trade for a variety of purposes and may well 
trade for all the above reasons.  
2.1.1 Trading  motivations 
In order to illustrate the various reasons why people trade, a simplified categorisation 
can be made along the following lines: 
•  Utilitarian traders. This category of trader trades in order to solve problems 
originating outside the markets. Investors and borrowers trade in order to transmit 
wealth through time, e.g. by issuing a security that provides for current cash flow 
while providing those who buy the security with future cash flows. Asset exchangers 
trade to exchange assets in their possession against assets for which they have an 
                                                 
7 This chapter builds heavily on Lawrence Harris’ excellent book on the micro-structure of securities 
markets (Harris, 2002). For those interested in securities trading, this book is indispensable reading as it 
offers a clear and concise account of the structure and dynamics of securities markets for the non-expert 
reader. The author is currently the chief economist of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). 
8 Primarily associated with Nobel laureate Robert Merton, the functional school of thought argues that 
financial systems carry out six core functions: they offer methods of clearing and settling payments, 
provide mechanisms for the pooling of resources, offer ways to transfer economic resources through time 
and across distances, provide methods of managing risks, provide price information that helps to 
coordinate decentralised decision-making, and offer ways of dealing with incentive problems in 
transactions (e.g. asymmetric information, principal-agent problems). See Crane et al. (1996), for further 
details.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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immediate need. Such transactions are carried out on cash or spot markets. Other 
traders trade to hedge risks arising in their conduct of business. They may issue a 
hedging instrument (e.g. a forward contract, a futures contract or a swap) that has a 
value that is the opposite of the risk they face. While gamblers trade for their own 
pleasure by betting on future events, speculators are informed traders using their 
information to predict future price changes. Other forms of utilitarian reasons for 
trading may be tax avoidance, cross-subsidisation and learning. 
•  Profit-motivated traders. Traders who want to profit from their trading have to buy 
at low prices and sell at high prices. Speculators try to predict the way prices will 
move in the future. Some speculators are informed traders, in the sense that they 
base their predictions on their informed estimations of assets’ fundamental values. 
When they believe the current price does not reflect the fundamental value, they 
trade. Other speculators are less benign, in that they do not contribute to moving 
prices towards fundamental values. Instead, they collect information on where the 
market prices are likely to go – irrespective of fundamental values – and adapt their 
trading strategy to exploit that knowledge (e.g. front-running). Some speculators 
may even create misleading information or trade for the sole purpose of 
manipulating prices. Dealers try to profit from providing liquidity to other traders. 
The difference between their bid and ask quotes (the spread) is the price they charge 
for supplying liquidity to impatient traders.  
•  Futile traders. Another category of trader consists of those traders who expect to 
profit from trading but who do not. Some are just inefficient, e.g. they lack the 
information or the skills to act on information to trade profitably. Others make the 
mistake of relying on agents who do not properly fulfil their fiduciary duties.  
The figure below presents a typology of the different trader types according to these 
motivations for trading. In sum, for utilitarian traders, trading is a means to achieve a 
desired end (e.g. to transfer wealth through time, exchange assets, hedge, etc.). For 
profit-motivated traders, trading is an end in itself, i.e. to make a profit. However, 
profit-motivated traders cannot trade profitably among themselves only: they need 
utility-traders. But utility traders only trade if certain conditions are met. In regulating 
investment services, it is therefore important to pay particular attention to ensuring that 
the needs of utilitarian traders are fulfilled. Those needs are primarily liquid and low-
cost markets with instruments that are well adapted to their utilitarian needs. 
  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Figure 2. Different trader types 
All traders
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Source: Simplified from Harris (2002), p. 199. 
 
As a result of these wide differences in trading motives, it is highly unlikely that a 
single trading venue can satisfy all needs. In other words, divergent needs are likely to 
lead to a divergent institutional trading structure. 
2.1.2 Traders 
There are many types of traders. Traders on the buy-side consist of those who buy 
exchange services. Common to all of them is that they use markets as solutions to 
problems they face. A trader on the buy-side may be an investor who desires to stock 
some of his or her current wealth for future use. It may also be a borrower who needs 
wealth instantly and is prepared to use some of his or her future wealth for that purpose. 
Another problem that the buy-side traders may face is the risk of operating a business. 
Trading may offer an opportunity to reduce such risks by hedging them via e.g. a 
futures contract. Trading also offers an opportunity for traders to exchange assets. 
The sell-side, on the other hand, consists of traders who provide exchange services to 
the buy-side. One such trader is a dealer, who trades with his or her clients when they so 
wish. Another type of sell-side trader is the broker, who trades on behalf of his or her 
clients. Brokers arrange trades for their clients by finding other traders. Sell-side firms 
often employ traders that offer both dealer and brokerage services, thus acting as 
broker-dealers. By providing an ever-widening range of trade arrangement services for 
their clients, brokers are increasingly moving onto the turf of exchanges.   A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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Table 1. The buy-side 
Trader type  Examples  Motivations  Instruments 
Investors Individuals 
Funds 
Money managers 
Move wealth from 
present to future 
Equities 
Bonds 
Borrowers Homeowners 
Corporations 
Move wealth from 
future to present 
Loans 
Bonds 
Hedgers Farmers 
Manufacturers 
Financial institutions 
Reduce business 
operating risks 
Futures contracts 
Forward contracts 
Swaps 
Asset exchangers  Multinational companies 
Travellers 
Acquire assets they 
value more than the 
asset in their possession 
Currencies 
Commodities 
Source: Harris (2002), p. 33. 
Table 2. The sell-side 
Trader type  Examples  Illustrations  Motivations 
Dealers Market  makers 
Specialists 
Floor traders 
Day traders 
Winterflood Securities (LSE) 
LaBranche & Co. (NYSE) 
Madoff Securities (NYSE) 
Knight Trading (US/EU) 
Earn trading profits 
by supplying 
liquidity 
Brokers Retail  brokers 
Discount brokers 
Full-service brokers 
Institutional brokers 
Charles Schwab 
Instinet (UK) 
Dreyfus Brokerage Services 
Abel/Noser Corp. 
Earn commissions by 
arranging trades for 
clients 
Broker-dealers Wirehouses  Goldman  Sachs 
Merrill Lynch 
Salomon Smith Barney 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
Earn trading profits 
and trading 
commissions 
Source: Harris (2002), p. 34. 
2.1.3  Trading services and instruments 
Securities markets provide many, if not all, of the core functions described above. The 
listing on an exchange offers companies access to wider economic resources. Trading 
venues offer ways to transfer wealth through time. Trade in futures contracts enables 
traders to manage risks. Trade execution venues offer highly sophisticated pricing 
mechanisms. Rules regarding trading systems, order execution and trader conduct of 
business reduce incentive problems, such as asymmetric information or principal-agent.  
2.1.3.1 Trading  services 
The trading chain – i.e. the services provided in order to carry out a trade – can be 
divided into six elements: finding traders, arranging the trade, executing the trade, 
clearing the trading details, settling the payment for the trade and the corresponding 
transfer of ownership, and depositing the proof of ownership.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Traditionally, each function had its specialised actor. Brokers, for example, took their 
clients’ orders to an exchange, where they arranged trades with other brokers and then 
executed these arranged trades on that exchange. Typically, at the end of the day, trade 
details were checked and eventually cleared. The cleared trades were then passed on to 
a securities depository for settlement and custody. These distinct roles have become 
increasingly blurred, however, as technology has allowed actors to perform other parts 
of the trading chain services with increasing ease. The trading chain has therefore 
become more contested:  
•  On the trading side (finding, arrangement and execution), intermediaries have 
entered the chasse-gardée of previous de facto monopolists. For example, brokers 
and exchanges offer competing trade-matching services. Moreover, trade execution 
is no longer the sole domain of exchanges, as other actors (e.g. brokers) and trading 
venues (e.g. ECNs) have arisen with their competing execution services.  
•  In the post-trade area (clearing, settlement, depository), the increase in contestability 
is more difficult to pin down. There appears to be little competition between the 
traditional “infrastructure” providers (central securities depositories, central 
counterparties). On the “intermediary” side (e.g. local agents and global custodians), 
however, more competition exists. 
Figure 3. Functions of the trading chain 
Finding Arrangement Execution Clearing Settlement Depository
y Exchange
y Broker
y ATS
y ECN
y Exchange
y Broker
y Exchange
y Broker
y Infrastructure
level: limited
competition
y Intermediary level:
more competition
y Infrastructure
level: limited
competition
y Intermediary level:
more competition
y Infrastructure
level: limited
competition
y Intermediary level:
more competition
 
2.1.3.2 Instruments 
As mentioned above, traders trade for a variety of reasons, e.g. transferring wealth 
through time or reducing risks. There are many instruments through which such motives 
can be satisfied.  
Trades can occur in real assets, e.g. commodities. Commodities trading is carried out by 
e.g. farmers and manufacturers. Another class of instruments more central for the 
purposes of this paper are financial assets, which provide ownership of real assets and 
the corresponding cash flow generated by those real assets. Among the most common 
are equities and bonds. Financial assets are issued by e.g. companies and public bodies. 
Another important class of instruments is derivative contracts (forwards, futures, 
options and swaps). Such an instrument derives its value from the value of an 
underlying instrument upon which it is based. The price of a derivative depends on 
future events.   A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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Table 3. Different trading instruments 
Class Instrument  Creators 
Real assets  Commodities 
Intellectual properties 
Real estate 
Emission rights 
Farmers 
Inventors 
Builders 
Governments 
Financial assets  Equities 
Bonds 
Trust units 
Currencies 
Corporate issuers 
Corporate issuers, governments 
Trusts 
Governments, banks 
Derivative contracts  Futures contracts 
Forward contracts 
Options 
Swaps 
Sellers 
Insurance contracts  Insurance policies 
Reinsurance contracts 
Corporations 
 
Hybrid instruments  Warrants 
Index-linked bonds 
Convertible bonds 
Corporate issuers 
Source: Harris (2002), p. 38. 
 
Following advances in information technology, the ability to design instruments to 
serve an increasing range of particular purposes, e.g. tax, has increased. As a result, the 
types of instruments have increased and have become more complex to categorise.  
2.1.4 Orders 
An order is an instruction to trade. It is issued when a trader cannot personally negotiate 
the trade. It is given to the broker or the exchange that arranges the trade. Not personally 
negotiating a trade may be disadvantageous, as a trader who issues the order cannot 
respond to market conditions as quickly as a proprietary trader. Instead, traders who 
find it too expensive or impractical to continuously monitor markets must instead rely 
on carefully drafted order instructions that truly capture their trading intention and 
strategy.  
The price associated with a sell order is known as the offer price (ask). 
Correspondingly, the price of a buy order is called the bid price (bid). The best prices 
are called best bid and best offer. The difference between the two is known as the bid-
ask spread.  
Orders supply liquidity if they give other traders opportunities to trade. In other words, a 
buy order is an opportunity for other traders to sell. Correspondingly, a sell order is an 
opportunity for traders to buy. A liquid market is one where traders can trade without 
affecting the price too much. In order to avoid misunderstandings and mistakes, a set of 
standard order types have evolved.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Table 4. Different order types 
Order type  Frequency of 
use 
Effect on 
liquidity 
Price 
contingencies 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Market order  Common  Demands 
immediacy 
None Fast  execution  Uncertain price 
impact 
Standing limit 
order 
Common  Supplies 
liquidity 
Trade price 
must be at or 
better than the 
limit price 
Limited price 
with no price 
impact 
May never 
execute or 
execute at worse 
price 
Marketable 
limit order 
Common  Demands 
immediacy 
Trade price 
must be at or 
better than the 
limit price 
Limited price 
impact 
Some price 
impact possible 
Tick sensitive 
order 
Occasional  Supplies 
liquidity 
Must sell on an 
uptick or buy on 
a downtick 
No price 
impact, adjusts 
with the 
market 
Uncertain 
execution price 
Stop market 
order 
Occasional  Demands 
liquidity when 
it is least 
available 
Triggered when 
price touches or 
moves through 
the stop price 
Often used to 
stop losses 
when the 
trader is not 
present 
Price impact can 
be large 
Market-not-
held order 
Common 
(among 
institutions) 
Broker 
decides 
whether to 
offer or take 
liquidity 
Whatever the 
broker decides 
Expert broker  Trader loses 
control over 
broker 
Source: Harris (2002), p. 87. 
 
The main types of orders currently in use are profiled below. 
•  Market orders. A market order is an instruction to trade at the best price currently 
available. Market orders are particularly well suited to traders who require 
immediate and certain order execution. They pay a price for immediacy, however, 
as they risk trading at worse prices than they expected when issuing the order. This 
is particularly the case of large orders, where impatient traders often have to make 
significant price concessions. 
•  Limit orders. A limit order is also an instruction to trade at the best price currently 
available, but with the proviso that the price does not exceed a certain limit.
9 Limit 
orders are convenient if a trader does not have time to follow the market. Instead, 
the trader can authorise his agent to execute the trade within certain price limits. In 
continuous markets (see below), the exchange or the broker will try to execute the 
order immediately. If there is no other trader willing to fill the order immediately, it 
will be stored in the limit order book. The probability of an order to be executed 
depends on how its limit price relates to the current best bid and offers. A standing 
                                                 
9 For a buy order, the trade price must be at the limit or lower. For a sell order, it must be at the limit or 
higher.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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limit order supplies liquidity, as it gives other traders the possibility to trade when 
they wish. As a compensation for this supply, a trader using limit orders expects to 
receive a better price than if using a market order. Limit orders come with an 
execution uncertainty risk. A trader only receives a better price if the order is 
executed at the given price limit. That may not be the case, however, as market 
prices frequently move away from the given price limit. In such cases, the trader 
must adapt his prices. Accordingly, a trader may well obtain a worse price than 
would have been the case if he or she would have used a market order.  
•  Stop orders. A stop instruction stops order execution until the specified stop price is 
reached. Stop orders are often used by traders to minimise their losses if the market 
price moves against their positions. Accordingly, a sell stop order will execute once 
a market price falls to a certain stop price. This does not mean that the order will be 
executed at the stop price, only that the order will start to be executed as a normal 
market order at best price available. If prices continue to fall quickly, the order may 
well execute below the stop price. Stop orders are disadvantageous from a societal 
point of view, as they exacerbate price changes. Stop orders create pressure to sell 
when prices are falling and conversely contribute to buy pressures when prices are 
rising. 
•  Market-not-held orders. Such an order leaves the broker with the discretion when to 
execute it. Market-not-held orders are common when a trader wants a broker to 
shape the trading strategy. They are also common for larger orders, where the broker 
is given significant discretion over when to execute the order in order to minimise 
the market impact. Originally more common in floor trading markets, where the 
floor trader possesses unrivalled knowledge about the market, market-not-held 
orders are also increasingly common with brokers running electronic order desks 
that use elaborate econometric models formulating order submission strategies. 
2.2 Market  structures 
The significance of market structure is aptly described by Harris (2002), p. 89: 
Market structure is extremely important because it determines what people 
can know and do in a market. Since power comes from knowledge and the 
ability to act on it, market structure helps determine power relations among 
various types of traders. These relationships greatly affect who will trade 
profitably. 
The market structure is made up of the rules and institutions that determine competition 
between trading platforms. It includes the design of the trading system and the means by 
which systems interact with each other and with their participants.
10 The market 
structure shapes traders’ order execution strategies. As indicated from the quote above, 
market structure not only shapes trading strategies, but also determines whether markets 
will be liquid, whether prices will be informative and, crucially, who will trade 
profitably. Market structures can be categorised according to how they organise trading 
sessions. Two main approaches exist: continuous markets, where orders are processed 
as they are registered, and call markets, where orders are executed at a particular time 
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when all market participants are called. A market can also be categorised according to 
what type of trading forum it uses for traders to meet, e.g. floor or via distributed access 
points. Yet another way of looking at market structures is according to their type of 
execution system. Some markets are quote-driven, i.e. market makers’ or dealers 
organise the trading, while others are order-driven, i.e. orders organise trading on the 
principle of first-come-first-served. Yet another form of execution system is the 
brokered trading system, where brokers match buyers and sellers. This section will also 
delineate how market information is created and distributed from market to market and 
from markets to market participants.  
2.2.1 Market  sessions 
The time between which trades are arranged is called a trading session. Most markets 
have continuous sessions, i.e. traders can trade whenever the market is open. The other 
way is to allow trades only on certain occasions. In such call markets, traders only trade 
when the market is called. Call markets are more in use for certain instruments, e.g. 
government notes, bills or bonds. They are also often used for less liquid securities. 
Exchanges sometimes mix these two structures, with e.g. opening the trading day with 
call market auctions before switching to continuous trading. 
The advantage of continuous trading is flexibility. Continuous systems allow traders to 
arrange trades during the whole session, which is particularly useful for traders who 
desire immediate execution. The main advantage of a call market is that it focuses 
liquidity in an instrument at a particular time and place, hence increasing the probability 
of order execution.  
2.2.2  Trading forums  
Each market provides a forum where traders meet, but the form this forum can take 
varies. Some markets provide a forum where traders meet physically, i.e. a trading 
floor. Other markets instead provide access to the forum by other means, e.g. via 
telephone or electronically via screens. The Internet has increased the number of such 
access points towards infinity.  
2.2.3 Execution  type 
The key function of any trading market is to match buyers and sellers. The procedures 
for doing so define a market’s execution system. Two major execution systems exist: 
•  Quote-driven dealer markets. In quote-driven markets, dealers or market-makers set 
the parameters of order-matching. Buyers and sellers cannot arrange trades directly, 
but have to go via a dealer. The prices at which the dealer is ready to trade – price 
quotes – drive the market. Quote-driven markets are particularly common in bond 
and currency markets, but are also used by some stock exchanges.  
•  Order-driven markets. In order-driven markets, buyers and sellers trade directly 
with each other on the basis of rules that determine how traders may arrange trades, 
who trades with whom (first order has precedence) and how prices are determined. 
Orders, instead of dealer quotes, drive market prices. In the large majority of order-
driven markets, the price of a particular instrument is decided in an auction. This 
formalised way whereby buyers seek the lowest ask price and sellers seek the  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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highest bid price is called the price discovery process. Order-driven markets are 
common. Markets with electronic auctions or open-outcries are order-driven. 
In addition, a third type of market has emerged catering specifically for those trading 
needs that may not always be satisfied on either quote- or order-driven markets. In these 
so-called brokered markets, brokers perform the role of matching buyers and sellers. 
Brokers find liquidity by negotiating trades directly with liquidity suppliers. Some 
suppliers may for some reason be unwilling to go public with their trade intention and 
are only willing to trade if a broker presents them with an opportunity to trade. Others 
may sit on liquidity but have no active ambition to trade, but may be willing to do so if 
a good opportunity arises. The broker matches liquidity suppliers and takers. Brokered 
markets are particularly important when the traded item is unique or when a trader is 
unwilling to hold an inventory of the traded item. In securities markets, brokered 
markets enable the execution of larger block trades.  
Table 5. Different market types 
Market type  Classification  Who offers 
liquidity? 
Who arranges 
trades? 
How are 
buyers and 
sellers 
matched? 
Examples 
Dealer markets  Quote-driven Dealers  Dealers  Clients choose 
dealers 
OTC in e.g. 
currencies 
Order-
matching 
systems 
Order-driven  Traders (limit 
orders) 
Brokerages or 
exchanges 
Trading rules  Electronic 
exchanges and 
automated 
brokerage 
systems 
Brokered 
markets 
Brokered  Public traders  Brokers  Brokers  Block trading 
Source: Harris (2002), p. 96. 
2.2.4  The organisation of an exchange
11 
In sum, an exchange has two essential characteristics. It provides a trading system that 
delivers regular price discovery, order routing and execution of securities, derivatives 
and commodities products. It also provides some form of open membership with 
members being asked to abide by certain rules. 
An exchange makes its revenues from a number of sources: fees earned on transactions, 
price information services and membership. Many exchanges also act as a listing 
authority while some have consulting arms and make considerable income from 
training. Clearing and settlement are not necessarily an essential part of an exchange, 
but are still strongly integrated in the business structure. Most European exchanges 
generate the largest share of their income through transaction fees, followed by services 
(such as clearing and settlement, membership fees and data dissemination) and listing. 
Trading is also the main source of revenue for the US exchanges, but this is followed by 
listing and services in second and third place, respectively. 
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Table 6. Exchange revenues by source, 1998 
 Europe  North  America 
Listing fees 
Transaction fees 
Services 
Other 
19.3% 
45.1% 
24.4% 
11.2% 
32.1% 
39.7% 
22.6% 
5.7% 
Source: Di Noia in Lannoo (2001) based upon data from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE, formerly FIBV). 
 
2.2.5 Market  information 
To quote again from Harris (2002), p. 101: 
Generally, those who know the least about market conditions most favour 
transparency. Those who know the most oppose transparency because they 
do not want to give up their informational advantages. 
Order information has to be transmitted from traders to either dealers, brokers or 
directly to the trading system. Order-routing systems link such actors together and must 
therefore be fast and accurate. They set the limit for trading strategies. While electronic 
routing systems are generally faster, more accurate and cheaper, they also have the 
disadvantage of only being able to carry out pre-programmed standard orders and 
transactions.  
Order-presentation systems submit orders to those who arrange trades (broker, dealer, 
exchange). Some trading systems use screens to present orders, while others may use 
boards (a big board where all orders are presented) or oral auctions (specialists shouting 
out bids and offers).  
The market information produced above is important to traders, as it determines when 
and how they will trade. Access to market information is therefore important to ensure 
that trades are carried out at a profit. As a result, market information is valuable, as 
evidenced by the revenue that many markets make from selling information. It is easy 
for electronic trading systems to collect information, as it has been recorded on the 
system when the trades were carried out. Non-electronic systems, such as floor-based 
trading systems, instead have to collect and consolidate market information afterwards. 
Market information is distributed to members and the wider public in a raw format. 
Members often receive more information than the public. In addition, they may receive 
it faster (e.g. in real-time). Disseminating information has given rise to a whole industry 
of broadcast services that publish information in real-time (orders, quotes) to the wider 
public. Data vendors sell market information that has been repackaged and made more 
user-friendly to the public. Moreover, some companies have specialised in providing 
not only information from different venues but also offer order-handling and routing 
systems that enables brokers to view, analyse and access a wide range of venues, hence 
executing both internal and external orders.
12  
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Table 7. Examples of market transparency 
Market  Current quotes  Trade reports 
NYSE  Best bid and offer immediately. No other 
prices or quantities 
All trades immediately and in no 
event later than 90 seconds. 
Nasdaq  All dealer quotes immediately  All trades immediately and in no 
event later than 90 seconds 
Foreign exchange 
markets 
Provided by data vendors  None 
Deutsche Börse  All displayed order size, aggregated by 
price for continuous markets, less 
information for single price auctions 
All Xetra trades immediately, 
very large privately negotiated 
trades may never be reported 
Euronext Paris  All orders (although iceberg facility)  All trades immediately (delayed 
reporting for larger trades) 
LSE  All dealer quotes in SEAQ equity, best bid 
and offer in SETS equity 
All small trades immediately, 
larger trade reports are delayed 
Source: Based on Harris (2002), p. 102. 
Some markets release more information, or in other words, are more transparent than 
others. Some release information of orders and quotes, i.e. they release pre-trade 
information. Others only release post-trade information, i.e. concluded trades and 
prices. Moreover, markets may choose to publish only the top of the order book (best 
bids and offers) while others open the whole order book. While most traders want to see 
the order book, or more particularly any unfilled orders in it, they are generally reluctant 
to see their own orders publicly exposed.  
2.3  Benefits to society of well functioning securities markets 
Well functioning securities markets provide benefits not only to traders but to society as 
a whole. The field of research that tries to measure the wealth effects of good markets is 
welfare economics. While a full recapitulation of the literature on the welfare effects of 
securities markets is beyond the scope of this paper, it may still be useful to have a 
general picture of how securities markets may be beneficial. The two main benefits to 
society from well functioning securities markets are informative prices and liquid 
markets.  
2.3.1 Informative  prices 
As mentioned above, one of the core functions of financial markets is that they help 
coordinate decentralised decision-making in the economy. Local decision-making is one 
of the cornerstones of market economies. Decentralised decision-making is only 
possible, however, if prices are informative about the real value of an asset. While a 
perfect measure of the fundamental value is impossible, in good securities markets, 
prices at least offer a good reflection of a traded instrument’s fundamental value. 
Informative prices are a prerequisite for a good allocation of resources in a society. 
2.3.2 Liquid  markets 
As mentioned above, traders trade for a variety of reasons, e.g. to hedge or share risks, 
obtain necessary assets or transfer wealth through time. Traders benefit from well 
functioning, liquid markets that enable them to achieve these goals. Society at large also  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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benefits from liquid markets. Traders who have been able to hedge their risks, get hold 
of necessary assets or transfer wealth through time generally conduct their businesses 
more efficiently. As a result, to cut a long story short, liquid markets enable 
specialisation among producers and provide for a well functioning allocation of 
economic resources. Society as a whole benefits from these efficiency gains in the form 
of prices.  
2.3.3  The positive effects of integrated securities markets in Europe 
There have been many attempts to measure the positive effects of well functioning 
markets. Of particular interest in the field of this study are the potential effects of well 
functioning European securities markets. Apart from increasing the efficiency gains 
resulting from liquid markets with informative prices, integrated European financial 
markets generate some additional advantages, notably increasing potential for portfolio 
diversification and higher economies of scale and scope. Financial integration reduces 
the risks that retail investors face. It also decreases the costs of intermediation, by 
opening up previously segmented national markets to competition and by enabling 
institutions to respond by seeking economies of scale and scope. Finally, the reduction 
of risk and lower costs of intermediation have dynamic effects on capital creation, 
which in its turn boosts overall economic growth.  
Measuring the extent of these gains is a politically popular approach, but one that is 
fraught with methodological pitfalls. A recent study contracted by the European 
Commission estimated that the dismantlement of all obstacles to a fully integrated 
European equity market would in the long run raise the EU’s real GDP level by 1.1% 
(€130 billion in 2002 prices).
13 This GDP increase results from a reduction in the cost of 
equity capital, bond and bank finance. The Commission claims that this figure is 
conservative as it only takes into account static effects of financial market integration 
and not dynamic gains, which are likely to be higher. However, considering the 
methodological problems (e.g. critical assumptions and econometric models used) of 
measuring the gains from market integration, the size of these gains is purely indicative. 
More important to note is that the gains are likely to be economically significant.  
3.  Forces shaping the structure of markets 
The increasing pace of advances in technology has increased the contestability of 
securities markets and has led to changes in their structure. Nevertheless, strong 
countervailing forces in the form of positive network externalities provide incumbent 
operators with a significant protection against any new entrants.  
3.1 Network  externalities 
Most observers stress the inherent limits to effective competition in securities markets. 
The reason is that there are strong forces working in favour of trading being carried out 
in a limited number of venues. Hence, even with the proliferation of trading venues, it 
would be unrealistic to expect a radical overhaul of securities markets in the near future, 
as there are a number of factors mitigating rapid change.  
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The reason why securities markets are likely to remain centralised is that securities 
markets are characterised by positive network externalities.
14 These are two-fold: first, 
benefits to market participants increase with the number of locations from which the 
system can be accessed, and second, the utility of a network to its users increases with 
the amount of others using it as well, as orders provide liquidity to one another.
15 In 
other words, order-flow attracts more order-flow, or “liquidity begets liquidity”.
16 In 
that sense, networks exhibit economies of scale. The reason is that liquidity is a function 
of how easily sell orders are matched with buy orders and vice versa. The potential for 
order-matching increases with the number of traders and the volume of trades they 
generate on any trading system. The network benefits are not limited to improved 
market liquidity, however. Another associated benefit that depends on positive network 
externalities is informative prices: the more traders using a particular system, the more 
informative are prices.  
Another characteristic of these externalities is that networks are self-reinforcing.
17 Once 
a network has achieved a critical mass, i.e. a minimal number of users, it tends to stand 
strong against any potential competitor, as these would have to reach a similar scale in 
order to offer a similar quality of service. This provides history with an important role: 
incumbent networks, once in place, are not easily dethroned. Historical accidents may 
well lead to lock-in effects: i.e. even though newer trading venues may offer better 
technology, and in the long run potentially lower trading costs, network externalities 
protect the incumbent. 
Network externalities also exert a moderating influence on forces of fragmentation, as 
only few operators will be able to achieve a critical mass of liquidity. In addition, even 
if a new entrant manages to capture a share of the market thanks to new technology and 
lower trading costs, its success is likely to lead to competitors adopting similar cost-
reducing technologies. Moreover, as illustrated above, increasing contestability is likely 
to lead to mergers and alliances, as operators try to establish the pre-eminence of their 
trading model (i.e. highest liquidity).
18 Accordingly, the structure of securities markets 
is likely to be oligopolistic or even monopolistic.
19 This could be beneficial according to 
the network literature, as a monopoly maximises the network externalities. In order to 
achieve this structure, however, policy intervention may be needed to coordinate the 
behaviour of private actors. 
Empirical tests indicate that network externalities and scale economies do not apply 
equally across financial markets or securities markets. For example, there appears to be 
limited benefits from networks in banking. Generally, empirical studies have found that 
some functions are more centripetal, i.e. they exhibit more network externalities and 
economies of scale, and hence are more susceptible to a centralised market structure. 
Other functions are more centrifugal, i.e. they feature less externalities and scale 
advantages. The reason for the latter has been found to be related to different sources of 
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friction (e.g. market access costs or importance of local information). For these 
functions, the relevance of geography persists.
20  
Generally, it is often claimed that payment and settlement systems as well as currency 
trading exhibit network externalities and scale economies. In the case of securities 
trading, research has found that the significance of externalities and scale depends on 
the function. Trade processing exhibit strong externalities and scale while company 
listing, regulation, supervision and monitoring the maintenance of the marketplace 
exhibit less externality and scale benefits.
21 It has also been found that the significance 
of these effects depend on various factors, e.g. regulation (more harmonised regulation 
provide more scope for exploiting externalities and scale), spending (exchanges that 
spend more on human capital and technology benefit more from externalities) and size 
(larger exchanges benefit more from a strategy of pursuing scale).
22  
In sum, while advances in technology have made securities markets more contestable, 
the lasting impact on market structures is uncertain, as inherent network effects and 
first-mover advantages mitigate the fragmentary competitive forces. These network 
effects imply the existence of strong centralising or centripetal forces at work in the 
structure of securities markets. 
3.2  An increasing pace of innovation 
The forces shaping financial markets in general, including securities markets, have 
changed dramatically during the last decades. As a result, the pace of change or 
innovation (new ways of doing things) has increased. One reason for this higher 
innovative pace is a more permissive policy climate, where financial markets have 
become deregulated and liberalised. Another reason is a changing economic context. 
Prior to the 1970s, the post-war period was characterised by macroeconomic stability 
(e.g. stable exchange rates, low inflation and stable growth). However, following the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the world economy has become significantly 
more volatile and hence more risky. This has increased demands for financial products 
to shelter and manage these risks.
23  
Although these general factors of context are certainly important as explanatory factors 
behind the rapid changes to securities trading since the 1970s, it is certainly 
technological changes that have had the most direct impact. Advances in technology 
have affected the capabilities and reach of traders and the amount of services provided 
by market centres. This has led to fundamental changes in market structure. 
Data processing and telecommunications have become more powerful and less costly, 
which has allowed financial institutions to amass more data and better assess risks – 
thereby enabling them to design new products and services. For example, transactions 
have become dematerialised, which has led to an exponential growth in trading 
volumes. Moreover, new communications technologies have enabled traders to reach 
more markets. Market data reporting systems have provided instantaneous information 
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about trading conditions elsewhere, and new order-routing systems have provided 
traders with the ability to act on that information. Moreover, new computing 
technologies have in their turn allowed markets to set up more sophisticated trading 
systems, for example, by providing order-matching based on complex algorithms. This 
has increased the efficiency of traders, who with these new trading tools can solve 
previously intractable trading problems.
24 Automated systems have also enabled trading 
services to be expanded to a wider set of securitised products, e.g. agricultural 
commodities and electricity.
25 
As these technologies have become more prominent, their costs have decreased. For 
example, the costs of developing and operating trading systems have decreased 
substantially, as has the cost of delivering trading services to customers and 
constructing computer networks capable of cross-border trading. Following this steep 
decline in costs, physical location has become less important. In short, technology has 
linked markets together and has expanded the reach of traders.  
New technology at lower costs has provided exchanges with novel opportunities. The 
diffusion of this new technology has enabled exchanges to pull themselves up to a 
higher production curve.
26 Overall, research findings suggest that those exchanges that 
have invested in trading technology (e.g. automated trading systems) have been able to 
provide a wider range of services more efficiently and at a lower cost.
27 
Another associated benefit of the lower cost of trading technology is that barriers to 
entry have decreased. This has contributed an increased contestability of markets.
28 
There are substantial benefits associated with this increased competition: 
•  Price decrease. Increased competition between exchanges and intermediaries should 
lead to a decrease in commissions and fees. Competition therefore reduces the 
potential rents earned by central markets and thus leads to a wider profit-sharing.  
•  Improved services. With the advent of more intermediaries, specialisation and 
catering for different investor needs have developed. Moreover, the competitive 
threat is likely to lead to more customer- (investor-) friendly behaviour.  
•  Innovation. A competitive system is more likely to adapt to the ever-increasing 
pace of financial innovation. Indeed, the dynamics of financial innovation appear to 
confirm the picture that the competitive advantage of launching a new service based 
on new technology, while giving ground for some first-mover advantage, is rapidly 
decreased, as other firms adopt the technology in question and start offering similar 
services. 
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Steil et al. (2002); and Davis & Steil (2001). 
26 Schmiedel (2002). 
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3.3  The network paradox – Forces of fragmentation  
Despite strong network externalities, markets are in practice often fragmented and they 
may remain so for long periods of time.
29 Overall, the extent of fragmentation depends 
on several factors. First, the size of the market determines whether there is enough 
liquidity to sustain several marketplaces. Second, the extent of fragmentation also 
depends on how efficient the incumbent operator is compared to new entrants. Third, 
and more generally, the business models of major trading venues and intermediaries 
also affect the level of fragmentation. Finally, regulation may also have an impact, 
either to facilitate or to constrain competition.
30 
3.3.1  Catering for the different needs of traders 
One reason may be that a fragmented marketplace with different competing structures is 
necessary in order to satisfy the various needs of traders. Traders have different needs 
and they differ in many respects:
31 
•  Difference in size. Traders trade different sizes. Some trade large sizes, others trade 
small. Large traders are often reluctant to reveal their intentions or trading plans. If 
they do so, they will find it more difficult to carry out their trades at reasonable 
prices, as other traders are aware of the extent of their need to trade. Therefore, large 
traders often prefer market structures that minimise the information they need to 
provide. Small traders on the other hand may well prefer to expose their trading 
intentions, as this enables them to fill their orders more easily. Accordingly, on 
balance they are likely to prefer transparent market structures. 
•  Asymmetric information. Traders also differ in the amount of information they 
possess. Generally, no one wants to trade with informed traders, as these traders 
possess information that will give them the upper hand when carrying out their 
trades. Informed traders therefore prefer anonymous consolidated markets, where 
their identity is easier to conceal. Uninformed traders, on the other hand, prefer 
structures where they can clearly identify who they are trading with. 
•  Different degrees of patience. Some traders prefer speedy execution over best price. 
As a result, impatient traders are ready to pay (spread plus commission) for the 
certainty that their trades are executed. Impatient traders therefore prefer structures 
where liquidity is readily available at short notice. This is for example the case in 
quote-driven dealer markets or brokered markets. Patient traders, on the other hand, 
care more about costs. They are ready to wait until market conditions ameliorate 
before executing their trades. Patient traders as a result often use limit orders and 
tend to prefer consolidated order-driven systems with time precedence (i.e. the first 
posted order is the first to be executed once the price limit has been met).  
•  Difference in access. Traditionally, the members of an exchange have privileged 
access to the information and trading opportunities. Other traders are confined to 
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trading via members. This has proved to be an important driver behind the 
development of disintermediated market structures.  
Some market structures are better adapted to handle some problems than others and, 
accordingly, one single market structure is therefore unable to satisfy all traders. All in 
all, the plenitude of traders and their different needs implies that there is an inherent 
need for diversity.  
3.3.2  The quest for dominating the transaction chain 
Another source of fragmentation is the change to business incentives of major market 
actors. Thanks to technology, the start-up costs of various lines of trading business have 
decreased, and thanks to deregulation and liberalisation, actors have been able to 
venture into previously unchartered areas of business. This has had the effect that the 
previously clear lines between different sorts of service providers have been blurred. 
For example, brokers have not only entered the dealer business but are also increasingly 
providing trading services. 
The result is that actors try to dominate larger parts of the value chain depicted above 
and hence capture new sources of profits. In some lines of business, the investment 
costs of maintaining a competitive offering remain prohibitive for all but the largest 
actors (e.g. global custody services where a very concentrated market structure is 
emerging). Nevertheless, the ambition of intermediaries to capture at least part of the 
profits emanating from order execution implies a new source of fragmentation. 
4.  The European Market Structure 
The impact of technological advances differs across the Atlantic, with the EU and the 
US following different trajectories on different time-paths. The impact of technology 
and automation can be observed along two paths: i) its impact on the trading model of 
the incumbent operators, and ii) the arrival of new market entrants. 
4.1 Central  markets 
Ever since the arrival of stock exchanges in the 17
th century, the degree of competition 
has moved in cycles.
32 Until 1985, European equity markets worked along lines laid out 
in the 19
th century. Stock exchanges were closed “clubs” with high barriers to entry for 
potential entrants. Most of continental Europe’s exchanges were call auctions, where 
publicly licensed single-capacity
33 intermediaries transmitted their customers’ orders, 
receiving a fixed commission for their arduous task. In London, “jobbers” who acted on 
orders from single-capacity brokers managed the trading, with commissions fixed by the 
exchange’s members. The exchanges operated in isolation from each other, more or less 
                                                 
32 For historical accounts see Lee (2002b and 1998). The earliest account is probably “Confusion de 
Confusiones” by Joseph de la Vega (1688), who explains the workings of the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, founded in 1602. 
33 The intermediary has to chose between trading on behalf of clients (agent) or on own account 
(principal). See Pagano (1997) for further details.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
 24 
like monopolies, protected partly by national regulations and capital restrictions, partly 
by natural barriers to competition (technology costs).
34  
Based on network externalities and scale economies elaborated upon above, exchanges 
have since the mid-1980s tried to attract more orders and hence boost liquidity. In 
Europe that process has taken four forms: i) international competition for liquidity in 
blue-chip shares, which spurred an evolution in trading systems in order to minimise 
costs, ii) an expansion in the range of services and products provided to customers, iii) 
changes to rules governing exchanges, in order to more vigorously pursue cost 
advantages, and iv) cooperation with other exchanges in order to tap other liquidity 
pools. 
4.1.1 Exchange  competition 
In the new environment of liberalised international capital flows, London’s 1986 “big 
bang” and introduction of a screen-based trading system (SEAQ, SEAQ-I) set off a 
decade of competitive reform based partly on regulatory advantages, partly on 
innovative use of new technologies. 
The SEAQ’s greater immediacy and market depth enabled the London Stock Exchange 
to capture a large share of turnover in continental European equities. The success of the 
LSE pushed continental exchanges to respond. Emerging from individual responses 
(Paris Bourse, German exchanges, Amsterdam) was a continental trading model with 
higher levels of electronic automation. This actually reversed the position, with a 
number of continental exchanges capturing turnover from London in specific markets 
(e.g. DTB grabbing the dominant share of trading in bund future contracts from LIFFE).  
Following this general pattern of competitive reform – first-mover advantage, 
technology adaptation and arbitrage – nearly all European exchanges have today 
converged towards a trading system design based on automated, electronic, continuous 
limit-order auction markets (see Table 8). The process of convergence has been far-
reaching in terms of the more precise rules governing these systems. European 
exchanges’ rules on tick and lot sizes, as well as approaches to excessive price 
fluctuations and short selling are quite similar (see Table 9). 
Table 8. Major global trading systems 
Exchange Trading  system  Type 
Deutsche Börse  Xetra + floor trading  Order-driven  
Euronext Paris  NSC  Order-driven 
London Stock Exchange  SETS etc.   Order-driven, quote-driven 
Swiss Exchange  SWX  Order-driven 
NYSE Floor  trading  Quote-driven 
Nasdaq Montage Quote-driven 
Tokyo Stock Exchange  CORES  Order-driven 
Source: Birinyi Associates (2002), p. 19. 
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Table 9. Electronic trading systems in Europe 
Market  System  Tick size  Lot size  Price limits  Short selling 
Athens Stock Exchange  OASIS  Varies by share price  10  12% daily change  Stock lending 
restricted 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange  SAXESS  Varies by share price  Variable  None  No restrictions 
Deutsche Börse  Xetra  €0.01  Variable  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Euronext Amsterdam  NSC  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Euronext Brussels  NSC  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Euronext Lisbon  LIST  €0.01  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Euronext Paris  NSC  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
HEX  HETI  €0.01  Variable  15% daily change  No restrictions 
Irish Stock Exchange  Xetra  €0.01  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Borsa Italiana  MTA  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
London Stock Exchange   SETS  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Bolsa de Madrid  SIBE  Varies by share price  One share  Static and dynamic 
limits 
No restrictions 
Oslo Børs  ASTS  Varies by share price  Variable  Variable daily 
limits 
Up-tick rule, 
covered shorts 
only 
Stockholmsbörsen  SAXESS  SEK 0.01  Variable  None  No restrictions 
Swiss Exchange  SWX  Varies by share price  One share  2% dynamic limit  No restrictions 
Wiener Börse  Xetra  €0.01  One share  None  No restrictions 
Source: Birinyi Associates (2002), p. 21. 
In yet a third aspect, exchanges have reacted more or less the same faced with a 
common challenge. Thanks to technology, exchanges face more competition from non-
exchange trading venues. Broker-dealers, for example, no longer execute all their trades 
on an exchange. One of the reasons why they do not is that an exchange’s public 
environment (exchanges and law often require that orders posted on an exchange are 
made public) is particularly ill-suited for certain transactions (e.g. large transactions). 
Instead of using an exchange, such traders increasingly have sought other less 
transparent trading venues. In order to encourage brokers to continue to post larger 
orders, exchanges have increasingly allowed exceptions to reporting requirements for 
larger trades. 
All in all, these changes have enabled significant cuts to trading costs. The difference 
between bid and ask prices (spread) on exchanges have decreased considerably since 
1994. In terms of the bid-ask spread as a percentage of the bid price, there are major 
differences between markets. Overall, spreads have fallen substantially since 1994, with 
the average spread in 2002 being 0.61% (see Birinyi Associates, 2002). Although there 
are considerable methodological differences in calculating spreads, and hence different 
studies posting widely different results, e.g. in terms of ranking different venues, the 
general trend of falling spreads is beyond doubt.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Box 1. Equity trading in London 
Not only does the size of London’s financial centre make it stand apart from other European centres, but 
the equity trading market structure is more diverse compared to many other centres. The City of London 
hosts a range of venues where securities trading takes place, both on and off central exchange trading 
systems.  
Central order execution 
The dominant trading venue for equities is the London Stock Exchange (LSE), founded in 1801. The LSE 
runs several markets, divided into domestic and international markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All orders posted on the SETS order book are immediately seen by all exchange members and data 
subscribers. On the SEAQ platform, all market makers are obliged to post firm two-way quotes, hence 
binding them to trade at those conditions with all exchange member firms. As for post-trade reporting, all 
SETS order book, automatic and auction trades are automatically reported immediately. Trades carried 
out off the order book are reported within three minutes and are published immediately by the LSE. 
Delayed publication is allowed for larger blocks.  
However, equity trading is not limited to the LSE. Virt-x, formed by the 2001 merger between the Swiss 
Exchange (SWX) and Tradepoint, attracts a limited amount of liquidity, primarily in Swiss blue-chip 
stocks. 
Internalisation 
It is estimated that 65% of the trading volume in FTSE 100 securities currently goes through SETS. The 
remaining volume is primarily wholesale business taking place away from the Exchange’s central trading 
system, e.g. trading in larger-sized blocks of shares between institutional investors. However, it also 
includes retail order flow executed by negotiation between agency stockbrokers and larger broker-dealers. 
These, despite not falling in any special regulatory category, go under the unofficial name of Retail 
Service Providers (RSPs). Having originated some time ago, the four largest are currently Merrill Lynch, 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Winterflood Securities and Credit Suisse. All are member firms of the 
LSE, active traders on the SETS order book and recognised market-makers in SEAQ securities.  
 
Market Type  Description 
SETS  Order-driven  Started in 1997, the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service is the central limit 
order book of the LSE where the 218 most liquid stocks are traded. It consists of 
SET1 (FTSE100), SET2 (77 liquid FTSE250 stocks), SET3 (stocks either priced in 
euros or stocks previously in 1 or 2) and exchange-traded funds. On SETS, trading 
is continuous over the day, but starts and closes with auctions.  
SEAQ  Quote-driven  The Stock Exchange Automated Quotations system for UK securities is a quote-
driven market-maker system. With the launch of SEAQ in 1986, trading away from 
physical stock exchange floors emerged in Europe, thereby starting the process of 
competition between exchanges in Europe. SEAQ today consists of around 1,500 
stocks. 
SEATS Plus  Hybrid  SEATS is the hybrid market for those equities whose turnover is insufficient for 
either SEAQ’s market-making system or SETS’ order book. It consists of 138 
smaller shares. 
IRS  Order-driven  The International Retail Service is made up of 110 listed and unlisted international 
securities. 
SEAQI  Quote-driven  Same as SEAQ but for international stocks. Managed to attract a significant amount 
of trading volume in European blue chips at its inception in 1986. Today trades 57 
stocks. 
IOB  Order-driven  The International Order Book handles the most liquid SEAQI stocks. 
AIM Quote-driven 
and hybrid 
The market for new or smaller companies. The Alternative Investment Market 
currently consists of 700 stocks. 
Covered warrants  Order-driven  Currently consisting of 163 warrants.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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RSPs typically conclude private contracts with brokers and set up a proprietary infrastructure, which links 
the RSPs with a network of brokers. The RSPs agree to stand ready to trade retail-sized orders and 
brokers agree to route orders to them, subject to certain qualifications. As a result, these brokers have 
traditionally polled their RSP rather than the LSE when checking for prices. Equipped with in-house 
trading systems based on algorithms, RSPs are able to match central prices and, if their inventory 
positions so permit and the client’s buying power makes it commercially interesting, they provide price 
improvement.  
From the LSE’s perspective, trades concluded between RSPs and brokers are regarded as trades 
concluded bilaterally between member firms. Accordingly, the relationship is the same as between two 
member firms trading in large blocks between each other. Trades executed via RSPs are subject to the 
LSE’s reporting and settlement rules, but not specific trading rules. Notably, RSPs are not subject to the 
market-maker rules that subject institutions making markets to provide firm two-way quotes to all 
exchange member firms. As a result, RSPs are entitled to refuse to trade. Nor do pre-trade transparency 
rules apply to RSPs. Instead, RSPs provide quotes on request to those participants with whom they have a 
relationship. In sum, RSPs act as quasi-market makers but without the regulatory obligations.  
RSPs are popular with retail brokers. Apart from often providing price improvement, they also offer 
immediate execution (although retain the right of refusing to trade) and a possibility to avoid certain 
exchange-related costs. For example, retail investors may be less willing to pay for the anonymity that the 
newly introduced central counterparty (CCP) service provides. However, the general argumentation about 
the fears of fragmentation and internalisation applies to RSPs as well. There is a risk that the RSP will 
“warehouse” client orders, i.e. sit on them until a price that is sufficiently interesting for the intermediary 
materialises. Moreover, it may fragment liquidity, resulting in less informative central prices. Finally, the 
lack of obligation to quote makes it difficult for investors to assess their execution quality. 
Overall, trades executed off-SETS are generally either small or very large while trades executed on the 
central book in a majority of cases fall in the middle range. This suggests that, in the London market, 
broker-dealers execute both small and very large trades off the exchange, with dealers then managing 
their inventory positions by trading average-size trades on the central order book. 
Sources: Interview with the London Stock Exchange and Davies et al. (forthcoming).  
 
Table 10. Block-trading in Europe 
Market  Block-trade execution  Reporting provisions  “Hidden-size” order 
available 
Athens Stock Exchange  Off or on-market  No special provisions  No 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange  Off or on-market  No special provisions  No 
Deutsche Börse  Special facility (Xetra XXL)  XXL auction every 30 minutes  Yes 
Euronext   Off or on-market  Immediate reporting if 
counterpart not a member, if 
member delayed reporting 
depending on size of block. 
Yes 
HEX  Off or on-market  15 minutes  No 
Irish Stock Exchange  Off or on-market  Up to four days  Yes 
Borsa Italiana  Off or on-market  30 minutes  Yes 
London Stock Exchange   Off or on-market  End of day  No 
Bolsa de Madrid  Special facility (“block 
market”) 
No special provisions  Yes 
Oslo Børs  Off or on-market  No special provisions  Yes 
Stockholmsbörsen  Off or on-market  No special provisions  No 
Swiss Exchange  Off or on-market  Up to two days  Yes 
Wiener Börse  Off or on-market  No special provisions  Yes 
Source: Birinyi Associates (2002), p. 21.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Figure 4. Average bid-ask spreads, 1994 and 2002  
(Spreads as a percentage of bid price) 
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Source: Birinyi Associates (2002), p. 27. 
4.1.2  Broadening the range of services and products 
Another effect of the competition between exchanges has been the attempt to broaden 
service and product offerings of different venues. For example, following the US lead 
(Nasdaq), many European exchanges introduced growth stock markets in the 1990s (e.g. 
AIM at the LSE, Neuer Markt of Deutsche Börse and Nouveau Marché in Paris).
35 
A more recent example is the introduction of central counterparty services (CCP). 
Although falling within the post-trade part of the trading chain, exchanges have been 
instrumental in pushing for more efficient clearing of trades. Clearing is the process that 
occurs between trading and settlement and involves the balancing of positions between 
the different parties to establish agreement on what each party is due, prior to the 
establishment of final positions for settlement. A clearinghouse can act as a CCP by 
being a legal counterparty to both sides of a securities market transaction. The 
clearinghouse hence becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. 
This process enables the CCP to net outstanding obligations of different actors which in 
turn vastly decreases the amount of transaction that has to be settled at the end of the 
day, especially if trading volumes are high. An exchange with a CCP service can hence 
offer a significantly more attractive trading offering. As securities markets have become 
larger and volumes have increased, the value of CCP services has become more 
pronounced. Moreover, following the advent of anonymous electronic trading books, 
the need to handle counterparty risks has increased. For example, some larger brokers 
have not been prepared to deal indiscriminately with other brokers, due to these 
perceived risks. Hence, CCP services have now started to be provided in Europe with 
the LSE, Euronext and Deutsche Börse all accessing them.
36 
 
 
                                                 
35 Clearstream International (2002). 
36 For further information on developments in the clearing and settlement part of the transaction chain, see 
Lannoo & Levin (2001).  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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Box 2. Cross-border integration – The case of Euronext 
In September 2000, the exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris merged to form Euronext N.V., a 
holding company incorporated under Dutch law. Euronext expanded in 2002 with the acquisition of 
LIFFE, a London-based derivatives exchange and the merger with the Portuguese exchange BVLP. For 
regulatory reasons, the five entities continue to exist. Together, the cash markets offer local entry points 
to the Euronext List, consisting of all securities listed in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Euronext cash markets 
Euronext Amsterdam Euronext Brussels Euronext Lisbon Euronext Paris
Premier Marché
Second Marché
Nouveau Marché
Mercado de cotaçoes
oficiais
Segundo mercado
Novo mercado
Premier marché
Second marché
Nouveau marché
Officiële Markt
NM Amsterdam
Euronext List
 
Once the merger has been completed, the aim of Euronext is to provide a single trading platform for 
equities (NSC) and derivatives (LIFFE-CONNECT), a single orderbook for each security, a single 
clearinghouse and a unified settlement system. Currently, Euronext, with the exception of Lisbon which is 
to be integrated during 2003, offers a single trading platform for cash products (i.e. stocks, bonds, 
exchange-traded funds and warrants) as well as a single clearing platform via its subsidiary Clearnet (with 
the exception of the London derivatives market).  
Authorisation to deal on Euronext is granted by the Belgian, Dutch, French and Portuguese regulators for 
their respective entry points. Likewise, the requirements on issuers depend on which entry point they 
choose, with listing criteria depending on the different markets depicted above.  
While keeping the previous segments and indices (e.g. AEX, BEL20 and CAC40) of the participating 
markets, Euronext has developed new features aimed at capturing the more pan-European nature of the 
merged entities. Two indices – Euronext 100 (100 largest companies) and Next 150 (strangely, next 150 
companies) – and two segments – NextPrime (companies in traditional sectors) and NextExonomy 
(technology companies) – have accordingly been created. In addition, Euronext contains other market 
components, e.g. NextTrack (exchange-traded funds) and NextWarrants. Euronext also organises three 
non-regulated markets: the Brussels Public Auction Market (securities and debt securities not admitted to 
Euronext Brussels), the Lisbon Mercado Sem Cotaçoes (for companies not meeting a regulated market’s 
listing requirements) and the Marché Libre in Paris (companies that are either too small or too new to be 
listed on a regulated market).  
Trading on the unified platform is continuous for the most liquid securities or traded at call auctions twice 
a day for the less liquid. Orders receive priority depending on 1) price and 2) time of entry. The trading 
day starts and closes with auctions.  
Source: Euronext (2003). Euronext: organization and procedures 
(http://www.euronext.com/extra/pdf/euronext_organisation_12_2002_en.pdf).  
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4.1.3  Changes to governance structures 
The increased scope for competition has also led to fundamental changes in the way that 
exchanges are governed. Traditionally user-owned utilities, most exchanges have 
become private for-profit publicly listed companies. Stockholm was a precursor in this 
respect, demutualised and privatised in 1993. Followed initially primarily by other 
Nordic exchanges, the larger ones followed suit at the beginning of the following 
decade (LSE in 2000, Deutsche Börse and Euronext in 2001).
37 The idea behind the 
move towards demutualisation is that for-profit companies are better adapted to 
operating in a more competitive landscape, where speed, flexibility and low costs are 
essential attributes for success. 
Table 11. Examples of demutualisation 
Exchange  Year 
Stockholm Stock Exchange  1993 
Helsinki Stock Exchange  1995 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange  1996 
Amsterdam Exchanges  1997 
Borsa Italiana  1998 
Athens Stock Exchange  1999 
London Stock Exchange  2000 
Euronext  2000 
Deutsche Börse  2001 
Source: Based in part on Domowitz & Steil in Davis & Steil (2001), p. 368, and updated. 
Box 3. Deutsche Börse Group 
Securities trading in Germany can be done on eight exchanges. The dominant trading service provider is 
by far the Deutsche Börse Group. It consists of Deutsche Börse AG and its subsidiaries Clearstream 
International (clearing and settlement), Deutsche Börse Systems AG, Entory AG (trading system 
development) and xlaunch AG. Deutsche Börse AG runs the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB) and 
controls 80% of Eurex, the derivatives exchange.  
Xetra is the fully electronic trading platform for the group’s cash markets. Launched in 1997, it is a 
central limit order book. Most of the shares on FWB as well as 2,000 warrants and certificates are traded 
on Xetra. Three-quarters of the total stock-exchange turnover in German equities goes through Xetra. The 
corresponding figure for shares on the DAX-index (the 30 most liquid stocks) is 95%. 
Deutsche Börse has several market segments. The Official Trading segment comprises roughly 530 
shares, including e.g. the DAX shares. This is the segment with the highest turnover. More than 130 
shares are admitted to the Regulated Market, where admission criteria are less strict. This is the segment 
of choice for medium-sized companies. The Regulated Unofficial Market has more lenient conditions for 
admission. It consists of 4,800 stocks and warrants. In 1997 the group set up Neuer Markt, one of 
Europe’s first markets dedicated to fledgling companies. After experiencing a spectacular rise in value, 
this market segment has been severely hit by the current market downturn. SMAX provides a forum for 
those companies that are traded on the Official Trading and Regulated Market that want to single 
themselves out. The group also runs XTF, a market for exchange-traded funds.  
Source: Deutsche Börse (2003). 
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4.1.4 Exchange  cooperation 
Exchanges have not only competed for listings, however. They have also engaged in 
closer cooperation with the aim of pooling liquidity and resources. This cooperation has 
taken primarily two forms:
38 
•  Mergers. In some cases, cooperation has taken the form of outright mergers where 
exchanges have joined forces to create a new entity. The purpose has been to 
directly achieve economies of scale by concentrating trading under one common 
trading system. Examples of this approach are Euronext N.V. 
•  Alliances. Alliances – often called implicit mergers in which participating members 
reach economies of scale by sharing trading platforms and/or trading systems – have 
been particularly common in Europe, e.g. between 1) nine exchanges in Germany, 
2) four exchanges in Spain, 3) three exchanges in Benelux, 4) four exchanges in the 
Nordic countries (Norex), 5) Deutsche Börse and the Vienna Stock Exchange and 6) 
between Eurex and the Helsinki Stock Exchange.
39 Some have limited themselves to 
common access systems (e.g. CME and LIFFE) while some are mere strategic 
alliances (e.g. OM Gruppen and NGX).
40 
Overall, linkages in all different forms between European exchanges have now become 
so common that the European exchange landscape has become quite complex, as fully 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
Some observers point out, however, that many of these agreements tend to run into 
difficulties when (if) implemented.
41 The problems may stem from the difficulty of 
creating credible contractual commitments between partners. Cooperation agreements 
are never neutral in the distribution of costs and benefits of the cooperation among the 
participating exchanges’ members and such political economy considerations often 
hamper cooperation on the ground. Even so, other observers have argued that Europe 
will in the short term remain largely confined to these less ambitious levels of 
integration. This could be justified as European financial markets remain different and 
fragmented due to e.g. different legislation, culture and language.
42  
Overall, recent research suggests that even the more modest forms of cooperation (i.e. 
alliances) may be successful. Hasan and Schmiedel find that a network strategy is 
significantly associated with better performance. Their findings suggest that by 
participating in alliances, exchanges improve liquidity, growth and efficiency while at 
the same time reducing transaction and operational costs.
43  
                                                 
38 Hasan & Schmiedel (2003). They also outline other forms of cooperation that fall somewhat between 
these two poles. Nasdaq, for example, has created branches with e.g. a European partner (Easdaq, which 
became NasdaqEurope). Using a common technology, the network of branches have enabled it to access 
regional markets while at the same time retaining regional characteristics.  
39 Hasan & Malkamäki (2000).  
40 Domowitz and Steil in Davis & Steil (2001).  
41 See Lee (2002b) who argues that only the more ambitious forms of cooperation, i.e. mergers or 
acquisitions, are likely to stand the test of time. 
42 Hasan & Malkamäki (2000). 
43 Hasan & Schmiedel (2003).  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Figure 5.  
 
Source: Federation of European Securities Exchanges (2003). 
4.2  Off-exchange order execution 
Advances in technology have also allowed actors to more systematically engage in new 
trading strategies and execution practices. For example, while large block trades have a 
long history of being negotiated and executed over-the-counter (OTC), advances in 
technology have made off-exchange execution cheaper and available to a wider 
audience and a wider set of instruments. Technology advances have enabled brokers to 
follow execution strategies that reduce some of the potential drawbacks of executing 
orders on a public central market. Such drawbacks are e.g. the signalling effect of 
publicly disclosing trade intention on a central market leading to a larger market impact. 
Traders are therefore looking for ways to achieve anonymity. A benign assessment of 
these new strategies considers the wider use of such strategies as novel ways of 
achieving a core functionality of securities markets, i.e. countering the impact of 
information asymmetries.
44 
In response to such drawbacks of executing certain orders on a central market, 
alternative execution practices have emerged. Intermediaries can send orders to 
alternative trading systems (ATSs) or electronic communication networks (ECNs). Or, 
they may internalise orders, i.e. filling their clients’ orders themselves. Instead of 
                                                 
44 See Crane et al. (1996).  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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automatically routing orders to the central market, intermediaries may “preference” 
orders, i.e. sending them to a preferred dealer in exchange for payment for order flow. 
Such payments can be both monetary and non-pecuniary. Intermediaries can also route 
the orders to a preferred trading venue or market-maker. There, the compensation often 
takes the form of a liquidity fee, which is paid when the limit order executes. Today 
intermediaries also often cross orders internally, i.e. they match and arrange trades 
among their clients. Or they can employ the services of a crossing network. These 
practices have one thing in common: orders are executed away from the central market 
(e.g. regulated markets). 
Overall, on the wholesale side off-exchange order execution has become quite common. 
Trades between institutional intermediaries (principal trades) have reached significant 
volumes, thereby adding a significant source of liquidity. So far, retail trades remain 
predominantly executed on exchanges. Most of the retail business also remains 
domestic. For example, it has been estimated that at least 60% of all equity trading 
remains purely domestic.
45  
4.2.1  ATSs and ECNs 
In the US, the process of increased competition has led to the emergence of new 
entrants rather than a competitive upgrade of the incumbents’ trading systems. The 
beginning of the 1990s saw the emergence of new entrant trading venues that offered 
direct access to trading, thus bypassing traditional broker-dealers. The fortune of these 
alternative venues were fuelled by the SEC forcing the NYSE to first limit the 
application of its concentration rule (“Rule 390”) and then in 1999 to dismantle it all 
together.  
These systems were originally labelled Proprietary Trading Systems (PTSs), as they 
were private companies offering trading services directly to institutional investors.
46 
They were in the large number of cases not regulated as exchanges, but as brokers. In 
1996, the SEC labelled them Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), containing a legal 
meaning with separate obligations compared to exchanges and brokers. Those ATSs 
trading on the Nasdaq were later given the term Electronic Communication Networks 
(ECNs). This term has since become the generic one, as most ATS trading takes place 
on the Nasdaq.
47 
ECNs are electronic automatic systems that offer services that the incumbent exchanges 
in the US has not been able to offer, such as speedier execution, anonymity, finer 
trading increments (i.e. lower tick size). ECNs also compete on the price side, as trading 
costs are potentially lower thanks to the elimination of intermediation. There is also 
significant competition between ECNs, via e.g. fee structure and services. Each ECN 
caters for the differing needs of different clients. In 2001, over 30% of share volume 
                                                 
45 Clearstream International (2002). 
46 This was a fairly controversial label, however, as “proprietary” gave negative connotations of private, 
for-profit and self-interested operators as compared to exchanges’ supposedly altruistic characteristics. 
See Domowitz & Lee (1998). 
47 For a discussion on the “alphabet soup” of new forms of trading intermediation, see Domowitz & Steil 
(2001).   M ATTIAS LEVIN 
 34 
(40% dollar volume) of Nasdaq was traded on ECNs. Overall, ECNs account for 3% of 
share volume in listed securities.
48  
Table 12. Percentage of Nasdaq share volume traded on ECNs 
ECN  Share (2001, %) 
Instinet 13.3 
Island 8.8 
REDIBook 4.1 
Archipelago 2.3 
B-Trade 1.8 
Brut 1.7 
Attain 0.2 
Nextrade 0.2 
Market XT  0.1 
GlobeNet 0.0 
Total 32.5 
  Source: Nasdaq (2002).  
ECNs have not reached a similar breakthrough in Europe. The rapid fall in the value of 
European equity markets since March 2000 may go some way towards explaining the 
lack of success for ECNs and ATSs in Europe, as it has significantly dented the ability 
of new trading intermediaries to capture any significant market share of equity trading.
49 
However, the fundamental reason is that the trading model chosen by the large majority 
of European central markets described above (automated electronic continuous auction) 
already offers most of the advantages of ECNs, e.g. anonymity, disintermediation, lower 
commissions and faster execution.
50 Therefore, pervasive network effects (see section 
3.1) and relatively competitive incumbent exchanges may explain why new entrants 
have found it so difficult to take off in Europe, despite the active participation of issuers 
(wanting to use ECNs to bypass exchanges and intermediaries), investors (buying ECNs 
in order to maintain influence and using ECNs to disintermediate exchanges) and 
intermediaries (buying or even becoming ECNs to remain in business).
51 
4.2.2  Preferencing and payment for order flow  
When routing orders to a preferred trading venue or market-maker, the venue or market-
maker may not be the one posting the best quotes. Instead, they have agreed in advance 
to execute the order at the best-quoted price.
52 To some extent preferencing may be 
natural, as brokers may for example for cost-saving reasons decide not to have links to 
all market-makers or trading venues. Preferencing may also be accompanied by 
compensatory payments. Payment for order flow originated in the US and increased 
                                                 
48 Barclay et al. (2002). 
49 E.g. Jiway and virt-x. However, for regulatory purposes both were authorised as regulated markets.  
50 Davis & Steil (2001) p. 428. 
51 Lee (2002a). 
52 Hansch et al. (1999) p. 1800.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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rapidly during the 1980s. It has been estimated that in the mid-1990s, 35% of small 
trades were being bought and diverted from the central markets.
53 Payments have arisen 
because trading venues, market-makers and brokers compete to obtain orders. Trading 
venues and market-makers try to induce brokers to route their orders to them. As 
brokers in their turn compete to obtain retail orders, the brokers pass on some of these 
inducements to their clients in the form of, for example, lower commissions.  
In the EU, such payments appear to be a less common market practice. One reason may 
be that European markets are more efficient in terms of tight spreads and structurally 
different in terms of smaller price increments (tick sizes) so that little room remains to 
pay for order flow. As a result, supervisors have devoted little attention to this issue. In 
the UK, for example, the FSA has only recently proposed that brokers, market-makers 
and trading venues be obliged to disclose such arrangements.
54  
4.2.3 Internalisation 
Internalisation can refer both to the execution of securities orders off a regulated market 
and against the books of an investment firm or via direct order-matching, i.e. execution 
of one client’s buy order against another client’s sell order. If the former, as compared 
to exchange trading where the exchange provides a platform for third party trading, 
internalisation means that the investment firm becomes the counterparty to its client’s 
transactions. Hence, the investment firm not only provides the means to carry out the 
transaction, but also provides the liquidity. As a result, if executed against the books, the 
investment firm takes on the risk of any price movements.  
When internalising an order, the broker may for example route the order flow to a 
market-maker belonging to the same firm.
55 Thanks to such vertical integration, a 
broker may send an order to a market-maker belonging to the same firm who will 
execute the order by matching best price. This practice of operating internal centralised 
trading desks where orders from internal portfolio managers are broken up, repackaged 
and sent to various trading venues, has become increasingly common.
56  
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a trade is internalised or not. In the 
wholesale (institutional) side of the market, a typical trade would see the broker giving 
the client a firm price for a particular security, with the broker then taking on the risk 
and managing it via the public markets. Another common type of transaction in 
institutional trading is when a broker guarantees a particular level of execution 
performance, as measured against a benchmark (e.g. volume weighted average price). In 
both cases, the trades may be nominally booked between the client and the broker, but 
the latter effectively works the orders and manages the risk by trading on various 
regulated markets.  
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4.2.4 Crossing 
Another option open to brokers is to cross their clients’ orders against each other instead 
of sending them to a central market. With developments in computing technology, 
brokers have been able to engage in more systematic crossing. As mentioned above, 
some brokers have set up in-house trading systems which match orders for them (e.g. 
crossing networks, ATSs, ECNs). Crossing has also become a popular method for 
brokers who take on large blocks of orders.
57 Crossing suits certain clients, who prefer 
this slower, but cheaper trading method. 
Box 4. Crossing networks 
Crossing originated in the US. The precursor is POSIT, set up by the broker ITG in 1987.
58 POSIT 
compares and matches institutional orders. Matching takes place eight times a day. Matching is 
maximised by a proprietary algorithm and occurs at the prevailing mid-point price at the time of the 
match. On average, 176 institutions and nearly 100 broker-dealers participate in these daily matches. In 
2000, POSIT executed 7.9 billion shares with a total value of $281 billion.
59 Nevertheless, crossing only 
accounts for 2.5% of total share volume in the US.
60  
POSIT is also active in Europe. Based in London, it offers matches six times a day in securities from 
several European countries. In practice, only volumes for UK mid-cap equities are significant with POSIT 
accounting for 1% of total share volume (value). So far, no other crossing network has achieved any 
significant volume. 
Source: Domowitz & Madhavan (2001). 
A crossing network is a particular form of a call or auction market in which trading 
takes place periodically. At a particular time, the network compares sell and buy orders 
placed on its books and matches them. In a crossing network, this is an entirely 
automatic process. The trading price is a function of prices determined in other markets. 
Crossing networks suit the needs of those investors who are ready to sacrifice speed and 
certainty of finding a counterpart for low-cost trade execution. It also offers complete 
anonymity, thus reducing the potential market impact of any specific trade order, 
particularly for those with low liquidity. 
4.3  European equity markets in a global context 
Nevertheless, in comparison with the US, equity markets in the EU remain limited. 
After peaking in 1999, equity markets at the end of 2001 (latest year of available data) 
did not even reach 100% of EU GDP. True, markets in the US had plunged even more 
dramatically, but from a higher level. 
Moreover, if one looks at the major European trading centres, they remain smaller in 
size compared to their US counterparts. This is clearly illustrated if looking at the value 
of share trading, where the value of shares traded on Nasdaq amounted to around 
€12,000 billion in 2001 (latest year of available data).  
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In one respect however, many European exchanges outpace US exchanges. The 
competition for blue-chip stocks have contributed to making European exchanges 
efficient. As a result, some studies suggest that the implicit trading costs in Europe are 
low compared to the US, while explicit costs high.
61 This is often attributed to the 
predominance of the automated central limit order book model in Europe, which is 
claimed to contribute in terms of spreads and market impact. 
Figure 6. Equity markets, % of GDP (2001) 
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Figure 7. Total share trading (2001, €bn) 
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Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2003).  
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Figure 8. Comparative trading costs: The US vs the EU 
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PART III. REGULATING SECURITIES TRADING 
The changes to the structure of markets give rise to regulatory concerns, all 
of which are related to the perils of fragmentation. These concerns have 
been the subject of much debate and empirical testing, but the results so far 
have been inconclusive. From a regulatory perspective, there are various 
ways of dealing with these concerns. The Commission has put much 
emphasis on transparency requirements. However, views differ on the 
effects of these, with an important body of opinion claiming that too much 
transparency may harm market quality. Should regulators agree to be less 
ambitious on the question of transparency, other regulatory instruments, 
although not perfect substitutes, are available. 
 
5.  Fundamentals of regulating securities trading 
Regulation refers to any publicly imposed rule governing a firm or an industry. 
Governments try to supervise and control the economic activities of private and public 
firms for a number of reasons and in various ways. Markets need a regulatory 
framework to function. If markets are contestable, rules can focus on certain core rules, 
e.g. ensuring low barriers to entry, while leaving most of the behavioural rules to the 
market itself. If the market is not contestable or if a society places significant value on 
avoiding institutional failure, then more detailed regulation is needed. Securities trading 
displays strong network effects and may thus not be sufficiently contestable. Moreover, 
considering the central importance of securities markets in the overall economy and the 
systemic risk associated with the fall of individual institutions, detailed regulation is 
called for. 
5.1  Aims of financial regulation 
Regulation occurs when unfettered market forces would lead to outcomes that are not in 
line with what is judged to be the public interest. For example, governments may want 
to curb or control the powers of a monopoly firm. They may want to address 
externalities, i.e. to regulate so that private actors are responsible for the unintended 
consequences their activities may have on the wider society. Another motive may be to 
redress differences in power between actors in the marketplace, e.g. information 
asymmetries, by ensuring that economically relevant information reaches as broad a 
public as possible, or differences in bargaining power. Other common motivations for 
regulatory intervention are to ensure the provision of public goods (i.e. goods that 
society values but that private actors would not produce if left to their own devices) or 
to coordinate production efficiently.  
Even if these aims sound abstract, issues of this kind underpin the current ISD review. 
The ISD’s transparency requirements are one way to address information asymmetries 
and to ensure that the public good of price discovery is produced. Also, the ISD’s code 
of conduct rules are a way of redressing differences in bargaining power between 
intermediaries and clients.  
In the field of finance, it can be argued that regulation has three predominant aims:  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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1.  Protection against monopolies. Most sectors in the financial services industry are 
marked by fierce competition. However, it has been judged that the provision of 
certain services is most efficiently carried out by a single provider. This is e.g. the 
case in payment systems and sometimes also claimed to be the case for certain 
functions in the securities settlement business. If services are provided by a 
monopolist, detailed regulation is needed to ensure that no monopoly power is 
exerted, e.g. by overcharging or failing to innovate.  
2.  Investor protection. Financial regulation also aims to protect consumers. This can 
be done either indirectly by prudential regulation, i.e. rules to ensure the soundness 
of individual financial institutions and hence promote the confidence of investors, or 
more directly by conduct of business rules, i.e. rules that govern the behaviour of 
firms vis-à-vis clients.  
3.  Systemic stability. As a supplement to prudential regulation, financial regulation 
often features systemic rules that aim to ensure the overall stability of the financial 
system. The reason behind these rules is the core role of the financial system in the 
overall economy and the potentially disastrous consequences of the failure of key 
financial institutions.
62  
5.2 Regulatory  instruments 
The ISD is an example of highly prescriptive rules. What other regulatory strategies are 
available? How does regulation relate to competition?  
5.2.1 Competition  rules 
A key aim of any regulatory strategy in the field of securities markets is to promote 
competition. If markets are contestable, the regulator is able to distance itself and refrain 
from regulatory intervention. Instead, the regulator can rely on competition and new 
entrants to eliminate market deficiencies.
63 
To promote competition, regulators need to prohibit barriers to entry, both explicit and 
implicit. The importance of barriers to entry is exemplified by the privileged position of 
incumbent operators. Network externalities provide incumbents with a first-mover 
advantage. Due to historical accidents, i.e. the incumbent being incumbent, market 
structure can become locked into an inefficient pattern, where the incumbent maintains 
its dominance despite the new entrant eventually being able to provide the same service 
at a lower cost, but is inhibited to start competing due to a lack of customers. In order to 
increase the potential of effective competition, policies that dent first-mover advantage 
and keep barriers to entry as effectively low as possible are important. This can be done 
e.g. by controlling prices charged by incumbent operator for quote and trade data.  
Even though securities markets have become more contestable in recent decades, the 
existence of positive network externalities imply that the trading market structure will 
remain concentrated. Hence, while competition rules play a key role, regulators need to 
resort to other regulatory instruments as well in order to ensure market quality. 
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Box 5. Regulating in the face of rapid change – Functional vs. institutional regulation 
Apart from these general problems inherent to all regulation, a particular problem is how regulation 
should adapt to changes to the marketplace it is supposed to regulate. Rapid change is particularly present 
in the field of financial markets, which, as portrayed above, have undergone fundamental changes in the 
last two decades.  
Traditionally, and in line with regulatory theory, rules on financial services have often tended to be 
shaped differently depending on the characteristics of the particular line of services. This is all fine, as 
regulation needs to take into account the various specificities of different marketplaces. However, 
traditionally regulation had been tailored differently depending on the kind of institution. Hence, banks 
did not face the same regulatory rights and obligations as, say, exchanges, which in their turn were 
regulated differently from brokers. This institutional regulation started to be challenged during the 1980s, 
when successive liberalisation and deregulation increased the freedom of institutions to engage in a range 
of financial activities. Accordingly, with the rise of financial conglomerates performing in-house a wider 
range of what had previously been regarded from a regulator’s point of view as segmented activities, 
institutional regulation became increasingly inadequate. Moreover, advances in technology allowed 
intermediaries to venture into new lines of business, with the result that the dividing lines between 
different institutions became even more blurred. For example, as illustrated above, ECNs in the 1990s 
started offering trade execution services without being regulated as exchanges. 
Following the structural changes described above, many economists in the beginning of the 1990s started 
to argue that financial regulation focused too much on institutional structure. Instead of institutionally 
focused regulation, many observers claimed that regulation should take a more functional perspective. 
According to this line of reasoning, functions drive institutional structure. As competitors search for more 
efficient ways of performing particular functions, the institutional structure will change. Regulation 
tailored at specific institutions will soon become outdated. Instead of tailoring specific regulations to 
institutions (e.g. legal obligations of brokers, legal obligations of exchanges), proponents of the functional 
approach argue that regulation should focus on the underlying functionality (e.g. clearing and settlement, 
risk management, price information, the transfer of resources through time…) irrespective of institutional 
structure.  
For all its immediate appeal, implementing a functional approach to regulation is difficult. Most 
importantly, defining core functions and allocating regulatory objectives and obligations remain as 
politically difficult as with a more institutional approach. Moreover, all institutional regulation involves a 
functional analysis. In most financial regulation, the various institutions covered by a particular obligation 
are characterised by what they do, in other words, what function they perform. The division between the 
two approaches therefore becomes blurred. This is of interest from an ISD point of view, as the ISD is 
one example of the underlying difficulty and the lack of a clear-cut, neat road-map of how to regulate 
evolving market structure. 
Source: Crane et al. (1996). 
5.2.2 Transparency  rules 
The new ISD proposal has brought transparency, i.e. the requirement on service 
providers to publish information so that consumers can make an informed choice when 
purchasing a particular service, to the forefront of the regulatory debate. In the field of 
securities markets, transparency can be defined as the “widespread availability of 
information relating to current opportunities to trade and recently completed trades”.
64 
Such information disclosure can occur both on an ex ante and ex post basis:  
•  Information about pre-trade opportunities focuses on price quotes, i.e. current bids 
and offers.  
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•  Post-trade transparency on the other hand provides information on volumes and 
prices of completed trades.  
As new trading venues have proliferated and an increasing amount of trading takes 
place outside regulated markets, states have started to reflect on how to extend 
transparency requirements beyond traditional venues with the aim of ensuring that 
quotations and orders in different marketplaces (liquidity pools) effectively interact. So 
far, however, most jurisdictions only impose transparency requirements on regulated 
markets (i.e. traditional exchanges).
65  
In theory, the more comprehensive are the transparency requirements, the more efficient 
will the price discovery process be. In practice, however, things are more complicated.
66 
Just as the trading needs of traders differ, so do their interests in transparency. While 
comprehensive transparency requirements are likely to encourage some traders to trade 
who would otherwise stay out of the market, they are also likely to inhibit other traders, 
especially those entering into large trades or those who are putting up capital to 
facilitate large trades and who fear that immediate disclosure may move the market 
against them.
67 The last decades have seen moves towards more transparency. 
Currently, the value of post-trade transparency has a strong measure of support, while 
there is a considerable divergence of views on the merits of pre-trade transparency. 
5.2.2.1  Advantages of transparency 
Generally, disclosure requirements are regarded as a fairly non-intrusive and self-
policing regulatory tool, say compared to more detailed behavioural rules. Hence, 
transparency requirements are regarded as quite attractive with low direct costs. In 
terms of economics, transparency requirements have distinct benefits. In short, broad 
transparency facilitates arbitrage, ensures price priority, enhances price discovery and 
provides a foundation for a more effective best-execution policy.
68 More specifically: 
•  Transparency requirements speed up the price discovery process and enhance 
market efficiency. 
•  They assist customers in monitoring their brokers, as information about current and 
past trading opportunities are abundant and can be used as a benchmark for 
evaluation.  
•  They contribute to enhancing competition between trading venues, as more traders 
will be aware of the multitude of trading opportunities.
69  
•  As prices will incorporate the information from all current trading opportunities and 
all recently concluded trades, traders will be able to choose the best trading venue at 
any time.  
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5.2.2.2  Drawbacks of excessive transparency 
While transparency is broadly regarded as beneficial, in the sense that prices generally 
become more informative,
70 there is some “disquieting evidence” that too broad of 
transparency requirements may have negative effects on liquidity provision and that 
transparent markets may be less efficient than opaque ones.
71 Empirical and 
experimental tests are much more ambiguous than the theoretical literature.
72 More 
specifically: 
•  Traders may be more reluctant to place limit orders, as this public display of trade 
intention may move the market against them. This is especially the case for large 
orders.  
•  Put differently, investment firms may be less willing to assist traders in their quest 
to offload shares if they have to signal their inventory to the wider public. The 
resulting increase in market impact implies that investment firms will face higher 
costs and hence may charge a higher price for the service.
73 
•  The display of quotes may make it easier for other traders to exercise a free trading 
option. This decreases the provision of liquidity. Particularly, with publication of 
pre-trade quotes, limit-order providers may lose to parasitic momentum traders. This 
may decrease market depth, and this thinner trading book would lead to larger price 
movements, which in turn would imply higher volatility and more costly execution. 
•  With pre-trade transparency, competition may fall, as there is less uncertainty about 
other dealers’ prices and hence less a need to compete with aggressive pricing. The 
end-result might be worse prices.
74 
•  If transparency requirements are much higher in one market compared to another, 
regulatory arbitrage may occur, with trading moving to a more accommodating 
environment. 
Experimental and empirical research therefore nuances the theoretical benefits of 
complete transparency. While the direct costs associated with implementing 
transparency rules are low, there seem to be indirect costs associated with it. 
Accordingly, while having beneficial effects, there are certainly costs associated with 
transparency as well. Pre-trade transparency in particular may have detrimental effects 
on liquidity and welfare. Even so, some observers claim that these detrimental effects 
should not be overstated. According to this view, the empirical evidence of detrimental 
effects on liquidity is limited, and the evidence of moves offshore solely due to 
transparency even more scarce. Moreover, the global trend is towards more, not less, 
transparency and markets often voluntarily impose higher than mandated transparency 
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rules. Hence, when contemplating transparency, they claim that the burden of proof 
should fall on those arguing in favour of opacity.
75  
5.2.2.3  No single regime universally accepted 
Transparency may therefore have conflicting effects on market quality. Spreads may 
both widen and decrease if transparency requirements are increased and extended. They 
may widen, as market-makers will be less inclined to pay to acquire information from 
traders with private information. Spreads may decrease, as information reaches more 
traders. Similarly, volatility may both increase and decrease. Transparency may both 
lead to stabilising speculation, which decreases volatility, and more strategic behaviour 
on the part of market-makers, which may increase volatility.
76 
Partly due to these uncertain effects, there is no consensus on the appropriate level and 
form of transparency. The lack of consensus is also explained by the fact that changes in 
any given transparency regime affect the distribution of trading profits. Put differently: 
transparency rules determine who trades with a profit and who does not. Changes to 
these rules will benefit one group of traders at the expense of other groups, who may 
exit the market. There is therefore no optimal market structure that benefits all traders. 
In other words: no single transparency regime is viewed as best by all parties.
77 
5.2.2.4  Voluntary or mandated? 
Due to these uncertain effects and differing interests, regulators therefore ought to 
carefully calibrate the requirements they impose in any particular market. They have to 
assess and consider when market practice is insufficient, i.e. when the incentive for 
trading venues to publish their quotes and trades is not sufficient to provide an optimal 
level of transparency. However, some studies have found that even if not all trading 
venues are equally transparent, the activities of the opaque ones do not undermine the 
more transparent venues.
78 If mandated, regulators have to carefully consider how to 
design the requirements so that liquidity provision is not reduced and that lines of 
business are not encouraged to migrate to more accommodating environments 
(“offshore”).
79 
The choice whether to impose or rely on market incentives also depends on the likely 
extent of market fragmentation, which, as mentioned above, depends on a number of 
factors, e.g. the size of the market (is there sufficient liquidity to sustain several 
venues?) and the relative efficiency and service levels of regulated markets vs new 
entrants. In other words, if the marketplace is more fragmented, mandated rules may be 
necessary. Conversely, if fragmentation remains limited, market incentives may be 
relied upon to a larger extent.  
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5.2.3 Best-execution  rules 
Another regulatory instrument at the hands of securities regulators is order-handling 
rules. The purpose of such rules is to shape the behaviour of intermediaries in a way that 
ensures that the customer’s interest in achieving as good an execution as possible is 
promoted when intermediaries handle customer orders. A core part of order-handling 
rules are best-execution rules. Such rules try to measure and evaluate how well 
investors’ trades are executed.
80 In a centralised market, there should be little dispute 
over what constitutes best execution. In a fragmented market, where the intermediary 
has a choice of where to execute orders, best execution becomes more difficult to 
measure and evaluate and the potential for misjudgement increases.
81 Faced with a more 
fragmented marketplace, regulators have therefore started to reassess approaches to best 
execution.
82 As will be further elaborated upon below (Chapter 7), best-execution rules 
are an important part of the Commission’s new ISD proposal.  
Traditionally, best execution has often been regarded as achieved if a trade was 
executed at the best price prevailing on a regulated market. The regulated market hence 
acted as an absolute benchmark and safe harbour for intermediaries. With the 
proliferation of trading venues, however, that approach has been deemed unsatisfactory. 
Better prices, speedier execution or lower overall trading costs may well prevail on 
venues other than the regulated market. Hence, the current consensus is that best-
execution rules should in one way or another oblige intermediaries to look beyond 
central markets when trying to achieve best execution for their clients. Furthermore, 
there is also a fair amount of consensus that best execution is not limited to “best price”, 
but that what really matters is overall execution quality. Best execution is hence a multi-
dimensional object, with e.g. speed of trade execution, the price impact, the likelihood 
of execution and overall trading costs (implicit, explicit) all playing an important part in 
assessing the overall quality of any particular order execution.
83  
While there is agreement in principle, views diverge in practice. Best-execution 
requirements currently differ across Europe. While most member states acknowledge 
the multi-dimensional nature of best execution, there are considerable differences on 
emphasis. Some member states emphasise trading costs as an important element in best 
execution (e.g. the Netherlands, Italy and Germany), others consider that best execution 
is provided on regulated markets (e.g. Italy, France) while in some member states the 
requirements for best execution depend on the nature of the customer (e.g. Sweden and 
Italy).
84 
Faced with the need to reform, regulators also have to struggle with inherent difficulties 
of the best-execution concept. Measuring best execution is not an exact science.
85 
Furthermore, as stressed above, investors have different needs and preferences. For 
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example, retail customers tend to value price and speed of execution, while institutional 
traders are often more concerned with any potential market impact of their trading.
86 
Hence, no single definition of what constitutes best execution is possible (or desirable 
for that matter). Ranking the different attributes of execution quality also depends on 
preferences and hence, agreement is not easy. In addition, there is an obvious link 
between transparency requirements and best-execution rules. The more transparent a 
marketplace, the easier it is for intermediaries to assess the execution quality of an 
increased number of trading venues. However, as mentioned above, there may be cases 
where too much transparency harms market quality and hence best execution may 
sometimes have to operate in less than perfectly transparent markets. Faced with these 
difficulties, some proposals for regulatory reform have emerged with a few elements in 
common: 
•  Best-execution rules should encourage intermediaries to make the best use of the 
opportunities presented by competing trade venues with the aim of achieving the 
most competitive execution possible for clients.
87 
•  Best-execution rules should focus not only on price but also on wider attributes such 
as trading costs (explicit, implicit). Intermediaries should hence focus on the overall 
cost of dealing on a particular platform. The focus should be on the net outcome for 
the customer in light of his or her objectives.
88 
•  Best execution is a process in which many parties share responsibility for ensuring 
best execution (e.g. investment manager, broker and exchange). Hence it is 
important that best-execution rules focus on requiring intermediaries to establish 
investment implementation processes so that they can measure and manage the 
quality of trade decisions.
89 
•  Intermediaries should disclose their execution arrangements to customers on a 
regular basis. This should not be limited to order-routing practices, but should also 
include potential conflicts of interest that intermediaries face when executing orders 
on behalf of customers and which may undermine their fiduciary responsibility.
90 
Such conflicts include payment for order flow, preferencing arrangements, 
internalisation, research provision, soft commissions, etc. Intermediaries should also 
regularly review these arrangements in order to make sure that they are up to date 
with market developments and that they route orders to the most competitive venue 
(e.g. in terms of price, transaction costs, access costs, etc). 
•  Post-execution monitoring is also important. To that effect records of trades should 
be kept to enable evaluation. Furthermore, intermediaries should on a regular basis 
review their execution quality.
91  
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Figure 9. The process of best execution 
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Source: de Ternay in EAMA (2002). 
 
All in all, best-execution rules are a way of promoting the investors’ interests in 
instituting rules on how his or her trade orders should be handled. In today’s more 
fragmented marketplace, however, the definition of what constitutes best execution is 
not straightforward and the design of such rules raise many issues. In reforming these 
requirements, regulators should aim less at spelling out details and more at providing 
intermediaries with the right incentives. As illustrated in the graph above, this can be 
done by intermediaries putting in place a more formalised process where measurement 
and management of execution quality is ensured in a more systematic manner. 
5.2.4  Order-handling (priority) rules 
Most trading systems have rules that structure the timing of order execution. In 
principle, execution timing depends on i) the price, i.e. better priced orders are executed 
first and ii) time, i.e. the first order placed receives priority execution. These rules are 
important for investor confidence, as without them investors would not know under 
what conditions their orders were prioritised. Accordingly, as will be described below, 
the Commission has proposed to introduce new rules on order priority (see Chapter 7). 
With the proliferation of trading venues, there is a risk that these order priority rules will 
break down. A competitively priced order placed early on one market centre’s trading 
book may well be executed later than an order placed later in the day on another market 
centre’s book. This may reduce the incentives to place competitively priced limit orders, 
which in turn would reduce market quality.
92 
Regulators face the choice of whether to intervene or to rely on market forces. Market 
forces may indeed settle the problem, as any investor has an incentive to place orders on 
the trading venue where the potential for order matching is the highest. Overall, orders 
are hence likely to be attracted to liquid trading venues. This is indeed the foundation of 
the network externalities elaborated upon above. 
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Regulators may however judge that client orders need more priority protection. If so, 
regulators could mandate arrangements that protect limit orders, e.g. by creating a 
centralised order book, or less ambitiously, by requiring market-makers to incorporate 
customer limit orders in their quotes or to route them to public books.
93 Apart from the 
potentially high cost of such regulatory interventions, the effects may not always be 
adequate. For example, some forms of regulatory intervention (e.g. best-execution rules 
that focus on price and some forms of centralised order books) may well favour price 
priority, but do little to protect time priority.
94  
Moreover, all order execution involves judgement. There is a risk of making order 
priority rules too prescriptive and e.g. elevate immediacy of execution to a regulatory 
goal per se. Instead, order-handling rules, including best execution and order priority 
rules, should perhaps be regarded more as guidelines for proper execution and should 
not inhibit intermediaries from exercising their judgement. For example, in many 
markets spreads are greater at the beginning of the trading day. In those cases customers 
would benefit from delays in execution.
95 
5.2.5 Access  rules 
Transparent markets and obligations to provide best execution is of limited importance 
if intermediaries cannot effectively access all trading venues. Many of the new trading 
venues that emerged during the 1990s targeted particular classes of investors (e.g. US 
ECNs, which primarily targeted institutional investors).
96 Moreover, restrictions of 
access may act as a barrier to competition. Incumbent operators may be in a beneficial 
position by either operating in or having privileged access to a wider services spectrum, 
in particular clearing and settlement. If competitors who are not providing these more 
utility-like services have less access, they may be effectively cut out from offering a 
competitive package.  
Some restrictions of access may be natural, e.g. exchanges requiring that traders are 
members of clearinghouses or central counterparties. However, it is not in the public 
interest that trading venues attracting a significant amount of liquidity restrict access on 
a discriminatory basis.
97 This could give rise to a situation where one class of investors 
was systematically disadvantaged by being denied access to certain trading venues. 
Moreover, in the name of the overarching interest of competition, regulators may 
nevertheless find it necessary to sacrifice the interest of the incumbent operator.
98 
5.2.6  Additional measures to protect retail investors 
Even if markets are competitive and even if information asymmetries have been 
addressed and rules to assure fair dealing is in place, retail investors may still need 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 The reason is that best execution rules would force intermediaries to shop around for best priced orders 
and montage solutions often only incorporate best quotes from various trading venues. See Board et al. 
(2002) for further discussion. 
95 See e.g. FSA (2002), which elaborates upon the regulatory trade-offs related to timeliness. 
96 Board et al. (2002). 
97 IOSCO (2001). 
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additional protection. As mentioned above, disclosure may not suffice to reach a 
sufficient level of protection of unsophisticated investors. While professional investors 
are fully capable (or at least should be) of acting upon the disclosed information, one 
cannot assume that retail recipients of the information possess sufficient knowledge and 
expertise to act on it wisely. Therefore, regulators need to actively monitor 
intermediaries to ensure that they effectively fulfil their regulatory obligations, and 
hence more interventionist regulation may be needed for the retail segments of the 
market. The benefits of additional protection must be weighed against the potential cost 
of increasingly complex and segmented regulation containing different obligations 
facing different parts of the market. 
5.3  Uncertainty and the risk of regulatory failure 
A particular problem arises when the harmfulness of a particular activity is uncertain or 
when the effects of a proposed rule are in doubt. When regulating in the face of 
uncertainty, it is important to rely on a framework of analysis where both potential 
benefits and costs are taken into account. 
5.3.1 Regulatory  risks 
Regulation frequently fails to correct the underlying failure and may sometimes make 
matters worse. One reason for regulatory failures is that regulators often do not possess 
sufficient information or expertise. Or, the information they possess may be biased and 
hence the regulators risk becoming captured by those they are supposed to regulate. 
Regulation may also fail due to inappropriately designed instruments. Given the 
complexity of securities trading and the rapid structural change, there is a danger that 
some of these problems will be exacerbated in financial markets. It is particularly 
difficult for regulators to set adequate rules that stand the test of time and achieve 
desired outcomes.  
5.3.2  Regulating in the face of uncertainty 
The ISD is a good illustration of the problem of devising regulation when there is 
uncertainty concerning the potential harmfulness of certain activities. As has been 
amply demonstrated above, there is no consensus on the harmfulness of off-exchange 
trading. When regulators aim at balancing opposing viewpoints, where should they set 
their foot down? Regulatory theory may provide guidance, but no straight answers. 
Faced with uncertainty, regulators often have a tendency to over-regulate. The reason 
may often be that it is too costly for regulators to gain a precise understanding of every 
single regulatory issue involved. Instead regulators try to devise rules that have as broad 
an application as possible. In addition, regulators often operate under time constraints. 
Sometimes, however, regulation may for similar reasons be under-inclusive, e.g. 
regulators fail to address a harmful activity, as they do not sufficiently understand the 
marketplace.  
Uncertainty means that regulators are bound to commit errors. They may prohibit an 
activity because they erroneously regard it as harmful. Or they may permit an activity 
under the misapprehension that it is harmless. In the first case, service providers bear 
the regulatory risk; in the second type, it is the consumer. Regulators often try to avoid 
committing errors of the first kind, i.e. they try to err on the side of not causing risks to  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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producers by permitting rather than outlawing a particular activity if they are uncertain 
about its effects. This is often justified by a “presumption of innocence”. This strategy is 
not universally approved, however. It can be argued that regulators ought to err on the 
side of avoiding putting consumers at risk by restricting potentially harmful activities. 
The reason is that regulators should protect consumers rather than the producers’ right 
to sell product or services. The burden of proof of the acceptability of a particular risk 
should, according to this line of reasoning, fall on those wishing to reduce producer 
rather than consumer risks, the reason being that producers reap most of the benefits of 
permitting a particular activity. In other words, according to this school of thought, 
regulators should aim at preventing harm rather than enhancing welfare. Moreover, 
consumers need more protection than service providers, as they have less information 
and fewer resources, all of which makes them less able to deal with hazard. Overall, 
when faced with uncertainty, it is difficult for regulators to argue that consumers should 
assume the risk. 
Box 6. Measuring good regulation: Cost-benefit analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has often been put forward as a way of improving the quality of regulation. 
Indeed, such analysis provides a way of measuring how different strategies satisfy the stated goal of 
regulation and may hence improve the pursuit of the mandate. Moreover, CBA is a means of appraisal 
that reveals costs and exposes policy judgements, hence increasing the accountability of regulation. In 
addition, it ensures that the regulatory process is open and provides a guide for rational rule-making, 
hence improving the procedural quality of regulation. It also clarifies justifications and highlights gaps in 
information and hence identifies areas where further research is needed. Most importantly, CBA promotes 
more efficient regulation, by identifying strategies that minimise costs for any given benefits.  
Underpinning the concept is efficiency-thinking, and this is perhaps the Achilles heel of CBA. It provides 
little guidance if regulatory goals are not related to efficiency. Moreover, CBAs tend to be biased towards 
quantifiable criteria, hence being less adept at incorporating more qualitative measures. Moreover, CBA 
is not neutral or value-free and has according to its critics been used to mask policy-making. In addition, 
it puts obstacles in the way of regulatory activity, which may lead to an under-supply of regulation. 
Finally, CBA provides little guidance on issues related to rights and justice. Overall, CBA certainly has a 
role to play, but it is no panacea. 
Source: Baldwin & Cave (1999). 
Even so, there may be a case for promoting the producer’s interest. First, there is often 
an inherent tendency towards over-regulation and over-inclusiveness. To promote 
producer interests would counter these tendencies. Second, if compliance costs are very 
high and the associated benefits of outlawing particular activity are low, there is a case 
for promoting producer interests. Finally, prohibition should be avoided if the costs of 
enforcement are high and if the problem can be effectively addressed at a later stage in 
the regulatory cycle (e.g. during the act itself or once harm has been caused). 
6.  Concerns raised by the evolving market structure 
The increase in certain elements of contestability has provoked a debate on their 
potentially damaging effects. This section considers three concerns: the fear that 
competition fragments the order flow, thereby reducing market quality and preventing 
the reaping of network benefits; the worry that off-exchange trading may lead to 
conflicts of interests and collusion; and the fear that the new trading landscape will alter 
the distribution of costs and benefits between types of users.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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6.1 Fragmentation 
The structure of securities markets is shaped by conflicting forces. First, markets 
naturally consolidate, as traders like to trade at the same place as other traders. 
Securities markets are therefore marked by strong externalities or network effects and 
trades therefore tend to gravitate to the most liquid markets. Despite these centralising 
forces, securities markets also naturally fragment. Traders are different: they do not 
have identical needs and they seek to solve different trading problems. This suggests an 
inherent need for diversity of trading venues catering for these different needs. This 
section aims at summarising the abundant literature on the pros and cons of 
fragmentation.
99 A first part looks at how the theoretical literature on the micro-
structure of the market regards the issue while a second part reviews the literature that 
has tested the theoretical hypotheses.  
6.1.1  Theoretical literature on fragmentation 
Whether or not the fragmentation of the marketplace should be a cause of concern is 
one of the most debated issues in securities market regulation. There is abundant 
literature on the subject, albeit predominantly of US origin, as US regulatory authorities 
have grappled with this issue since the 1970s.  
6.1.1.1  The benefits of off-exchange order execution 
As elaborated above, traders differ in many respects. They may differ in terms of the 
size they normally trade, with some trading large orders and others small. Some 
investors prefer immediacy while others have more patience. Some use simple buy and 
sell orders while others use more advanced trading strategies. A marketplace with 
different competing structures is necessary in order to satisfy their various needs. Some 
market structures are better adapted to handle some problems than others and, 
accordingly, one single market structure is therefore unable to satisfy all traders. All in 
all, the plenitude of traders and their different needs implies that there is an inherent 
need for diversity.  
Accordingly, off-market order execution – whether by internalisation, ATS, crossing, 
etc. – may be interesting for some traders, as it helps them to a) mitigate adverse 
selection costs, i.e. avoid informed traders, and b) dampen the price impact of off-
loading, e.g. a large block of shares.
100 In that sense, off-market trading enables these 
potential liquidity providers to find a suitable counterpart. With the help of the broker, 
counterparts with private information are screened away. This kind of off-market 
execution helps these liquidity providers to manage the risk of providing other traders 
with a free option. It brings out liquidity that would otherwise not exist. In other words, 
off-market order execution in this view enables transactions that would otherwise not 
occur.
101 They are complementary to open market structures, e.g. open central limit 
order books.  
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100 Madhavan (2000).  
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6.1.1.2  Drawbacks of off-exchange order execution 
As illustrated above (ch. 4), the last decade has seen a proliferation of trading venues 
and techniques. This increase in the contestability of markets has tilted the balance 
between these conflicting forces of consolidation and fragmentation.
102 The 
proliferation of trading venues means that buyers and sellers are often at different places 
and may accordingly have problems finding each other.
103 This may have a negative 
impact on transaction costs, as compared to the result if all traders arranged and 
executed orders in the same market.  
Moreover, fragmentation of the order flow has the potential under certain conditions to 
be harmful from a public policy perspective. Society at large benefits from an efficient 
price formation mechanism, as informative prices are a necessary precondition for an 
economically efficient allocation of a society’s resources.  
It is often claimed that due to the above-mentioned network externalities, the price 
mechanism works best when trading is concentrated in one market. In other words, in 
certain sectors, economies of scale effects are so large that production in that particular 
market is most efficiently carried out by one single supplier, i.e. a natural monopolist.
104 
However, sectors traditionally considered to be natural monopolies have become 
increasingly contestable due to advances in technology.  
The price formation mechanism can also be regarded as a public good. Accordingly, it 
suffers from two weaknesses normally associated with such goods. The supply of the 
good in question to anybody necessarily means that you supply it to everybody. In other 
words, it is impossible or impractical to exclude anyone from benefiting from the goods. 
Public goods are hence vulnerable to free-riding. As a result, they would not be 
provided if private actors were left to themselves. In the context of securities markets, 
one may argue that even though a more diverse market structure serves one important 
need of private traders (diversity) and thus should be welfare enhancing, it may be 
harmful from a public interest point of view if the fragmentation results in an impaired 
overall price formation mechanism. Moreover, even if traders cherish diversity, they all 
have a strong preference to have as informative prices as possible. To a large extent, 
private interests therefore overlap with the public interest. 
Many regulated markets (i.e. the incumbent exchanges) argue that since the prices they 
supply serve as a benchmark for best execution elsewhere, they should be regarded as 
contributing the most towards informative prices. Given that securities trading is 
characterised by strong positive network externalities, the quality of the price formation 
mechanism is improved the more the order flow is routed to the central market. 
Accordingly, exchanges often claim that the fragmentation that results from competing 
market structures may undermine the provision of the public good. 
•  Deteriorating market quality. The existence of several competing order books 
fragments liquidity. As a result, the markets’ ability to provide stable prices may 
                                                 
102 See Lee (2002a), who argues that this increase in contestability is likely to be temporary and that 
network effects will prevail in the longer term.  
103 Harris (2002), p. 526. 
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suffer. Likewise, the ability of prices to aggregate information, i.e. the price 
discovery process, may be reduced.
105 Accordingly, it may become more difficult to 
assess best price and market depth.  
•  Increasing trading costs. Overall, the cost of trading is claimed to increase, as any 
decrease in commissions and fees is offset by likely increases in price spreads and 
market impact.  
These detrimental effects are often claimed to be particularly strong if competing 
venues attract more lucrative trades (uninformed traders) and leave the central markets 
with the less lucrative trades (informed traders), i.e. cream-skimming. This would lead 
to higher spreads that could well offset any potential gain in lower commissions and 
fees that the increasing contestability has brought about. Suggested remedies from the 
exchanges range from promoting strict concentration rules to ensuring that competing 
structures publish their prices and orders. 
6.1.2  Empirical assessments of the impact on market quality and transaction costs 
The more empirical literature has tried to analyse how the proliferation of trading 
venues affects overall market quality and trading costs, most often measured by the 
evolution in bid-ask spreads (both quoted and effective). Most of this literature is 
American and focuses on the effects on dealer and market-maker spreads on the NYSE 
and Nasdaq after these started facing competition from regional exchanges (NYSE) and 
ECNs (Nasdaq). In that sense, these studies are carried out in a specific context where 
the central markets are quote-driven dealer markets and their conclusions may be less 
relevant in another structure (e.g. limit order). However, while not as abundant, there 
are nevertheless some studies of off-market order execution in the context of order-
driven auction markets.  
6.1.2.1 “US”  studies 
Battalio, Green and Jennings (1997) focus on the NYSE and two competing regional 
exchanges (the Cincinnati Stock Exchange and the Boston Stock Exchange), and more 
specifically the CSE’s and BSE’s decision to change their rules to allow dealers to 
internalise orders.
106 They analyse how this affected the width of the spread and the size 
of the liquidity premium (i.e. the price you pay for liquidity, as measured by the 
closeness of the execution price to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) midpoint). 
They find that in contrast with predictions from the theoretical literature and despite a 
substantial movement of order flow from the NYSE after the rule changes, the changes 
had little short-run effects on posted or effective bid-ask spreads on any of the 
exchanges. Even though not statistically significant, they find that quoted spreads 
decrease for 66% of the securities in their sample after the rule changes. Moreover, they 
found no evidence that trading costs increased after starting to trade on the regional 
exchanges. Finally, both the BSE and CSE were more likely to be part of the NBBO 
prices after the rule changes. They therefore conclude that “the adverse effects 
associated with allowing brokerage firms to fragment the market by internalising order 
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flow may not be as severe as some analyses suggest”.
107 The reason, they suggest, may 
be that the competing trading venues offered lower costs and/or a more advanced 
trading technology and that these lower costs were passed on to their clients. Overall, 
they find that their evidence suggests that internalisation “stimulates competition for 
order flow” and that a competing venue can well attract liquidity if it “provides a 
valuable service to its members”.  
Battalio (1997) compares spreads on the NYSE before and after one of the largest third-
market broker-dealers (Madoff) starts to selectively buy and execute NYSE orders, i.e. 
internalisation. He finds that spreads on the NYSE tighten while trading costs remain 
constant. He concludes that internalisation does not affect market quality or transaction 
costs. Nor does the widespread fear of cream-skimming seem to occur. He finds that the 
fact that the internalised orders get as good or better treatment suggests that Madoff uses 
a cost-advantage. He concludes that under certain conditions “the adverse selection 
problem associated with allowing agents to selectively execute orders in exchange-listed 
securities may be economically insignificant”.
108 This conclusion is conditional on 
Madoff being a typical broker-dealer. However, while most broker-dealers receive order 
directly from the public, Madoff rather purchases orders from brokers. Therefore, other 
broker-dealers may be more able to selectively execute.  
Madoff’s conclusion contrasts with that reached by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) 
who assert that cream-skimming may indeed be a problem. In the context of 
competition for order flow between the NYSE and CSE, they find that traders on the 
latter are indeed generally less informed, while the NYSE is left with the less profitable 
informed traders.
109 They reiterate the theoretical predictions that while a proliferation 
of trading venues has beneficial effects on competition, it is not “uniformly benign” as it 
decreases liquidity in any one setting, which may have negative effects on the capacity 
to provide stable prices and the quality and effectiveness of the price formation process.  
These problems are exacerbated if accompanied by cream-skimming. Indeed, the more 
orders that are diverted from the central market, the more profitable the practice 
becomes for those selectively purchasing order flow. The reason is that as the central 
market is left with informed traders, the spreads on the central market widen. This 
makes it easier for broker-dealers to fulfil their obligation of matching best price (as 
best execution is often deemed to occur if orders are executed at the prevailing price of 
the central market). The authors fear that this process can develop into a spiral. This is 
not automatic, however, and whether or not this has negative welfare implications 
depends on several qualifications. For example, whether it occurs or not depends on a) 
the level of competition among order purchasers and b) the types of orders remaining in 
the central markets. Moreover, the net welfare implications are not easy to assess. If the 
broker-dealers’ larger profits are partly passed through to clients in terms of lower 
commissions, then uninformed traders may well benefit from internalisation. In 
addition, if internalisation was prohibited and execution restricted to the central market, 
then uninformed traders could be worse off, as informed traders would exploit their lack 
of knowledge. Finally, even if cream-skimming occurs, the authors cannot rule out that 
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these profits are shared with traders.
110 Therefore, all in all, while internalisation may 
worsen the price formation process, the net welfare implications are difficult to assess. 
Weston (2000) also studies the effects of more competition on the Nasdaq marketplace. 
He finds that the proliferation of trading venues on the Nasdaq market has brought its 
spreads closer to those of the NYSE. Before the reforms, the Nasdaq marketplace was 
characterised by collusion and extensive payment for order flow and preferencing 
arrangements. In 1997, two new regulations – the requirement that public limit orders 
are allowed to compete with traditional market-makers and the obligation of market-
makers to publish orders they post on ATSs or ECNs – changed this state of affairs. As 
a result, Nasdaq bid-ask spreads have fallen. The reason according to Weston is that the 
new competition from public limit orders has decreased the rents earned by market-
makers. As expected, the regulatory changes have also led to the exit of some market-
makers (unable to sustain their activity when faced with competition). The 
concentration in the market-making market has also decreased. Weston therefore 
concludes that the introduction of competition has “significantly improved the 
competitiveness of the Nasdaq market”.
111 
Huang (2002) investigates the Nasdaq market and more particularly the competition 
between traditional market-makers and ECNs. He finds that this proliferation has not 
harmed overall market quality. On the contrary, his evidence suggests that this 
competition may promote market quality rather than fragment it. He finds that the new 
venues post informative quotes, they post them rapidly and their quotes are more often 
on the inside compared to normal market-makers. For example, the quoted spreads on 
Island and Instinet were less than half the width of the quoted spreads posted by market-
makers in 1998, and less than a third in 1999.
112 Accordingly, Huang suggests that 
fragmentation has not affected the information quality of bid-ask quotes. Moreover, the 
new venues contribute to price discovery and are often price leaders. As such, they do 
not free-ride on the prices provided by the central market (Nasdaq). Therefore he 
concludes that “the additional competition provided by ECNs, the structural diversity 
that they offer, and the presence of regulation aimed to foster competition appear to 
have combined to generate a positive effect on quote quality”.
113 
Overall, these studies dent the theoretical prediction that fragmentation of trading may 
decrease market quality and transaction costs. US experience instead suggests that 
fragmentation in the form of ECN-trading or internalisation has contributed towards the 
tightening of spreads and stable, if not decreasing, transaction costs. In sum, 
fragmentation does not seem to have hurt market quality or transaction costs.  
6.1.2.2 Non-US  studies 
The studies done in a US context all focus on the US mid-1990s context. The central 
markets were then (and predominantly remain) quote-driven dealer markets. Such 
markets have the benefit of immediate liquidity provision (via dealers or market-
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makers). Such immediacy often comes at a price, however, and accordingly such 
markets are often associated with high spreads (i.e. the price of liquidity). Moreover, it 
has often been claimed that both markets and the NYSE in particular have been slow in 
adopting new low-cost communications technology. All in all, it is perhaps not 
surprising that new competitors have been able to provide tighter spreads. Would the 
largely benign conclusions therefore hold in another context? Unfortunately, research 
here is less abundant.  
Hänsch, Naik and Viswanathan (1999) look at data from the LSE. Their aim is to assess 
the execution quality and dealer profits related to preferencing or internalisation of 
order-flow on the LSE.
114 The authors test whether the preferencing and internalisation 
arrangements decrease incentives to compete, hence resulting in widening spreads. The 
reason why that may occur is that if preferencing and internalisation become 
widespread, then market-makers are not rewarded with more orders even if they post 
aggressive quotes. Hence, their incentive to compete decreases. Instead, they may 
collude to divide the order flow between them, accordingly decreasing overall price 
competition and widening bid-ask spreads, resulting in a worsening execution quality 
for all orders. The authors find that preferenced trades receive worse execution than 
non-preferenced trades (they pay higher spreads) while internalised trades receive better 
execution than non-internalised trades (lower spreads). They find no relation between 
the profits of a dealer and the proportion of trades that are internalised or preferenced. 
This refutes the hypothesis of decreasing incentives to compete and increasing ones to 
collude. The result highlights the importance of search costs, however. Impatient traders 
who want to avoid search costs go to their regular dealers even if they do not post the 
best quotes. If they are patient, they negotiate with several dealers and choose the one 
with best quotes. As a result, preferenced trades pay a higher spread.  
Fong, Madhavan and Swan (1999) carried out an empirical investigation on data from 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), an order-driven auction market.
115 On the ASX 
there are no market makers or dealers, instead liquidity is provided by public orders. 
The trading system (SEATS) is fully computerised, trading is continuous and the 
trading day since 1997 closes with an auction. Apart from a concentration rule, the ASX 
is thus similar to the prevailing European market model. The ASX faces competition 
from a variety of off-exchange trading venues (e.g. upstairs block trades, crosses and 
after-hours trades).
116 They find that depth is positively related to trading volume and 
spreads and negatively related to market depth and the imposition of a closing auction. 
In other words, off-exchange order execution is more likely in high-volume stocks and 
                                                 
114 This is certainly a European context, but at the time of observation (data set from 1994), the LSE was 
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if spreads are wide and less likely when the market of a particular share is deep and a 
closing auction is set up. Since the ASX is so similar to European exchanges, these 
findings merit a more detailed summary: 
•  Off-exchange order execution is more common in heavily traded shares (as 
measured by dollar volume). For example, in 1998 nearly 30% of all trades in the 
most traded shares were executed off the ASX. The corresponding value for the 
least traded shares was around 5%.  
•  They also find a consistent and significantly positive relationship between the bid-
ask spread and the amount of off-exchange order execution. This supports the 
hypothesis that off-exchange trading is primarily motivated by a desire to lower the 
cost of execution. 
•  Off-exchange order execution is also more common in larger shares and shares 
included in indexes. In other words, shares that face a larger institutional trading 
demand tend to have a higher share of trading off-exchange. 
•  Most of the off-exchange trading is done after normal trading hours. For example, of 
the top volume shares traded off the exchange, more than half took the form of after-
hours trades. In absolute numbers, of all off-exchange trades, around 21% were 
executed during trading hours, while the remainder (81%) were executed afterwards. 
After-hours trading is also confined primarily to smaller trades. This suggests that 
brokers use after-hours trading as a way of matching small orders. The reason, 
according to the authors, may either be due to order characteristics (“at close”) or 
brokers’ eagerness to earn commissions from both sellers and buyers. 
•  Off-exchange trading has decreased. For example, between 1994 and 1998 off-
exchange trading for the most traded shares decreased from 37% to 30%. This may 
be related to the creation of a closing auction in 1997. 
•  During the period 1994 to 1998, most off-exchange trades were executed at the 
prevailing (pre-trade) bid and ask quotes on the ASX. For example, for the most 
traded shares, 60% were executed at prevailing quotes, 32% outside the prevailing 
quotes and 8% received price improvement, i.e. execution inside the prevailing bid-
ask spread. If measured in dollar volumes, most off-market trades are executed 
outside prevailing quotes (52% for top decile, 72% bottom decile). A substantial 
amount of trades are executed at prevailing quotes (39% top decile, 15% bottom 
decile). The amount of trades receiving price improvement remains limited (9% top, 
13% bottom).  
•  While after-hour trades are smaller, the large majority of off-exchange trades are 
nevertheless large trades. Most of these execute either at or outside prevailing 
quotes. Nearly 40% of heavily traded shares execute at prevailing quotes while 50% 
execute outside; for the least-traded shares the corresponding figure is 15% and 
62%. The reason why such a high proportion of off-exchange trades execute at 
worse prices is related to on-exchange market depth. Generally, shares with low 
volumes of trading have shallow quotes and receive worse execution. In shallow 
markets, informed trading is likely to be more prevalent. Thanks to the absence of 
anonymity in the off-exchange market, the market depth is larger and execution is 
hence easier. Even if these shares execute outside prevailing quotes, it would be  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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more expensive to execute these orders on the even thinner exchange. Even if prices 
are nominally on the outside, the authors find that execution nevertheless is less 
costly off the exchange. 
•  The authors also find that price volatility decreases the appeal of off-exchange order 
execution. Unstable prices make negotiations difficult. Instead, electronic limit order 
books with continuous trading offer better ways of keeping up-to-date with price 
developments. 
These findings suggest that trading volume and on-exchange liquidity (spread and 
depth) are the fundamental factors determining the extent of off-exchange order 
execution. Traders’ predominant motivation for seeking off-exchange order execution is 
to reduce market impact costs.  
This echoes Madhavan (2000), who finds that the main aims of off-exchange trading is 
to a) avoid informed traders (mitigate adverse selection costs and locate suitable 
counterparties) and b) dampen the price impact (share risk). As such, although 
associated with some problems
117 and for many types of trades relatively modest 
economic benefits, Madhavan suggests that off-exchange trading enables transactions 
that would otherwise not have occurred on the exchange. 
This suggests that exchanges should aim at a) improving liquidity and b) replicating to 
the extent possible the characteristics of off-exchange trading venues. The experience of 
the ASX suggests that closing auctions can play a significant role in improving 
liquidity. Since its introduction in 1997, off-exchange order execution has decreased 
substantially. Moreover, exchanges could aim at increasing the ability to identify 
counterparts, e.g. via “sunshine trading”, i.e. posting customer identities either on a 
voluntary or compulsory basis. Moreover, trading hours can be extended. 
In a forthcoming study for the European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI), Davies, 
Dufour and Scott-Quinn (2003) investigate the effects of fragmentation on two markets, 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and the LSE.  
•  TSE. Trading volume is largely concentrated in the hands of ten member firms, who 
participate in more than half of the total dollar trading volume. Member firms are 
able to internalise trades. Early studies suggested that internalisation primarily 
occurred for larger orders (while only accounting for 3.33% of trades, internalised 
trades amounted to 56% of the TSE’s total trading volume).
118 However, following 
changes to the structure of the Canadian financial markets, the large banks gained 
control of the major retail brokers. In a quest to reduce the costs of exchange fees, 
the brokers set up Proprietary Electronic Trading Systems (PETS). These were 
designed to maximise the internalisation of orders. Fearing that internalisation 
would reduce depth and liquidity on the TSX, and hence reduce its attractiveness 
vis-à-vis the NYSE and Nasdaq, the TSE changed its trading rules by requiring all 
orders for less than 1,200 shares to be posted on the CLOB.
119  
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•  LSE. The authors also investigated trades on the LSE’s central limit order book 
SETS (December 2000-February 2001), a market with high liquidity where 
internalisation and preferencing is common. They find that the trades executed off-
SETS are generally either small (<£10,000) or very large (>£600,000) while trades 
executed on the central book in a majority of cases fall in the range of £25,000 to 
£200,000. This suggests that in the London market, broker-dealers execute both 
small and very large trades off the exchange, with dealers then managing their 
inventory positions by trading average-size trades on the central order book. The 
authors also find that most of the price formation process occurs on the SETS, as 1) 
most of the changes to prices are explained by SETS trades, and 2) trades performed 
on the SETS contain more information. Hence, these results suggest that dealers 
dominate the price formation process. However, the dissemination of information 
into prices appears slow. This may be explained by the dominant position of dealers, 
who do not have to compete aggressively for order flow. In order to remedy this, the 
authors suggest more transparency of broker-dealer executions and more direct 
access of traders to the central order book.  
6.1.3  A trade-off between differentiated services and informative central prices 
The studies above shed no conclusive light on whether off-exchange trading deteriorates 
the overall quality of the market. Some studies support the concerns stated above, while 
others refute them.  
While a well functioning price discovery process is of central importance for e.g. the 
allocation of capital in an economy, the potentially negative impact on this process of 
off-exchange order execution has to be weighed against the advantages of diversity 
(differentiated services). This suggests that there is a trade-off between the benefits of a 
fragmented marketplace, where the diversity of structures meets the differing needs of 
traders, and the benefits of an integrated marketplace, where the information content of 
central prices may well be maximised.  
6.2  Agency problems, conflicts of interest and collusion 
The change in market structure also reactivates traditional issues of conflict of interest, 
collusion and monopoly practices. 
6.2.1  Conflicts of interest 
Leaving the intermediary with discretion as to where to execute a particular order raises 
the question whether there is a conflict between the interest of clients – who wish best 
execution – and intermediaries – who has a self-interest in executing orders in own 
books or via a preferenced/paying agent. Broker-dealers may have an interest in 
executing orders in-house, as this could enable them not only to avoid paying exchange 
fees but also to time the execution of some of their clients’ orders (e.g. retail) to fit their 
own proprietary trading interests or those of a larger, favoured customer.
120 This is not 
necessarily in the interest of those clients. This conflict, the argument goes, may be 
particularly pronounced when intermediaries are dealing with unsophisticated retail 
clients. 
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While establishing that such a conflict exists, another thing is to assess whether 
intermediaries act in such a way as to substantiate the claim. Indeed, intermediaries such 
as broker-dealers frequently point out that legislation already in place prevents such 
conflicts from effectively arising. They hence claim that the allegation that broker-
dealers may time the execution to fit their own trading interests is unrealistic. One 
reason is that current best-execution rules often require orders to be executed 
immediately. More fundamentally, if a broker-dealer wants to change its inventory, such 
changes are more easily done by actively trading on the relevant market rather than by 
passively waiting for suitable client orders to arrive.  
Overall, if an intermediary has discretion over where to route a trade order, his choice is 
likely to be affected by relative costs and benefits. While the intermediary has a self-
interest in executing orders in-house, it is often prevented from doing so by restricting 
regulation. However, cost assessments remain. Accordingly, if in-house matching 
remains cheaper than maintaining costly relationships with exchanges and local 
intermediaries, then there is always going to be an incentive to internalise. The current 
fragmented European exchange landscape indeed gives rise to such costs, since 
intermediaries, in order to access European markets, have to maintain multiple 
exchange and local agents relationships.
121  
In order to address problems of this kind, policies aimed at enabling direct access and 
harmonisation of access requirements are likely to play a large role. So is consolidation 
of the exchange landscape. However, competition between trading venues is also likely 
to be of importance. Hence, while some forms of off-exchange order execution give rise 
to agency problems, the net analysis is not straightforward. Off-exchange order 
execution exerts a competitive pressure on central markets, which may have positive 
effects in terms of putting pressure on central markets to decrease trading and access 
fees. 
6.2.2 Collusion 
In the context of quote-driven markets, some forms of off-exchange order execution 
may decrease the incentives for price competition and thus facilitate collusion. The 
reason is that intermediaries that price aggressively will achieve little benefit, as 
internalised order flow by definition is captive. Therefore, these types of off-exchange 
order execution may under certain conditions lead to higher bid-ask spreads for the 
overall order-flow.  
The potential for collusion is particularly pronounced if intermediaries are few and if 
switching intermediary is cumbersome or associated with certain drawbacks. Biais and 
Davydoff (2002) claim that this is precisely the situation in Europe.
122 They argue that 
in the European universal banking model, brokerage services are often bundled with 
other financial services. Accordingly, changing intermediary due to unhappiness with 
the quality of broker services would practically entail switching intermediary for 
remaining financial services as well. Moreover, choice is often limited or ineffective. In 
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some markets, the banking market structure is very concentrated. The internal market 
programme has contributed towards increasing contestability, as foreign intermediaries 
are able to provide services. Even so, it is claimed that replacing the use of a domestic 
bank by becoming the client of a European intermediary may not be optimal: foreign 
banks may have less knowledge of local conditions, and cultural differences may be 
more pronounced.  
However, some researchers have found that the kind of order flow being preferenced is 
not more profitable than other order flow.
123 Moreover, others find little evidence 
supporting collusion arguments.
124 Indeed, off-exchange order execution may 
sometimes dent collusion, as it introduces more competition for order flow.
125  
A more benign view of off-exchange order execution would claim that it is ideally 
suited for the trader who desires immediacy but does not wish to engage in a costly 
search process. Off-exchange order execution, according to this view, would be a 
supplement to on-exchange execution fitting the needs of particular types of trades.  
6.2.3  Exchange governance and predatory monopolies 
The changes in market structure depicted above not only give rise to concerns regarding 
new trading venues. The way that central markets are governed and controlled is also a 
source of potential concern. Despite the proliferation of trading venues, exchanges 
retain the advantage of incumbency. Hence, there is a public policy interest in ensuring 
that their actions do not become those of an uncontrolled monopolist. 
In spite of demutualisation, effective ownership of the demutualised entity often 
remains in the hands of former members. Compared to other listed companies, 
exchanges have a fairly concentrated shareholder structure with relatively little liquidity 
in their shares. However, differences between those exchanges that demutualised early 
compared to latecomers are apparent, with the shares of the former often being more 
widely held and circulated. This suggests that over time, exchanges may become more 
widely owned and held. 
This kind of demutualisation and the fact that some European exchanges retain the 
mutual structure may explain that while the trading process itself (matching of orders) 
has become entirely automated and disintermediated, the transmission of orders to 
trading venues remains heavily intermediated. Many exchanges do not allow direct 
access, but oblige traders to access the exchange via registered intermediaries. 
Disintermediation in this field would according to some observers generate a second 
generation of important cost savings. According to Domowitz and Steil, 
disintermediating exchange members in Europe may decrease trading fees by 70%, 
translating into a cost of capital savings of 7.8%.
126 
The advent of for-profit exchanges may come at a certain risk. Corporate finance theory 
predicts that shareholders may find it difficult to control the acts of management, 
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especially if ownership is dispersed. Limits to the effective control by shareholders is 
related to lack of resources and information, limited expertise and little of incentives to 
achieve a change (voice) compared to selling the share (exit).
127  
Considering the strong positive network externalities in securities markets described 
above, competition in the field of securities markets trading is likely to exhibit 
oligopoly, if not monopoly, characteristics in the long run. This poses the risk of 
exchanges developing anti-competitive behaviour, such as monopoly pricing. 
Demutualisation, while delivering certain distinct benefits (e.g. responsiveness to the 
needs of users), may over time weaken ownership control of these potential monopolists 
compared to the traditional mutual structure. In spite of trading venues increasingly 
facing the threat of being taken over if they perform badly, the market for corporate 
control in Europe remains hampered by cross-country obstacles (e.g. regulation and 
tax). Finally, even though a company performs well from the shareholders’ perspective, 
this does not automatically mean that its users or the public interest are satisfied. The 
private shareholders’ interests may indeed not overlap with the public interest.
128 
Traditional corporate governance rules are not likely to suffice to control these 
practices. Instead, some observers argue that answers have to be found in more 
regulation, e.g. of the kind associated with traditional natural monopolies such as 
utilities.
129 
6.3  Cream-skimming and distributive equity 
Another concern of the change in market structure is cream-skimming, i.e. the fear that 
new trading venues will attract the most profitable trades and income streams, hence 
leaving the central markets with the less profitable ones. This, the argument goes, would 
exacerbate the problems associated with fragmentation delineated above and undermine 
regulated markets’ ability to fulfil their public duty: price discovery. However, other 
observers have argued that the proliferation of trading venues have simply led to a 
change in the distribution of who trades what orders at a profit – without negative 
consequences to overall welfare. 
6.3.1  Impact on cross-subsidisation 
Any given market structure distributes costs and benefits among its users. Traditionally, 
exchanges have faced little competition and have hence had significant discretion in 
how to distribute such costs and benefits. Exchanges have in the past often used 
lucrative order flow to subsidise less lucrative order flow.
130 Such cross-subsidisation 
has taken several forms: 
•  Cross-subsidisation of large trades by small trades. This is especially prevalent in 
dealer markets, such as Nasdaq, where dealers/market makers perform a certain role 
(make markets under certain rules) against certain benefits (e.g. control on the 
order-flow data communicated to a wider audience). This protects the market-
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maker against disintermediation. It also enables it to compensate losses connected 
with trades in one class of shares with profits of trades in another class of shares.
131  
•  Cross-subsidisation of on-exchange by off-exchange trades. Many auction markets 
oblige traders who execute part of their order book off the central order book to 
execute the whole book at similar or better prices. Such “interaction rules” can be 
regarded as a subsidy of on-exchange trades by off-exchange trades.
132 With 
advances in technology, traders have become able to avoid such obligations by 
executing their orders on markets without such rules. 
•  Cross-subsidisation of retail trades by institutional trades. In certain dealer markets 
(e.g. NYSE, Nasdaq), small retail trades have the right to be executed electronically 
against market-maker quotes. In the US, such rules has not applied to ECNs, who 
are mostly regulated as brokers. They have thus been able to avoid this costly 
obligation by concentrating on institutional, high-volume traders.
133  
While the advent of new entrants normally increases the contestability of markets, it 
does not necessarily do so in all market segments. Entrants are likely to offer their 
services only in profitable areas. In the area of securities markets, it has been argued 
that the profitable trades for dealers are those done by uninformed retail traders, while it 
is more difficult to extract profits from more informed wholesale traders’ orders. This 
poses the risk of new entrants skimming the more profitable lines of business from the 
incumbent, who is left with the unprofitable ones. This would undermine the traditional 
equilibrium of cross-subsidisation and lead to a redistribution of costs and benefits. 
However, the cream-skimming argument has to be somewhat nuanced in a securities 
trading context. The fear of losing profitable orders and being left with less profitable 
ones should apply less to exchanges, as they do not enter into such direct relations. 
Instead, they provide platforms where traders meet. One should therefore expect them to 
be neutral in terms of their preferences regarding what type of traders they attract. Retail 
investors, while making up a small part of the overall trading volume, certainly provide 
exchanges with an important stream of revenue. The reason is not, however, that a 
single retail transaction is particularly profitable. Rather, the benefit of retail order flow 
is that despite its limited contribution to overall trading volume it represents a high 
amount of “tickets”, i.e. transactions.  
6.3.2  Payment for order flow 
Particular concern has been voiced over the practice of payment for order-flow 
described above. Order flow purchasers buy profitable order flow from brokers. The 
margins involved in executing smaller and less informed trades have been claimed to be 
so large that the purchaser can afford to match the best-price, pay the broker and still 
make a profit.
134 This leads to an adverse selection problem, with the central market 
being left with those trades least likely to be profitable. As a result, the central price 
discovery process is likely to function less well with worsening prices as a result. Some 
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evidence from the US markets suggests that by paying for order flow, purchasers 
effectively skim the most profitable (uninformed) trades from established exchanges.
135  
Such negative evidence is not conclusive, however. As illustrated above, other studies 
have found no evidence of harmful cream-skimming.
136 Moreover, other studies provide 
a more benign assessment of payment for order flow, seeing the practice as largely an 
effect of deficiencies in the central market. According to this line of reasoning, payment 
for order flow may be welfare-enhancing as it reduces the monopoly rents that a central 
market may incur from such deficiencies.
137 In that context, payment for order flow 
reduces market-makers’ rents and divides it more “fairly” between market-makers, 
other brokers and traders.
138 
Even so, payment for orders leads to diversion of profitable trades away from the 
central market. The central price, which often serves as a benchmark for best execution, 
may therefore increase. This would add to the gains to be made from an order 
purchasing strategy, as the cost of matching the best price would decrease. The 
purchaser of order flow would accordingly be able to make even higher profits.
139 Any 
welfare enhancing aspects of such strategies depend on the amount of the profit that is 
being passed on to traders.  
In sum, technological advances and new entrants have undermined cross-subsidisation. 
This raises questions of distribution of economic benefits and costs. In some markets 
(e.g. US quote-driven dealer markets), certain intermediaries (e.g. market-makers) have 
traditionally been allowed to extract profits from retail traders to compensate for losses 
made on more informed institutional traders. Payment for order flow enables other 
intermediaries to capture the execution of such profitable retail trades, leaving the 
traditional market-makers with the loss-making institutional trades. Put simply, this is a 
redistribution of the right to make profits from retail traders. Whether this enhances 
welfare or not depends on how much of the profit is passed on to retail traders and how 
the market will be able to cater for institutional traders.  
7.  A regulatory framework for managing structural change 
This chapter builds on the analysis above in trying to identify the difficult choices, or 
trade-offs that regulators have to make when drawing up rules. Drawing on the difficult 
choices derived from the above analysis, it will identify the major trade-offs regulators 
face. Second, it will assess how the country with the largest securities markets in the 
world has tried to create an integrated market. Third, it will assess the choices the 
Commission has made in its proposal for a directive, which on a whole was received 
favourably although parts have been subject to some controversy. It will compare these 
choices with the issues, concerns and regulatory strategies elaborated upon above. The 
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aim is to filter out the current noise in the regulatory debate and concentrate on the 
desirability and feasibility of the Commission’s regulatory choices. Finally, it will put 
forward a number of policy recommendations.  
7.1  The regulatory trade-offs 
The concerns depicted above are manifest and real, and the factors giving rise to them 
may have potentially harmful effects. However, their harmfulness depends on the 
structural context of different markets. For example, off-exchange order execution may 
in certain circumstances impair the overall price formation mechanism. In other 
conditions, it may not. Likewise, collusion may be more of a problem in smaller 
marketplaces, whereas in larger ones, more effective competition makes collusion less 
probable. 
In large, well developed, diverse and competitive market centres, collusion is, on 
balance, less of a problem and competition may be relied upon to, if not prevent, at least 
significantly mitigate any abuse or inefficiencies. In smaller marketplaces, which are 
less developed and less contestable, there may be more of a need for stringent rules on 
conflicts of interest and policies aimed at improving the efficiency of the price 
formation process.  
Faced with this need for rules to be adapted to local conditions, it is difficult to foresee a 
high level of harmonisation of rules being introduced at the EU level. Indeed, a case can 
be made for providing national rule-makers with a degree of discretion in adapting EU 
principles to local conditions. This, however, runs counter to one of the primary aims of 
EU law; to integrate national markets.  
This brings the analysis to the frustrating area of trade-offs. Public rule-making contains 
a significant amount of trade-offs. Rule-makers have to weigh the costs and benefits of 
any particular regulatory action. Such analysis should serve as the basis for a proper 
regulatory response.  
Several such trade-offs exist in the field of securities markets. One is the risk that 
member states will adopt protectionist regulation if they are provided with a lever of 
national discretion. However, this risk has to be weighed against the possibility of sub-
optimal regulation that is not tailored to national specificities if an approach of detailed 
harmonisation at the EU-level is envisaged.  
At an equally general level is the risk that regulatory actions may fail, no matter how 
well intentioned and well designed they are thought to have been. Regulators ought to 
bear such risks in mind before embarking on a particular regulatory strand. Such risks 
include lack of information and imperfect knowledge, regulatory capture and lack of 
flexibility once a regulatory response has been enacted and implemented. Even though 
these risks may advocate a careful attitude towards regulatory intervention, such risks 
have to be weighed against the benefits derived from proper regulatory intervention; e.g. 
highlighting and mitigating conflicts of interest, outlawing collusion and providing a 
framework to correct the inefficiencies arising from market failures.  
More specifically, trade-offs are inherent in most of the issues relating to the concerns 
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•  When laying down transparency requirements, regulators have to weigh the benefits 
of the more informative prices that the transparency requirements would produce 
against a likely decrease in the liquidity that large traders are willing to provide. A 
key problem is how to deal with investors’ desire to avoid informed traders. They 
may seek shelter from them by trading in more opaque marketplaces. If forced to 
trade in the open, they will protect themselves with wider spreads. 
•  When devising best-execution rules, whose aims are to reduce overall trading costs, 
regulators have to weigh the benefits to clients of the resulting lower spreads (as 
best-execution rules force brokers to shop around for the best price) against the 
higher commissions that intermediaries will charge their clients (search is costly).  
•  When laying down rules affecting the level of consolidation in markets, regulators 
have to chose between different sorts of competition. They can either promote 
competition among traders or intermediaries (concentrated markets) or competition 
among market centres (fragmented markets). 
•  Fundamentally, regulators have to choose whether they want to stimulate a dynamic 
service climate (fragmented markets) or an externality-maximising climate 
(consolidated markets).  
Such trade-offs are inherent and cannot be avoided. In order to handle these issues 
properly, regulators should a) identify the trade-offs, and b) identify the main 
parameters in the cost and benefit side respectively, and c) weigh the costs against the 
benefits and only regulate if the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs or if the 
benefits are of such a central public interest that costs are defensible. This analysis does 
not necessarily have to be formal, relying on hard numbers (although US and UK 
regulators follow such a more formalistic approach). It is important, however, that both 
costs and benefits are acknowledged and that some form of systematic analysis is 
devoted to assessing their respective weights. At EU level, such a formalised framework 
for thought is regrettably missing. 
7.2  Integrating fragmented markets in the US 
In the explanatory memorandum preceding the November proposal, the Commission 
refers to prior US regulatory experience. Indeed, such comparisons are worthwhile, as 
many of the current trends in financial regulation emanate from a US context where 
regulators have been grappling with e.g. the problems of fragmentation for some time. 
Making comparisons is one thing, drawing regulatory conclusions another. Needless to 
say, the US context is in many respects different from the EU. For example, the US has 
a single capital market (although multiple markets in terms of corporate governance, 
which is regulated at the state level) with a single regulator and supervisor, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Moreover, recent events illustrate that the 
US regulatory system has important problems of its own. With these caveats in mind, a 
deeper foray into US regulatory experience highlights many of the difficulties EU 
regulators are currently facing. (See Box 7 for an overview of the US market structure.)  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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7.2.1  A gradually emerging public framework 
In the early 1970s, some formal competition to execute trades in US securities markets 
existed. On the exchanges, competition largely took the form of exchange dealers 
Box 7. US market structure 
Securities trading in the US is dominated by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. There
are also a number of regional exchanges, each with a different specialisation.  
Listed securities 
The large majority of exchange trading of listed securities takes place on the NYSE. There are de facto
three different forums where trading in NYSE-listed securities takes place:  
•  Specialist floor trading. The NYSE, unlike most European exchanges, operates a trading floor
where specialist firms are appointed for each traded security. These specialists are market-makers,
i.e. they commit their capital to maintain two-way quotes (bid-ask prices) and they are obliged to
trade on these quotes with those who are interested.  
•  “Upstairs” trading. A significant amount of NYSE trading does not go through the specialists on
the floor. Member firms often match larger orders with other customers or commit their capital by
also taking the other side of the transaction. Such transactions are only later crossed on the
exchange.  
•  “Third market”. While the above trading methods are both on-exchange, there exists a third
market. At the end of the 1970s, the SEC curtailed the scope of the NYSE’s concentration rule
(NYSE Rule 390). Prior to that, a limited third market did exist where member firms who wanted
to avoid some rules of the NYSE (e.g. fixed commissions) carried out some trading with non-
members. With the 1979 Off-Board Trading rules, where agency trades and trading in securities
listed after 1979 were excluded from the scope of the concentration rule, the third market became
more important and is today dominated by dealer firms that specialise in the internalisation of retail
order flow. The concentration rule was eventually abolished in December 1999. 
Nasdaq securities 
In 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) started to run an Automated Quotation
System. The purpose was to collect and display quotes posted by dealers in the OTC market that was
regulated by the NASD. NASDAQ consisted of a quote management system that collected and
displayed quotes from market-makers and ECN members of the NASD. As such it was not really an
exchange, but more a decentralised dealer market. Market centres trading Nasdaq securities are
currently linked by the NASD's SelectNet system.  
Many of the new ECNs emerging in the 1990s catered specifically for the wholesale market. Faced with
the potential difficulty of finding market-makers interested in executing retail orders, the NASD in
1984 introduced the Small Order Execution System (SOES). It allows Nasdaq participants to execute
small orders automatically against the best bid and offer of a market-maker.  
Faced with changes in technology and market structure, however, which increased the competition
between market-makers and ECNs, Nasdaq’s systems were increasingly regarded as insufficient by
market participants who wanted to see more than just the best bid and offer of the trading interest of
market-makers and ECNs. Hence, coupled with the decision to divest its interest in Nasdaq in due
course, the NASD in 1999 proposed a new order display and collection facility, the Supermontage. In
2001, it won regulatory approval to establish this new order display and collection facility for Nasdaq-
listed securities. Supermontage consists of the Nasdaq Order Display Facility (NODF) and the Order
Collector Facility (OCF). It will provide a means to present a greater depth of trading interest (by
adding more orders and quotes) at multiple price levels. In effect, Supermontage will be very similar to
a central order book.  
Source: Seligman (2001).  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
 68 
competing with floor traders and limit order submitters. Off the established exchanges, 
traders were formally able to execute orders in exchange listed equities. Moreover, 
dealers on regional exchanges were able to execute orders for those exchange-listed 
equities that their regional exchange had been granted the right to trade even though 
they remained unlisted on the regional exchange. Therefore, the formal ability to trade 
on other exchanges was in place. However, due to the lack of effective information 
about the quotes on other markets, as the various markets were not connected, traders 
lacked information about trading opportunities elsewhere, and quotes hence varied 
substantially. 
Dissatisfied with the increasing fragmentation and the existing barriers to interaction 
between markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the early 1970s pondered 
how to stimulate a more contestable market structure while at the same time ensuring 
that investors had access to information from all markets. In 1975, at the instigation of 
the SEC, the US Congress put forward changes to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
(the “1975 Amendments”). These were far-reaching, e.g. ending fixed commission rates 
and granting significant new powers to the SEC. Most importantly, however, the 
amendments initiated the development of a national system with integrated markets.  
In the Exchange Act, Section 11, Congress chose to provide the SEC with maximum 
flexibility in developing a market system that would “foster efficiency, enhance 
competition, increase information available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate 
the offsetting of investors’ orders, and contribute to best execution of these orders”.
140 
These aims are all very familiar to the seasoned observer of the ISD review. However, 
in contrast to the European Commission’s decision to provide for detailed primary 
legislation, the US Congress restrained itself to only directing the SEC “to use its 
authority…to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities.”
141 
Since then, the SEC has gradually developed a framework of secondary law which 
together forms the National Market System (NMS). The main components are: 
•  Off-board trading rule (19c-3). As a first measure to increase competition, the SEC 
in 1979 curtailed restrictions on off-exchange order execution for listed shares (Rule 
19c-3). As a result, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) members were increasingly 
able to execute NYSE-listed shares against their own account on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) OTC-market.
142 This provided a boost to 
the “third market”. 
•  Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The SEC also required the major trading venues 
to create links between themselves. The ITS links nine US markets and is itself 
linked to NASD's Computer-Assisted Execution System (CAES).
143 These links 
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permit trading across different trading venues by allowing a broker-dealer in one 
market centre to send an order to another market that is trading the same security.  
•  Transaction Reporting Rule (11 Aa 3-1). This rule requires trading venues to report 
transactions and last sale information to their self-regulatory organisations (SROs) 
who in their turn file with the SEC a transaction reporting plan for equity securities 
listed on a national securities exchange or included in the National Market tier of 
Nasdaq (so-called NMS-securities) traded in its market.
144  
•  Quote Rule (11 Ac 1-1). Originating in 1978 but amended several times since, the 
quote rule requires SROs to put in place procedures whereby its members make 
available bids, offers and quotation sizes for exchange-listed equities, and Nasdaq 
National Market and SmallCap Market securities, to information vendors. It also 
requires these quotes to be “firm”, i.e. the dealer or market maker is obliged to 
execute an order in any amount up to the published quote size. This rule is subject to 
some exceptions.
145  
•  Display of transaction reports, last sale data and quotation information rule (11 Ac 
1-2). In 1980, the SEC put forward the display rule, which requires those (e.g. 
vendors, broker-dealers) providing broker-dealers and investors with market 
information from a single market in a security to provide information from all other 
markets as well (“a consolidated display of information from all reporting market 
centres”).
146  
•  Display of customer limit order rule (11 Ac 1-4). In 1996, the SEC imposed the so-
called “order-handling rules”, which require OTC market-makers and exchange 
specialists to display certain customer limit orders for covered securities (all 
exchange-traded securities and the 1000 Nasdaq securities with the highest average 
daily trading volume in the previous quarter) unless some stated exceptions apply.
147  
•  Regulation ATS (17 CFR 242.301(b)). This regulation, which was created in 1996, 
requires ATSs and ECNs that trade 5% or more of the average daily trading volume 
in an exchange or Nasdaq-listed security to display and provide execution access to 
their quotes through an SRO. 
Moreover, the 1970s also saw the centralisation of clearing and settlement arrangements 
into two utilities, the Depository Trust Company (DTC) in 1973 and the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) in 1976. These were put under a single roof – 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in 1999. 
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7.2.2  A vivid regulatory debate 
The rules underpinning the NMS have been the subject of much debate over the years. 
As a result they have been frequently changed. According to its detractors, the rules are 
unnecessary, as market competition provides the incentive to spread quote information 
in order to gain new orders. Moreover, the rules are claimed to have contributed to 
cream-skimming, effectively allowing third markets to free-ride on the central markets’ 
price production while picking the most lucrative trades themselves. In addition, they 
claim that the rules have rendered permanent the reigning institutional structure and 
technology of the 1970s, the reason being that as market forces are replaced with 
Box 8. Collecting and distributing market information in the US 
The rules outlined above govern the collection and distribution of quotes, trade prices and volumes in 
US securities and options markets. The information is collected from the stock exchanges, the options 
exchanges and the NASD for all exchange-listed and Nasdaq shares in near real-time. After 
collection, the information is consolidated and distributed. The consolidated information forms the 
basis of the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) for each security. 
There are four different national market systems (“plans”) that disseminate the consolidated market 
information. These plans govern the four networks that SROs have developed to disseminate market 
information:  
•  Network A for NYSE-listed securities,  
•  Network B for securities listed on Amex (or meeting Amex listing criteria on regional 
exchanges),  
•  The Nasdaq system for Nasdaq-listed securities, and  
•  The OPRA system for exchange listed options.  
Under Network A, the Consolidated Tape Association plan (CTA) collects and distributes transaction 
information while the Consolidated Quotation plan (CQS) governs the collection and distribution of 
quote information. The information is collected from nine SROs in the two plans who all have as 
members venues that trade NYSE-listed securities: Amex, the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), CBOE, 
Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX), Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE), NASD, NYSE and Phlx. Similar 
provisions apply to Network B. In the Nasdaq system and OPRA plan, things work slightly 
differently however. 
Market information volumes 1980-2000 
  Network A & B   Nasdaq  OPRA 
Reported transactions       
1980 18,304,000  8,000,000  -- 
2000 312,100,000  643,000,000  42,947,524 
Processed quotes       
1985 30,798,000  10,000,000   
2000 691,000,000  1,090,000,000  10,949,856,412 
 
The collected and consolidated information is then disseminated via these networks to information 
vendors. The income from selling the information ($598 million in 2000) is distributed among the 
trading venues according to each plan’s formula.  
Source: Seligman et al. (2001).  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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government intervention the incentive to innovate and compete for orders is reduced. 
The result, according to the detractors, is a decreased dynamism of markets.
148  
The order-handling rules have also provoked a significant debate, with some observers 
claiming it has fragmented the markets. Prior to the rules only one ECN existed, as most 
potential marketplaces were not sufficiently liquid to be credible venues of execution. 
Following the SOES rules, the number of ECNs have flourished as they have no longer 
been confined to orders on their own books but also been able to tap the larger Nasdaq 
book and market-makers who did not want to include the new quotes instead sent them 
on to ECNs.
149 Other observers, however, claim that even though the market may be 
nominally more fragmented, overall market quality has increased as different liquidity 
pockets are now connected. 
Proponents of the US approach argue that the rules provide a framework for market 
forces and in the process ensure competition and market linkages. The rules, according 
to this line of reasoning, improve the likelihood that market forces direct their 
dynamism in a direction that will benefit end-users. All in all, proponents believe that it 
is reasonable to expect that there is no perfect overlap between the interests of service 
providers (markets, market intermediaries) and end-users (issuers, investors). Hence, the 
commercial incentives of service providers imply that a market structure directed only 
by market forces would be inefficient and unsatisfactory from a wider, public interest 
point of view. In the absence of perfectly competitive markets, there is hence an 
inherent reason for government intervention.
150  
Recently, the market information rules (Rules 11) have been the subject of debate.
151 
Following the emergence of new trading practices (e.g. online trading), which resulted 
from the transition in the governance of exchanges towards for-profit structures and as 
decimalisation has been introduced, the way that market information is collected and 
distributed has been the subject of review. Online traders need information in real-time, 
not close to real-time as currently provided by the plans. The logic of for-profit 
exchanges and SROs changes the foundation on which the more utility-based networks 
are built. Decimalisation has the potential to increase the number of quote and 
transaction reports exponentially, as prices now move in much smaller increments. 
7.2.3  A system in constant change 
The wider debate, part of which has been recapitulated above, and changes to market 
structure have contributed to frequent changes to the rules underpinning the NMS. The 
discretion granted to the SEC has enabled it to create flexible rules, which have 
gradually evolved over the years as new regulatory concerns have arisen and old ones 
disappeared. A carefully drafted framework providing for market transparency and 
linkages, with appropriate exemptions and special provisions, is in place. As a result, 
the US has so far been able to reap the benefits of competition while at the same time 
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sufficiently mitigating the potentially negative effects from fragmentation. As such, the 
US experience is certainly of interest to the EU.  
7.3  The ISD proposal 
A cornerstones of the EU’s financial market legislation, the ISD does not lends itself 
easily to summarising owing to its wide scope. Overall, the aim of the new proposal is 
to achieve a directive that better protects investors and the market integrity while 
promoting efficient and integrated markets. The proposal retains the division between 
regulated markets and investment firms. 
A key aim of the new proposal is to provide a framework catering for a more 
contestable trading landscape.
152 A key part of the new directive is therefore the 
imposition of an ambitious transparency regime. The new proposal creates a coherent, if 
differentiated, pre- and post-trade transparency regime for regulated markets, 
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and investment firms. The new ISD also contains 
stronger rules regarding the operation of investment firms (e.g. conflicts of interest) and 
its relations with clients (e.g. conduct of business rules). It also introduces for the first 
time explicit best-execution rules and order-handling rules. For regulated markets, the 
proposal provides for more harmonised rules regarding organisational requirements, the 
operators of the market, admission of instruments to trading and transparency. The ISD 
proposal also contains elaborate provisions on supervisory authorities, particularly 
concerning the designation in each member state of a competent authority and the 
powers and resources of that authority. 
Following lengthy consultations within the framework of FESCO/CESR, the ISD 
proposal adds new obligations for multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), which would 
include ATSs and crossing-systems as described above. This is in line with a functional 
theory of regulation, which stipulates that the functional characteristics and not the 
institutional form should determine regulatory rights and obligations. Accordingly, the 
proposal aims to impose similar obligations on MTFs as those imposed on regulated 
markets (e.g. transparency and capital requirements).  
Critically, the proposal contains no concentration rule. Provided that i) the investor was 
resident of a EU member state, ii) the trade was carried out by an investment firm via its 
main establishment, branch or via remote access, iii) it concerned instruments listed on 
a regulated market and iv) the investor could avoid complying with the obligation, the 
1993 ISD allowed but did not compel member states to require that trades were 
executed on a regulated market (Art. 14). Instead of routing all trade orders to a 
regulated market, investment firms will be free to settle orders elsewhere provided that 
their clients allow them to. This is in line with the Commission’s aim to devise a 
directive that is neutral in terms of impact on market structure and that favours more 
competition. Whether the Commission has achieved that aim will be further discussed 
below.  
Instead of presenting all parts of the ISD, the presentation below follows the regulatory 
instruments developed above (ch. 5) and accordingly focuses on the framework for 
dealing with more fragmented markets that the Commission is putting forward.  
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7.3.1  The new transparency regime 
In spite of the ISD’s wide scope, the proposals that have caused much lobbying and are 
likely to be the ground of debate as the co-decision process gathers pace once again 
relate to competition between trading venues and how to deal with the potentially 
harmful effects of this fragmentation. Accordingly, the Commission’s proposal contains 
new transparency requirements for regulated markets and investment firms, the latter 
containing alternative trading systems (or MTFs in the Commission’s term) and broker-
dealers. 
7.3.1.1  Regulated markets (Arts. 41 and 42) 
The 1993 ISD already contained transparency provisions for regulated markets. These 
were both of post-trade (notably requiring regulated markets to publish at the end of 
each trading hour the weighted average price and the trading volume of the six 
preceding hours and every 20 minutes the weighted average price and the highest and 
lowest prices) and pre-trade (where prior access to information on prices and quantities, 
such information shall be continuous and quotes should be firm) character (Art. 21.2).  
The new proposal contains a more comprehensive pre- and post-trade transparency 
regime. This is in line with the academic literature referred to above, which universally 
concludes that pre- and post-trade transparency are appropriate on public trading forums 
such as stock exchanges, since the very intention of routing orders to a public market is 
to disclose trading interest to other market participants. Moreover, stock exchanges 
make their living from attracting as many traders as possible, and hence have an 
inherent incentive to publish widely. 
As for pre-trade information, Art. 41.1 requires regulated markets to “make public 
current bid and offer prices which are advertised through their systems for shares 
admitted to trading”. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission makes a 
distinction between quote-driven markets and order-driven markets. This is in line with 
the academic and expert debate which stresses the fundamentally different workings of 
these markets, differences that have to be reflected in pre-trade requirements. 
Accordingly, regulated markets will have to make public part of their order book if they 
are order-driven while quote-driven markets’ market-makers will have to publish some 
of their bid- and ask-quotes. Furthermore, it provides a waiver for large transactions 
(Art. 41.2) and also requires regulated markets to publish the pre-trade information 
investment firms will post following the obligations of Art. 25.  
The proposal also delegates to comitology to spell out how pre-trade obligations can be 
excluded for trading methods operated by regulated markets “which conclude 
transactions under their rules by reference to prices established outside the rules and 
systems of the regulated market or by periodic auction” (Art. 41.3d). This refers, for 
example, to crossing systems. 
Regarding  post-trade transparency, regulated markets will have to publish prices, 
volumes and times of all equity trades at all times on a “reasonable commercial basis” 
and “as close to real-time as possible” (Art. 42.1). Deferred publication is allowed for 
transactions that are large in scale (Art. 42.2).   M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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7.3.1.2  Multilateral trading facilities (Arts. 27 and 28) 
MTFs resemble regulated markets in the sense that they, without participating in the 
trades themselves, provide a trading facility where users can meet. The ISD proposal 
accordingly imposes transparency obligations on MTFs similar to those imposed on 
regulated markets. Not part of the 1993 ISD, these provisions are entirely new. 
Regarding pre-trade information, investment firms operating a MTF will be obliged to 
make public “current bid and offer prices which are advertised through their systems in 
respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated market.” This information is to be 
made public on “reasonable commercial terms” on a continuous basis during the trading 
day (Art. 27.1). The same deferrals and exceptions applying to the regulated markets’ 
pre-trade regime will apply for MTFs. As a result, crossing systems not involving “prior 
disclosure of firm indication for prices” may be exempted from the scope of the pre-
trade obligation.  
The  post-trade obligations of MTFs are equally in line with the regulated market 
regime, as MTFs ought to “make public the price, volume and time of the transactions 
executed under its rules and systems in respect of shares” admitted to trading on a 
regulated market (Art. 28.1). The same requirements regarding content, timing and 
methods of publication applying for regulated markets also apply for MTFs (Art. 28.2).  
7.3.1.3  Investment firms (Arts. 20.4, 25 and 26) 
The Commission recognises that different transparency requirements have to be 
developed for off-exchange order execution by investment firms, “given the 
fundamental difference between bilateral dealing or order-execution by investment 
firms and exchanges” (Explanatory Memorandum, p. 21). Despite these differences and 
the uncertain effects of pre-trade transparency elaborated above, the Commission has 
taken the position that a high level of pre-trade transparency is the best way to prevent 
fragmentation and to promote investor protection. Although not being identical to those 
imposed on regulated markets and MTFs, the Commission for the first time accordingly 
extends pre- and post-trade transparency obligations to investment firms.  
The client limit-order display rule (Art. 20.4) will require investment firms to publish 
those limit orders (instructions to trade at best price, but not worse than a specified 
limit) that they are unwilling or unable to execute themselves immediately. Such 
unexecuted limit orders are interesting from a price point of view and the rule’s aim is 
to ensure that the information content of these orders reaches the market. The rule 
allows a number of exceptions, however. If clients request orders not to be disclosed, 
investment firms will not be obliged to publish. Also, the rule allows the same 
exceptions for large transactions as allowed for in the regulated market regime (Art. 
41.2). 
In its quote disclosure rule (Art. 25), the Commission also proposes to require 
investment firms that run a trading book to publish the terms (bid and ask quotes) at 
which they are ready to trade typical retail transactions in liquid equities. More 
precisely, the article requires any investment firm that is authorised to deal on its own 
account to “make public a firm bid and offer price for transactions of a size customarily 
undertaken by a retail investor in respect of shares in which it is dealing, and where 
those shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and for which there is a liquid  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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market” (Art. 25.1). The intention of the Commission is to calibrate the requirements so 
that they do not impede liquidity provision. Accordingly, the rules are not intended to 
capture larger-sized transactions or transactions in illiquid securities.  
In effect the rules mean that investment firms have to make markets to all participants in 
these liquid equities. This obligation is waived for smaller investment firms that do not 
represent an “important provider of liquidity for the share(s) in question on a regular or 
continuous basis” (Art. 25.2). The quotes are to be made public in an “easily accessible” 
manner to other market participants, free of charge and on a continuous basis during the 
trading day (Art. 25.3).  
When drafting these requirements for investment firms, the Commission has taken the 
view that an expansive pre-trade regime is needed to effectively link liquidity pools of 
different trading venues. It has also decided that mandated rules are necessary and that 
market incentives are not sufficient for a coherent transparency regime to evolve. The 
Commission has not entirely ignored research that suggests that quote transparency may 
sometimes harm liquidity. Transparency requirements differ between regulated markets, 
MTFs and investment firms. Moreover, as has been alluded to above, there are 
exceptions to the pre-trade rules on investment firms. First, clients can opt out from pre-
trade requirements if they so wish, as “…investment firms, unless the client expressly 
instructs otherwise, are to take measures to facilitate the earliest possible execution of 
that order…” (Art. 20.4). Moreover, the Commission’s purpose, as expressly stated in 
the Explanatory Memorandum, is to capture retail size transactions: the “mandatory 
disclosure quote disclosure rule should be confined to retail-size transactions in highly 
liquid equities” (Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 22-23). In addition, those investment 
firms that are not important providers of liquidity for shares on a continuous or regular 
basis are exempted (Art. 25.2). Finally, exemptions are to be further detailed by 
comitology (Art. 25.4). Whether these exceptions are sufficient to target retail business 
only will be further discussed below. 
The proposal also contains post-trade requirements. Investment firms that execute listed 
shares outside regulated markets or MTFs, either for their own account or on behalf of 
clients, have to make public the volume and price of the transactions and the time they 
were concluded. This information should immediately be made easily accessible to the 
wider public against compensation (Art. 26.1). The same requirements regarding 
publication and timeliness applying to the regulated market regime (Art. 42) will apply 
to investment firms (Art. 26.2).  
7.3.2  Provisions on best execution (Art. 19) 
Not part of the 1993 ISD, EU rules will in the future also contain provisions on best 
execution. This is in line with the academic debate which has increasingly stated the 
benefits of execution rules for ensuring that the execution quality of investors is kept. 
Art. 19 provides that investment firms should execute client orders in such a way that 
the client obtains “best possible result” in terms of price, costs, speed and likelihood of 
execution (Art. 19.1). The article directs authorities to ensure that procedures 
maintaining execution quality are in place and that those procedures take into account 
execution conditions in the wider marketplace (Art. 19.2). These procedures should be 
reviewed on a regular basis so as to ensure that the investment firm has access to those 
venues that offer the most favourable execution for their clients (Art. 19.3).   M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Parts of the conduct of business rules (Art. 18) are also aimed at boosting execution 
quality. Paragraph 5 provides that clients shall receive information on e.g. different 
execution venues while paragraph 8 states that clients should receive reports on the 
progress and costs of their transactions. Art. 23 also provides that investment firms must 
maintain records for all transactions they have carried out on behalf of clients. 
7.3.3  Conduct of business rules (Art. 18) 
The new ISD proposal updates the 1993 provisions on conduct of business rules. The 
old rules were vague and left significant discretion to member states. They were 
entrusted to draft rules, subject to being in line with a few core principles contained in 
Art. 11. However, these principles were vague and over the years gave rise to different 
interpretations between member states. Notably, there was significant ambiguity 
regarding the role of home and host authorities concerning enforcement.  
In order to overcome this lack of clarity, the new rules foresee the adoption of common 
conduct of business rules via comitology. Based on previous work by CESR, the 
Commission intends to differentiate these rules according to type of investment service 
and type of investor (retail, professional) (Art. 18.5). The new rules, for example, 
regulate the information flow between investment firms and their clients (e.g. 
marketing, timely information on nature of risks, record of agreements, etc.). Regarding 
branch operations, the host authority will be responsible for enforcing the conduct of 
business rules (paragraph 12).  
7.3.4  Provisions on time priority and handling of orders (Art. 20) 
The 1993 ISD contained no provision for order-handling. However, if the 
Commission’s proposal is accepted by the Council and the EP, investment firms will 
have to implement procedures that ensure “fair and expeditious execution” of client 
orders (Art. 20.1). Member states shall ensure that investment firms implement 
procedures so that time precedence prevails (Art. 20.2). The stated aim is to enhance 
clients’ confidence in the “impartiality and quality” of the execution service.  
The Commission takes the view that before executing orders outside a regulated market 
or an MTF, a client’s prior consent is required (Art. 20.3). That consent has to be 
renewed annually. Furthermore, as elaborated above, orders that are not immediately 
executed should be made public immediately, unless the client “expressly instructs 
otherwise” or if the order is large in size compared to normal market size (Art. 20.4).  
7.3.5  Provisions on conflicts of interest (Art. 16) 
Following the blurring of lines between previously differentiated lines of business, the 
new ISD proposal contains a self-standing provision on conflicts of interest. This was 
not the case in the 1993 Directive, where such conflicts were part of prudential rules 
(Art. 10) and conduct of business rules (Art. 11).  
According to the new proposal, investment firms must identify conflicts of interest 
between themselves and their clients or between clients with conflicting interests (Art. 
16.1). Investment firms are required to have arrangements in place to handle those 
conflicts and prevent them from affecting their clients’ interests (Art. 16.2). If such 
arrangements are not enough to prevent conflicts, investment firms must disclose the  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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source and nature of the conflict to potential clients before undertaking any business 
(Art. 16.3). 
7.3.6  A longer and more detailed directive 
The new ISD proposal hence contains an elaborate framework aimed at countering the 
potentially negative effects of a more contestable trading landscape while at the same 
time upgrading its provisions on investor protection.  
The ISD contains much more, however, than the regimes elaborated upon above. Being 
the most important piece of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), each rule is 
likely to have a significant impact. Other contentious parts have not been covered in this 
report, e.g. the issues related to the inclusion of commodity derivatives.  
While this paper has not analysed the other parts of the ISD in detail, it is clear that the 
higher level of ambition has resulted in a more detailed and longer piece of regulation. 
A simple calculation of the number of words and articles in the current ISD proposal 
compared to the 1993 ISD illustrates this. Compared to the 1993 ISD’s 32 articles, the 
new proposal contains 67 articles, of which 28 concern investment firms. In number of 
words, this difference is cemented, with the new ISD containing 10,000 more words 
than the old ISD (see Table 13).  
Table 13. The level of detail in the 1993 ISD compared to 2002 ISD proposal 
  Number of articles  Articles open to 
comitology 
Total word count 
(including recitals) 
1993 ISD  32  (few, and never 
implemented) 
14,381 
ISD proposal 
(Commission draft, 
2002) 
67 18  25,556 
Articles applicable to 
investment firms 
28 12  9,188 
Articles applicable to 
exchanges 
12 4  2,715 
Source: Lannoo (2003). 
7.4  Assessing the new ISD proposal 
These new rules for investment firms aimed at ensuring investor protection and 
achieving market transparency have provoked heated discussions between market 
participants, member state authorities and the European Commission. The vocal 
discontent from some traders is an illustration of how important the ISD is and how 
contentious the review has become. The ISD is important because it regulates traders 
and execution venues in the EU, hence shaping market structure. It is contentious 
because regulatory choices on market structure determine who trades profitably. 
Therefore, while the debate is certainly driven by regulatory concerns, the intensive 
lobbying surrounding that debate should be read in the light of competition between 
trading venues wanting to shape rules so that their potential to capture orders is 
maximised.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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When devising responses to counter the concerns raised by fragmentation, it is obvious 
from the above that the Commission has access to several instruments. The relative 
importance accorded to any instrument is a matter of emphasis. The instruments are 
partly dependent, partly independent. For example, there is a clear link between 
transparency and rules on execution quality, as it is easier to assess execution quality in 
transparent markets. However, a regulator can compensate for a lighter touch in one 
area with more stringent use of other instruments. The key difficulty, as recognised by 
the Commission itself, is to create a regulatory framework capable of adapting as 
markets evolve. The regulatory concerns elaborated relate above all to the higher degree 
of contestability that marks today’s securities markets. However, will this more 
contestable landscape prevail or will the inherent forces of network externalities 
eventually lead to a return to a more concentrated marketplace? The outcome has an 
impact on regulatory strategy. As no one can predict the industry’s future structure, 
flexibility becomes a key attribute of any regulatory framework. Hence, the most 
important aim is to avoid forging a rigid regulatory structure. The remainder of this 
chapter assesses the adequacy of the regulatory framework proposed by the 
Commission in terms of the concerns elaborated above, and where it is found wanting, 
explores whether there are alternative means of addressing these concerns. 
7.4.1  A flexible framework for calibrating transparency requirements 
Transparent markets offer significant benefits. The rules to achieve transparent markets 
entail low direct costs and are less intrusive compared to other forms of more detailed 
command-type regulation. Hence, it is natural that a basic presumption would lean 
towards maximising transparency and that the burden of proof would fall on those 
wanting to restrict it. In that sense, the Commission is certainly correct in its high level 
of ambition. However, the benefits of transparency have to be weighed against its 
indirect costs. 
7.4.1.1  Who should trade profitably?  
Changes to rules that structure markets have an impact on who trades with a profit. No 
single transparency regime benefits all traders, as these have different needs and 
preferences. Accordingly, regulators are faced with the decision of choosing who to 
benefit. Should regulators favour retail investors, and hence apply a more ambitious 
transparency policy? Or should they favour the economically important wholesale or 
institutional sector, and hence allow a more divergent transparency approach? Which is 
the more important? Or, is this dichotomy false, as wholesale business fundamentally 
comes down to managing the investments of retail investors?  
The current proposal puts some wholesale business on the line. The envisaged pre-trade 
regime will increase the credit and counterparty risks that investment firms face, as they 
would have to deal with any interested party eager to trade at the quotes that they had 
posted (Art. 25) or willing to fill the orders they had submitted (Art. 20.4) no matter 
whether that party is already a client or not. The large intermediaries are important 
liquidity providers in all markets, both from an internal market and global viewpoint. 
Even though these to some extent represent the producer interest (which per se should 
have no precedence over consumer interest), the danger is present and clear. In the face 
of these risks, liquidity providers are likely to at best hedge their bets by posting worse  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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prices (which results in wider spreads) or at worst, to search for a more permissive 
regulatory environment elsewhere.  
It is also uncertain whether the pre-trade regime would benefit retail investors. 
Currently, off-exchange venues often offer them speedy execution at competitive costs. 
Moreover, as retail investors possess little of potentially harmful information, 
investment firms are willing to trade with them and often offer price improvements. 
However, if investment firms were obliged to extend these favourable quotes 
indiscriminately, matters would change. Investment firms would likely hedge their 
potential exposure by charging wider spreads. As a consequence, the prices on exchange 
may become the best. Finally, as the wholesale business is fundamentally about 
managing retail investments, any proposal that affects the wholesale cost line is likely to 
be passed on to retail investors. 
If pre-trade transparency requirements are relaxed, however, how can the regulatory 
concerns be addressed? For example, how can retail investors’ wider interests be 
accommodated? To some extent the risks to retail investors can be dealt with 
differently. For example, more stringent order-handling rules and conflict of interest 
rules may ensure that there is a reasonable level of protection for retail investors. 
In addition, how can the risks of fragmentation to the functioning of the price discovery 
process be handled in the absence of pre-trade requirements? Fundamentally, this 
involves a choice. A more contestable landscape is by definition characterised by 
fragmentation, which comes at an economic cost (less informative central prices) but 
also with certain benefits (competition, choice, innovation).  
7.4.1.2  A framework for integrating disconnected liquidity pools?  
Micro-market structure theory predicts a number of potentially negative effects of too 
much transparency, notably that excessive requirements may hamper liquidity 
provision. Overall, research empirically testing these theoretical risks provides support 
for both advocates and opponents of pre-trade transparency. Current research is 
therefore not conclusive. 
•  Research on the harm of fragmentation is inconclusive: some studies offer evidence 
that off-exchange order execution harms market quality (e.g. the price discovery of 
the central market), others find no such evidence while some actually document 
beneficial effects.  
•  While post-trade transparency is generally regarded as beneficial, research findings 
are less straightforward on the merits of pre-trade requirements. While benefiting 
some traders, pre-trade requirements are likely to inhibit some traders from entering 
the market. These traders are important from a liquidity supply point of view, as 
they represent large trades or providers of capital. The effects of pre-trade 
requirements on overall liquidity therefore run a high risk of being detrimental. 
Hence, there is a magnitude of studies supporting the theoretical risks, but equally 
abundant research casting doubt on the practical effect of those theoretical risks. 
Fundamentally, when designing pre-trade rules, regulators have to make a choice 
between maximising economic efficiency or promoting more service competition. The 
former would imply setting high pre-trade requirements so that the overall price 
mechanism is maximised (provided that trading does not move offshore). However, as  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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illustrated above, pre-trade transparency may have detrimental effects on part of the 
market and may prevent some investors from satisfying their legitimate needs. If 
regulators chose to satisfy these needs and hence limit pre-trade requirements, this 
comes at a certain cost in terms of economic efficiency. Informative central prices are 
certainly a laudable aim, but there are other aims as well, such as competition.  
If off-exchange order execution venues become less of price-taker (i.e. relying on 
exchanges’ prices when providing best execution) and more of price-maker, there is 
certainly a more pronounced need to bring that order flow into the public sphere. Also, 
if off-exchange venues become more like standardised “exchanges” and less like an 
“OTC”, then the case for these venues to be governed equally certainly become 
stronger. This is in line with the functional theory of regulation which states that 
institutions performing similar functions should face similar regulatory obligations. 
Widespread off-exchange order execution also raises issues of access. If alternative 
trading venues become price-makers, why should some traders be left unaware of this 
particular trading opportunity? This could imply that some traders were systematically 
excluded from valuable trading.  
Nevertheless, there is significant uncertainty at present about the extent in Europe of 
off-exchange order execution in general and internalisation in particular. Little reliable 
data exist and more research and empirical testing are needed. Due to the lack of data, it 
is very difficult to verify whether off-exchange order execution has reached such a level 
that the benefits of competition are outweighed by the detrimental effects on central 
prices. In the countries where off-exchange order execution is permitted (e.g. the UK 
and Sweden), there is little evidence supporting the hypothesis of harm. This suggests 
that off-exchange order execution should be accorded the benefit of doubt and that pre-
trade arrangements should wait until more certainty has been reached. 
Overall, much research highlights the advantages of off-exchange trading: traders have 
different needs and no single market structure can benefit all of them. Pre-trade 
transparency requirements risk removing the possibility that at least some of these needs 
will be satisfied. Further research is therefore needed on the precise effects of pre-trade 
transparency.  
Considering the uncertainty of i) the extent of the underlying activity (off-exchange, 
internalisation), ii) the harmfulness of that activity in terms of market quality and iii) the 
effects of the remedying feature on market quality (pre-trade requirements), the 
Commission’s proposal to introduce pre-trade requirements for investment firms 
appears premature. A tentative policy recommendation at this stage should accordingly 
be to start with post-trade transparency coupled with stringent best-execution, conduct 
of business and order-handling rules. Only if this proves to insufficiently protect clients 
should the imposition of pre-trade transparency be contemplated. 
7.4.1.3  A framework for protecting retail clients?  
Nevertheless, faced with uncertainty, one strand in regulatory theory states that 
consumer interests’ should take precedence. Hence, the quote rule could be defended on 
grounds that it offers particular protection for retail clients. If so, it is important that the 
rules are carefully calibrated in order to offer sufficient scope to ensure that institutional 
lines of business are excluded. International comparisons suggest, however, that the 
draft rules are insufficiently limited and hence risk harming institutional business. The  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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EU pre-trade rules are directly inspired by US rules. Compared to US rules (11Ac1-1, 
11Ac1-4), however, the EU rules (Arts. 20.4 and 25) are much wider in their scope and 
coverage.  
At its inception, the US quote rule (11Ac1-1) had as a target to integrate the “third 
market”, i.e. its scope was to target those who systematically internalise retail orders. 
Accordingly, the rule provides for significant exceptions for those who do not fall in 
that category: 
•  The US quote rule only applies to dealers who hold themselves out to execute 
certain orders on a continuous or regular basis (i.e. who routinely internalise) and 
not to dealers who trade for their own account or on a case-by-case basis to satisfy 
their clients’ requests. The EU rule on the other hand forces any important liquidity 
provider to hold itself out, no matter whether they already do so or not.  
•  The US quote rule only applies to OTC trading, i.e. the “third market” described 
above. In other words, trading done in the US “upstairs market” described above is 
not included when calculating whether a dealer is an OTC market-maker. In the EU, 
however, there is no similar restriction. Hence, the obligation to publish quotes risks 
being triggered by active on-exchange trading. 
•  The US quote rule aims to protect retail investors. Hence, the rule is only triggered 
by retail-sized trading and not by institutional-sized trading. Accordingly, a dealer 
that only does block-size trades is not regarded as an OTC market-maker and is not 
covered by the quote rule. The EU quote rule has a similar intention but as it is 
currently drafted, the likely practical effect is that all liquidity providers will have to 
comply.  
•  Moreover, what constitutes a “block” in the US is much smaller than in the EU. In 
the US, block size starts at 10,000 shares or a value of $200,000. In Europe, market 
practice tends to regard blocks as larger. At the LSE, for example, for SETS trade 
reporting purposes, blocks start at eight times normal size, i.e. they range between 
800,000 and 1,600,000 shares (£1-2million). US rules also allow a so-called “block 
positioner exemption”, which takes into account trading strategies such as 
programme trades. Under this exemption, dealers are under some circumstances 
allowed to consider smaller transactions as part of a block, if the executions are 
considered part of one block transaction. No similar exemption is predicted by the 
European quote rule. 
There are also differences between the EU’s limit order display rule (20.4) and the US 
display rule (11 Ac-4), which is the closest equivalent. First, US rules do not require a 
generalised public display of clients’ orders. The rule only applies to specialists (i.e. on-
exchange market-makers who have received special responsibilities from the exchange 
to continuously provide two-way quotes so that markets always exist in their 
specialities) and OTC market-makers who in certain circumstances are obliged to reflect 
their clients’ limit orders in their public quotes. It does not apply to other broker-dealers. 
The rule should be seen in its US context, where the dominant trading model for most 
listed securities remains the quote-driven dealer market. In such a market context, it is 
essential that specialists’ and OTC market makers’ quotes are timely, representative and 
inclusive. Not only does the rule only apply to specialists and OTC market-makers, it 
also does not oblige them to display the full extent of clients’ open trading interest to the  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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wider market. It only requires inclusion of those customer limit orders that are either 
better priced than the specialist’s or market-maker’s current quote or add to the size of 
current best bid and offers. Other orders do not need to be published.  
Moreover, the display rule only applies to “held” orders (i.e. orders where the 
intermediary has no discretion how to execute the order) that are not executed 
immediately. Accordingly, it does not apply to “market-not-held” orders, which are 
typically used when traders want their intermediary to devise a trading strategy for 
them, a practice which is common for institutional trading of larger-sized orders. The 
US rules does not apply to larger-sized orders. As for the quote rule, blocks are 
excluded (same limits: 10,000 shares, $200,000 value). Furthermore, the rule does not 
apply to “odd-lot” orders, i.e. orders that are not possible to break down in “round lots”, 
i.e. equal pieces (e.g. 100, 200). Nor does the rule apply if the customer requests that the 
order should not be included. This can be done either on an order-specific basis or as 
part of a general agreement.  
While the EU display rule also allows customers to opt out, the rule does not contain the 
same range of exceptions. Hence, the rule’s scope is much wider and is likely to capture 
a much larger amount of orders. The EU rule requires intermediaries to publish unfilled 
customer limit orders in a “manner which is easily accessible to other market 
participants”. If that means posting them in a limit order book, this would expose the 
trade intention to a much wider public than the corresponding US obligation to include 
them in a market-maker’s quotes. Hence, there is a much bigger risk that the market will 
move against the trader.  
As the EU rule makes no distinction between “held” and “not-held” orders, the rule 
risks harming a predominantly institutional business, i.e. the practice of institutional 
traders providing their intermediary with discretion over how to execute their orders. 
This would run counter to the rule’s intent to target primarily retail-sized orders.  
As discussed above, the market practice for deferred reporting of EU blocks is much 
higher than the regulated limit in the US. As the EU rule appears to be based on this 
practice, EU blocks for transparency purposes are also likely to be much larger. This 
high hurdle is likely to have as an effect that the EU rule will capture much institutional 
business, which today often falls within the range of 10,000 to 800,000 shares. Once 
again, this runs counter to the stated intent of focusing on retail business.  
As a result, the EU display rule is likely to have a much wider scope than its US 
counterpart. This runs counter to the aims of pre-trade requirements targeted only at 
providing a cushion of protection for retail investors. Overly expansive rules can 
reactivate the fears stated above of over-inclusive pre-trade rules, which both academic 
theory and empirical studies suggest may hurt market quality in terms of lower liquidity 
provision.  
Fundamentally, the two pre-trade frameworks have evolved in two different contexts. In 
the US, the SEC has since the 1970s tried to link together markets. Quote-driven dealer 
markets combined with a large “third market”, where large parts of the retail order flow 
were being internalised by investment firms, led to the creation of a pre-trade regime for 
exchange specialists and “third-market” market-makers. The quote rule and display rule 
are key parts of that approach. In the EU there is so far little systematic reliable data 
providing evidence of widespread internalisation of retail order flow. This could offer  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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support for those who claim that regulating a potentially harmful activity before it arises 
is premature. However, even if retail order flow was internalised, the welfare analysis 
would not be straightforward. As highlighted above, internalisation offers such benefits 
as speedy and reliable execution, which in many surveys comes out on top of retail 
investors’ preferences. Nor are pre-trade requirements the only way to deal with the 
potential risks of internalisation. Best-execution and order-handling rules also play an 
important role in providing cushions of protection for retail investors.  
7.4.1.4  Alternatives to pre-trade requirements 
Another argument in favour of waiting or abstaining to impose pre-trade rules at this 
stage is that alternatives to a mandated public framework of rules may exist. More 
specifically, while pre-trade requirements are motivated out of the concern that 
disconnected liquidity pools may otherwise arise with negative effects on price 
discovery and in the end, worse execution for large classes of investors, there may be 
other ways of improving the execution quality of customer orders.  
Relying on market incentives? 
First, pre-trade requirements may not need to be mandated. There may be market 
practices aimed at uncovering hidden liquidity that may make mandatory pre-trade 
requirements unnecessary. For example, Immediate or Cancel (IOC) orders are one way 
by which intermediaries currently uncover liquidity in more opaque venues. Such 
practices are not perfect substitutes, but they offer market-based ways of uncovering 
liquidity even when all trade interest is not visible. 
Moreover, each trading venue has an incentive to publish as much information as 
possible in order to attract more orders. This should in principle apply to price quotes as 
well. Therefore, before embarking on a strategy of mandating quote disclosure, 
regulators should assess whether relying on market incentives may be sufficient.  
However, for that to be the case and best practices to spread, intermediaries have to be 
engaged in effective competition. Contestable markets can be partly stimulated by 
regulators, by e.g. ensuring that barriers to entry are as low as possible. Best-execution 
rules also play an important part in this respect, as they would force intermediaries to 
contemplate a wide range of venues before executing customer orders. Such 
requirements would accordingly increase competition between trading venues 
(including intermediaries). Hence, in perfectly competitive markets, pre-trade rules may 
be superfluous. In less than perfectly competitive markets, there will probably be more 
of a need for well calibrated rules.  
Sunshine trading on regulated markets? 
One reason why traders want to trade off public markets is that they want to avoid 
trading with more informed counterparties. In addition, some traders with significant 
positions want to avoid signalling the size of their trading interest to the wider market. 
More opaque trading venues, e.g. in-house crossing services provided by broker-dealers, 
can assist traders in their quest to find suitable counterparts by screening out potentially 
informed traders. Hence, since regulated markets may not be able to provide the desired 
functionality, traders use off-exchange trading instead. Extending pre-trade 
requirements to investment firms risks undermining that possibility, by making these  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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trading venues just as transparent, and hence open for informed traders, as are 
exchanges. 
An alternative to extending pre-trade requirements would be for exchanges to address 
the reasons why traders want to trade off the exchange in the first place. One study 
above (Madhaven, 2000) suggested that regulated markets ought to emulate some of the 
characteristics of off-exchange trading venues in order to improve their liquidity 
provision overall and for certain shares in particular. Exchanges have done so by e.g. 
extending trading hours and introducing closing auctions.
153 It has been argued that 
exchanges could introduce some kind of “sunshine trading”, i.e. the ability of traders to 
know the identity of potential counterparties, hence enabling them to screen out 
informed traders. 
Currently, European exchanges offer some exceptions to full anonymity. Traders can 
see the name of their counterparty both pre- and post-trade in Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the four Nordic markets. In Portugal that is possible post-trade, while in France, Britain, 
Holland and Belgium, it is not possible. Nevertheless, despite these possible reductions 
in anonymity, orders routed to a regulated market will at some stage have to be 
displayed to the public. 
Overall, these results suggest that there is a legitimate need to avoid informed traders. 
The CLOBs of regulated markets do not always provide the desired functionality, 
although they may achieve some of the desired characteristics. Instead, other venues 
have arisen to cater for this need (in-house matching, crossing…). In the discussion 
surrounding transparency requirements of trading venues, these differing needs of 
traders should be taken into account and regulation should provide for traders’ 
continued ability to choose trading venues depending on their differing needs. 
7.4.1.5  Transparency no panacea 
There are two major arguments favouring a high level of transparency. First, 
transparency could enable the co-existence of competing venues while ensuring that the 
harm from fragmentation is minimised. Second, transparency is also an effective way of 
redressing information asymmetries by giving retail investors more information about 
trading opportunities. These benefits are amplified when taking into account the 
administrative benefits. Relying on transparency is an attractive regulatory strategy: it 
requires low resources on the part of regulators and it “leans with the market”, as it 
enables market forces to play. Hence, it is natural to have a presumption in favour of 
more transparency. Accordingly, any future regulatory framework is likely to have a 
significant transparency component. 
However, while there is agreement on the general benefits of transparency, there is no 
consensus on how far it should extend. There is close to consensus on the merits of 
extending post-trade requirements to all actors dealing in securities. However, views 
differ on the effects of pre-trade requirements, with an important body of opinion 
claiming that too much transparency may under some circumstances harm market 
quality. While benefiting some traders, pre-trade requirements are likely to discourage 
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traders sitting on large blocks from entering the market. These traders are important 
from a liquidity supply point of view, as they represent large trades or providers of 
capital. If they decide to retreat to a more accommodative environment, the effect of 
pre-trade requirements on overall liquidity risks being detrimental. There is a magnitude 
of studies supporting the theoretical risks, but equally abundant research shedding doubt 
on the practical effect of those theoretical risks.  
Fundamentally, when designing pre-trade rules, regulators have to make a choice 
between maximising economic efficiency or promoting more service competition. The 
former would imply setting high pre-trade requirements so that the overall price 
mechanism was maximised. However, pre-trade transparency may have detrimental 
effects on part of the market and may prevent some investors satisfying their legitimate 
needs. If regulators choose to allow investors to satisfy these needs and hence limit pre-
trade requirements, this will come at a certain cost in terms of economic efficiency. It 
remains to be decided which is the most important.  
Transparency is no panacea and as stated above, there is “disquieting evidence” that too 
much transparency may harm market quality, as it effectively disables some liquidity 
provision. In addition, some of the concerns voiced above, e.g. that a too low level of 
transparency puts some investors at risk, can also be addressed with other means.  
7.4.2  Promoting better execution 
The Commission’s proposal to introduce a framework for best execution is welcome. 
Best-execution rules are a core part of any regulatory approach adapted to a more 
diverse trading landscape.  
The EU definition, that execution quality is not limited to price, is well in line with 
international consensus and practice. The best-execution rule also provides incentives 
for intermediaries to survey access execution opportunities in a wider range of trading 
venues and hence eliminates the idea that a regulated market can act as a benchmark or 
a safe harbour. Moreover, by requiring intermediaries to review their execution 
arrangements on a regular basis, the rules insert an element of change and competition. 
Depending on how the conduct of business rules are interpreted, the rules also foresee 
that intermediaries should disclose their execution arrangements to clients. By requiring 
intermediaries to maintain records, the proposed directive enables clients and 
supervisors to monitor execution quality.  
These rules appear broadly appropriate, although the term “ensure” may be too harsh on 
investment firms. It is important that the implementing committees put a strong and 
rigorous framework in place. As developed above, best-execution rules are another 
regulatory tool to promote the consumer’s interest, i.e. to ensure that investors receive 
adequate execution quality. Best-execution rules are certainly made more effective by 
pre-trade transparency, as intermediaries will have price quotes from a wider range of 
trading venues. However, as elaborated upon above, where to put the emphasis is a 
matter of judgement.  
7.4.3  Stringent order priority rules 
To harness the positive effects of internalisation, it also important to have stringent 
order priority rules. In their absence, there is a potential that the intermediary will time  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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the execution of customer orders to fit its proprietary trading needs and not execute the 
trade according to the best interest of its customer. With clear time precedence rules, 
such a possibility is denied.  
The Commission’s proposed Art. 20 will enforce time priority, i.e. first orders received 
are the first to be executed. The directive states little about price priority, however. 
Whether these rules are flexible enough to enable intermediaries to exercise proper 
judgement as to when to execute client orders remains a matter of debate.  
If pre-trade transparency for investment firms were eliminated, the effect may well be a 
reduction in price priority. However, market incentives should play a major role in 
ensuring that investors post orders on the most liquid trading venue. 
Best-execution rules in combination with order-handling rules can, if properly designed, 
somewhat attenuate the lack of pre-trade transparency. This is illustrated by recent FSA 
proposals, which would still impose a demanding regime on intermediaries – who 
would be obliged to explain how they set prices (disclosure), consider other venues 
(review) and demonstrate that outcomes of in-house matching are just as good as other 
execution venues (monitoring) – despite the absence of pre-trade transparency.
154 By 
requiring intermediaries to disclose how they handle orders to achieve best execution 
and how they effectively rout their orders, investors will be able to assess execution 
quality even in the absence of pre-trade requirements. Furthermore, if obliging 
intermediaries to regularly review these arrangements, pressure for change and 
competition are promoted and disconnected liquidity pools somewhat reconnected. 
Better execution and order-handling rules are hence related to pre-trade transparency. 
Pre-trade rules provide information. Coupled with best-execution and priority rules, 
intermediaries will be obliged to act upon that information. However, if pre-trade 
transparency is in some cases regarded as potentially harmful, the ensuing respite for 
intermediaries of not requiring such transparency can be somewhat mitigated by putting 
more emphasis on the other rules. Regulation is accordingly a matter of emphasis. 
While the best solution may well be to require more transparency, the lack of 
transparency can somewhat be compensated for by another solution: more stringent 
best-execution requirements.  
7.4.4  Addressing conflicts of interest 
Another way of ensuring that intermediaries treat investors fairly is to strike down any 
potential conflicts of interest. As illustrated above, much financial intermediation 
contains such conflicts. Eliminating them entirely is not a feasible regulatory goal. 
Instead, procedures should be put in place to highlight and deal with them.  
The Commission’s decision to insert a free-standing provision on conflicts of interest is 
laudable. The proposal will decrease the risk that clients’ interests are not put first when 
executing orders. This is essential in order to avoid situations where an investment 
firm’s own interest takes precedence over its clients. These rules assume special 
importance in the face of the conflict of interest in internalisation, where intermediaries 
have a direct interest in executing customer orders in-house (hence avoiding exchange 
fees and commissions and also being able to offset inventory problems). This risk, as 
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mentioned above, is especially important when less informed retail investors are 
involved. Hence, these conflict of interest rules are an essential additional cushion of 
protection for retail investors. 
7.4.5  Competition and equal access to trading opportunities 
In order to increase the level of contestability, barriers to entry should be kept low and 
arrangements that effectively hinder such entry should be eliminated. In this respect, the 
ISD should not be the primary vehicle, but rather a task falling to DG Competition. 
More active involvement of DG Competition is necessary. This also necessitates 
potential cases being brought to its attention by market participants.  
Public authorities should also clamp down on unreasonable obstacles to access to 
trading opportunities. While some restrictions may be justified from a prudential point 
of view, e.g. limiting counterparty risk, trading venues (including off-exchange venues) 
should not be allowed to restrict access in any discriminatory manner. So far, off-
exchange trading has been more leniently treated, being a relatively new phenomenon 
attracting a minor part of what are predominantly professional investors. However, if 
off-exchange trading achieves more important levels, it is important that no class of 
traders is systematically shut out.  
Posting firm quotes, as envisaged in Art. 25, is certainly one way of granting access of 
traders to the trading opportunities that broker-dealers’ in-house trading implies. 
However, such an absolute access may run counter to one important reason why traders 
choose to engage in off-exchange trading: to avoid informed traders by acquiring the 
help of an intermediary that screens these out. If the current pre-trade regime stands, 
intermediaries will be hampered in offering that service. While they may continue to be 
prepared to offer the service, they will protect themselves against informed traders by 
posting worse prices, which will result in wider spreads. In order to avoid this negative 
outcome, a more subtle method is called for. 
7.4.6  Promoting flexibility by extending the use of comitology 
Considering the uncertainty about the harmfulness of the underlying activity (off-
exchange order execution) and the effects of the remedying feature (pre-trade 
transparency), the Commission’s September proposal seemed reasonable. It represents a 
coherent regulatory strategy: if faced with uncertainty, wait, see, evaluate and possibly 
act down the road. 
Such a strategy runs counter to the logic of legislating at the EU level, however. The 
EU’s legislative process has an element of “now or never”. The process is cumbersome, 
lengthy and consumes resources. Moreover, once implemented the directive assumes 
the character of being set in stone. It is therefore perhaps understandable that the 
Commission, faced with the uncertainty related to fragmentation and transparency, 
opted for an expansionist approach.  
Since June 2002, however, the EU has been equipped with the so-called Lamfalussy 
process, which provides for a more flexible and speedy regulatory process. Faced with 
the uncertainty, one could ideally have delegated the responsibility of setting 
transparency standards to the European Securities Committee (ESC) and the Committee 
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considering the inherent need to continuously evaluate and calibrate these requirements. 
However, there are a number of problems preventing such an “easy fix”. First, current 
comitology rules probably prohibit delegating such wide powers to committees. No 
level 2 measure can be put forward without specific powers having been delegated at 
level 1. Second, such a wide-ranging delegation carries the risk of renationalising parts 
of the acquis communautaire. The implementing committees could for example, in the 
context of discussing level 2 measures, decide that no harmonised legislation is needed 
and that powers should fall at level 3 (i.e. member state coordination). If such fears 
materialised, it could reiterate the drawbacks of the current ISD, where different 
interpretations have given rise to differences in implementation, with some member 
states being more lenient, others tougher. Third, wide-ranging delegation may be 
politically unattractive. For example, considering the European Parliament’s lack of 
call-back right, it is doubtful whether parliamentarians would have accepted such an 
approach. It is therefore important that the issue of call-back is resolved so that the 
possibilities of the Lamfalussy process can be exploited to their full extent. However, 
the Council is not likely to be comfortable with delegating such a broad range of powers 
to implementing committees.  
Faced with what is currently a cumbersome process, the importance of getting any 
regulatory regime “right” from the outset becomes important. Bearing in mind the 
differences in context, a comparison between the EU’s choices with those in the US is 
in this case salutary. The US regulatory framework for integrating markets described 
above has emerged gradually over the last three decades. While the initial push for 
creating a National Market System (NMS) came from the top (Congress and the SEC), 
regulatory developments have since had more of a bottom-up character, as the SEC has 
petit-à-petit added rules contributing towards constructing and upholding the NMS. This 
process has been slow-moving, as each step has been preceded by careful deliberations 
and consultations with concerned parties.  
In comparison, the EU’s attempts to integrate markets are more recent. While the 
Community has certainly been grappling with the integration of markets since its 
inception and discussions regarding the raison d’être of e.g. concentration rules have 
been a part of the somewhat repetitive debate since the 1960s, it is only with the current 
ISD review that the Commission has put forward a more or less complete transparency 
regime. Combined with the strictures of EU rule-making, with binding rules emanating 
from the Community institutions, the EU’s approach is more top-down.  
This is not surprising or for that matter inappropriate, as it is natural that the EU builds 
on prior experience. Accordingly, the EU does not necessarily have to take the same 
time to put a similar transparency regime in place. However, there are inherent 
weaknesses to an accelerated top-down approach. By attempting to put an entire regime 
in place at once, it is easy to underestimate the challenge of drafting well calibrated 
rules. Moreover, considering the wide range of market structures catering for the 
different needs of traders, it is doubtful whether any regulatory agency has the skill and 
the resources to properly manage the imposition of a complete system.  
With these caveats in mind, the priority should be to put a flexible, carefully drafted and 
calibrated transparency regime in place. In this respect, the Commission’s proposed pre-
trade regime for investment firms at first sight appears inadequate. It is rigid, as its 
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international comparisons suggest that the current rules will cover too much ground in 
light of its stated aims. Considering the inherent difficulties in and the need for frequent 
changes to any pre-trade regime, it would have been better if these issues were referred 
to comitology level. The US precedence, where Congress only gave an indication of the 
desired end goal (an effectively integrated market system) while leaving the actual 
choice of means of achieving that end in the hands of the SEC, is interesting. While the 
Commission’s decision to put more detail in what is supposed to be a framework 
directive is understandable, given the rules of comitology, the risk to the acquis and the 
European institutions’ reluctance to delegate detailed rule-making power, it is an 
unfortunate decision as it will put in place a rigid regulatory regime which, if not 
carefully drafted, risks harming European securities markets.  
7.4.7  The importance of investor education 
Today’s marketplace is considerably more heterogeneous than yesterday’s. With the 
proliferation of trading venues, intermediaries have a much wider choice of where to 
execute orders. This inherently gives rise to misjudgements as regards best execution. 
The regulatory framework dealing with this more fragmented marketplace is also likely 
to be more complex.  
All the rules in the world cannot replace the value of having capable investors who are 
aware of the complexity of today’s trading processes and who know their rights and 
hence are able to exert pressure on their intermediaries. Educated investors are 
especially important as the EU’s presently segmented securities markets will integrate. 
Even though a harmonised framework of law will be in place, this is likely to be of 
predominantly minimal nature. As illustrated above, this is all together natural and 
appropriate considering the wide structural differences between member state markets. 
However, with the advent of investors increasingly being able to reap trading 
opportunities in other member state markets also comes the potential of misjudgements. 
These may be caused by e.g. persisting differences in regulatory approaches. More 
educated investors will be more capable of handling such difficulties. 
That said, however, it is difficult to see any provisions on investor education being part 
of a future directive. Taking into account the subsidiarity principle, this is a task falling 
squarely in the lap of member state authorities. Currently, member state approaches to 
investor education differ widely – with some member states having a stronger equity 
culture than others. It could therefore be useful for one of the common institutions, say 
the Commission or CESR, to coordinate a process of benchmarking and spreading best 
practice. The more educated an investor, the lighter the regulatory touch required. 
7.4.8 Concluding  remarks 
Regulators have to make difficult choices. Should they give priority to the maximisation 
of network externalities at the expense of choice and competition? Should they put the 
interests of retail investors first, at the risk of hurting the institutional business? Such 
choices are not unique. There are indeed formalised strategies to deal with such 
uncertainty. As stressed before, many of the concerns can be somewhat dealt with 
differently and any regulatory approach to deal with a changing marketplace needs to be 
composed of several instruments. Their relative importance and prominence is a matter 
of emphasis. Instead of pre-trade transparency, more stringent order-handling rules for  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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example may partly alleviate some of those concerns. More fundamentally, measures 
aimed at boosting competition are essential. Transparency rules, even though effective, 
are not the only option. 
In sum, i) considering the potential harm of overly ambitious pre-trade requirements, ii) 
in view of the limited extent of many of the supposedly harmful activities in Europe so 
far and iii) bearing in mind the danger of putting detail in an inflexible directive, the 
inclusion of pre-trade requirements for investment firms appears premature. If particular 
protection should be provided to retail clients, then at a minimum the current rules 
should be rewritten so that they i) capture the intended harmful activity (dangers of 
certain execution manners to retail investors), as appears to have been done in the US, 
and ii) do not unnecessarily harm liquidity provision. However, even for the execution 
of retail-sized trades, many of the concerns above apply. Bearing in mind the general 
drawback of putting detail in a rigid directive, it would have been better if the whole 
transparency regime was referred to comitology as part of a strategy of waiting and 
seeing. It is unlikely that such a course of action would have been possible, however, 
under current comitology rules. 
Alternatives to the disputed pre-trade requirements exist that somewhat mitigate the 
effects of not having pre-trade rules. In order to integrate markets and protect retail 
investors, more emphasis could be put on best-execution rules. By forcing investment 
firms to screen and have access to several trading venues and by requiring them to 
regularly review their execution practices, dynamism and change are introduced. 
Trading venues will have incentives to gain them as customers and hence are likely to 
compete more aggressively. By requiring investment firms to disclose their execution 
arrangements and costs, retail clients will have effective tools for disciplining their 
service providers. Order priority rules are also effective in structuring the discretion of 
brokers concerning the way they can execute client orders. Conflict of interest rules 
offer an additional cushion. These rules in combination with post-trade transparency 
will offer quite a rigorous regime for achieving the twin goals of integrated markets and 
protecting retail investors. 
Considering the rapidly changing nature of securities markets, a flexible regulatory 
framework is of the utmost importance. When devising future rules, it is therefore 
important that the full potential of the flexibility offered by the Lamfalussy process is 
exploited. For this to be possible, however, trust between the regulatory institutions has 
to be in place, which is not the case at present. The EP has repeatedly signalled that in 
the absence of the right to call back implementing measures, it will take a very 
restrictive stance when delegating powers to committees. As a result the ISD, which 
supposed to be a framework directive, contains too much detail. The EP should rapidly 
be granted a call-back right. As the Commission and the EP agree on this, the ball lies 
with the Council of Ministers.  
Last but not least. regulations cannot replace the value of well educated investors. This 
falls within the remit of member state responsibility. Current levels of education and 
professionalism differ from one country to another, and perhaps the Commission or 
CESR could assume a role in coordinating a process of spreading best practice.  91 
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ANNEX 1. SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE 2002 ISD PROPOSAL 
 
Article 16 
Conflicts of interest 
1.  Member States shall require investment firms to take all reasonable steps to identify
conflicts of interest between themselves, including their managers and employees,
and their clients or between one client and another that arise in the course of
providing any investment and ancillary services, or combinations thereof.  
2.  Member States shall require that investment firms whose activities give rise to
conflicts of interest maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative
arrangements to prevent those conflicts from adversely affecting the interests of
clients, or otherwise manage them so as to achieve the same result. 
3.  Where organisational or administrative arrangements made by the investment firm
to manage conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable
confidence, that risks of damage to client interests will be effectively avoided, the
investment firm shall clearly disclose the general nature and/or sources of conflicts
of interest to the client before undertaking business on its behalf. 
4.  In order to take account of technical developments on financial markets and to
ensure uniform application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the Commission shall adopt, in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 59(2), implementing measures
to: 
(a) define the steps that investment firms might reasonably be expected to take to
identify, prevent, manage and/or disclose conflicts of interest when providing
various investment and ancillary services and combinations thereof;  
(b) address conflicts that arise from any inducement that is received or self-interest
that arises in connection with the performance of an investment service which
may compromise the quality or fairness of a related investment service that is
performed on behalf of or provided to a client.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Article 19 
Obligation to execute orders on terms most favourable to the client 
1.  Member States shall require that investment firms providing services which entail
the execution, whether by the firm itself or another investment firm, of client orders
in financial instruments ensure that those orders are executed in such a way that the
client obtains the best possible result in terms of price, costs, speed and likelihood
of execution, taking into account the time, size and nature of customer orders, and
any specific instructions from the client.  
2.  The competent authority shall verify that investment firms implement effective and
efficient procedures which form a systematic, repeatable and demonstrable method
for facilitating execution of client orders on terms that are most favourable to the
client. In assessing these procedures, regard shall be had to the extent to which the
procedures enable the firm to obtain the best possible result having regard to the
conditions prevailing in the marketplace to which the investment firm can
reasonably be expected to have access. 
3.  Member States shall require investment firms to review, on a regular basis, the
procedures which they employ to obtain the best possible result for their clients and,
where necessary, to adapt those procedures so as to obtain access to the execution
venues which, on a consistent basis, offer the most favourable terms of execution
available in the marketplace. 
4.  In order to ensure the protection necessary for investors, the fair and orderly
functioning of markets, and to ensure the uniform application of paragraphs 1, 2 and
3, the Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article
59(2), adopt implementing measures concerning:  
(a) the factors that may be taken into account for determining best execution or the
calculation of best net price prevailing in the marketplace for the size and type
of order and type of client; 
(b) the procedures which, taking into account the scale of operations of different
investment firms, may be considered as constituting reasonable and effective
methods of obtaining access to the execution venues which offer the most
favourable terms of execution in the marketplace.  A SSESSING THE ISD REVIEW 
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Article 20 
Client order-handling rules 
1.  Member States shall require that investment firms authorised to execute orders on
behalf of clients implement procedures and arrangements which provide for the fair
and expeditious execution of client orders, relative to other client orders or the
trading interests of the investment firm.  
2. Member States shall ensure that investment firms operate procedures or
arrangements for executing otherwise comparable client orders in accordance with
their time of their reception by the investment firm, and for preventing client
interests from being adversely affected by any conflicts of interest.  
3.  Member States shall ensure that investment firms obtain the express prior consent
of clients before proceeding to execute client orders outside the rules and systems
operated by a regulated market or MTF. Member States shall allow the investment
firm to obtain this consent either in the form of a general agreement or in respect of
individual transactions. If the prior consent of clients is given in the form of a
general agreement, it should be contained in a separate document and should be
renewed annually. 
4.  Member States shall require that, in the case of a client limit order which cannot be
immediately executed under prevailing market conditions, investment firms are,
unless the client expressly instructs otherwise, to take measures to facilitate the
earliest possible execution of that order by making public immediately the terms of
that client limit order in a manner which is easily accessible to other market
participants. Member States shall provide that the competent authorities are to be
able to waive the obligation to make public a limit order that is large in scale
compared with normal market size as determined under Article 41(2). 
5.  In order to ensure that measures for the protection of investors and fair and orderly
functioning of markets take account of technical developments in financial markets,
and to ensure the uniform application of paragraphs 1 to 4, the Commission shall
adopt, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 59(2), implementing
measures which define: 
(a) the conditions and nature of the procedures and arrangements which result in
the prompt, fair and expeditious execution of client orders and the situations in
which or types of transaction for which investment firms may reasonably
deviate from prompt execution so as obtain more favourable terms for clients;  
(b) the procedures for obtaining and renewing client consent prior to executing
those orders outside the rules and systems of a regulated market or MTF;  
(c) the different methods through which an investment firm can be deemed to have
met its obligation to disclose unexecuted client limit orders to the market.  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
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Article 25 
Obligation for investment firms to make public firm bid and offers 
1.  Member States shall require any investment firm authorised to deal on own
account to make public a firm bid and offer price for transactions of a size
customarily undertaken by a retail investor in respect of shares in which it is
dealing, and where those shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and
for which there is a liquid market. 
Member States shall require that the investment firms referred to in the first
subparagraph trade with other investment firms and eligible counterparties at the
advertised prices, except where justified by legitimate commercial considerations
related to the final settlement of the transaction.  
2.  Member States shall provide that the obligation set out in paragraph 1 is waived in
respect of investment firms which do not represent an important provider of
liquidity for the share(s) in question on a regular or continuous basis. 
3.  Member States shall ensure that the bid and offer prices required under paragraph
1 are made public in a manner which is easily accessible to other market
participants, free of charge, on a regular and continuous basis during normal
trading hours.  
The competent authority shall verify that published quotes reflect prevailing
market conditions for that share, and that the investment firm regularly updates the
bid and offer prices that it makes public pursuant to paragraph 1.  
4.  In order to ensure the uniform application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, in a manner
which supports the efficient valuation of shares and maximises the possibility of
investment firms to obtain the best deal for their clients, the Commission shall, in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 59(2), adopt implementing
measures which:  
(a) specify the size of transactions customarily undertaken by a retail investor in
respect of which the investment firm shall make public firm bid and offer
prices; 
(b) define the shares or classes of share for which there is sufficient liquidity to
allow application of the obligation under paragraph 1; 
(c) determine which types of investment firms shall be exempted, pursuant to
paragraph 2, from the obligation under paragraph 1; 
(d)  specify the means by which investment firms may comply with their
obligations under paragraph 3, which shall include the following possibilities: 
i)  through the facilities of any regulated market which has admitted the
instrument in question to trading; 
ii)  through the offices of a third party;  
iii) through proprietary arrangements.  99 
MEMBERS OF THE CEPS TASK FORCE 
The report does not reflect a common position of the member of the Task Force. Accordingly, each 
member of the Task Force does not subscribe to every assessment contained in this report, nor does the 
report necessarily reflect the views of the respective institutions to which they belong. 
Rapporteur:    Mr. Mattias Levin 
Research Fellow 
CEPS 
 
Mr. Ludovic Aigrot 
Special Adviser 
European Affairs 
Euronext Brussels 
 
Mr. Paul Arlman 
Secretary General 
Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) 
 
Mr. Alberto Baltanas Nunez 
Economist 
Banco Santander 
 
Dr. Matthias Bock 
Executive Director & Counsel 
Goldman Sachs International 
 
Mr. Richard Britton 
ISMA - International Securities Market 
Association 
 
Ms. Asuncion Caparros 
Vice President 
EU Liaison Office 
ABN Amro Bank N.V. 
 
Mr. Nick Collier 
Director 
European Government & Reg. Affairs 
Instinet Europe Ltd 
 
Mr. Ronny Cosijns 
CAPCO 
 
Mr. Daniel Dax 
Deputy Director 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
 
Mrs. Simonetta Di Cagno 
Head of Representative Office 
Assonime 
Ms. Sophie Gautié 
EU Representative 
General Secretariat 
BNP Paribas Securities Services 
 
Mr. Kyriakos Gialoglou 
Research Fellow 
CEPS 
 
Mr. Charles Goldfinger 
Managing Director 
Global Electronic Finance 
 
Mr. Daragh Grant 
Public Policy Analyst 
UBS AG 
 
Mr. Alasdair Haynes 
Chief Executive Officer 
ITG Europe 
 
Ms. Ellen Hörth 
Referent 
Capital Markets Policy 
Deutsche Bank AG 
 
Mr. Staffan Jerneck 
Deputy Director & Director of Corporate 
Relations 
CEPS 
 
Mr. Adam Kinsley 
Head of Regulatory Strategy 
London Stock Exchange 
 
Mr Jens Krenchel 
Adviser 
Confederation of Danish Industries - DI 
 
Mr. Karel Lannoo 
Chief Executive 
CEPS  M ATTIAS LEVIN 
 100 
Mr. Henry Manisty 
Head 
Government & Regulatory Affairs 
Reuters 
 
Mr. Alex Marin 
CAPCO 
 
Mr. Jose Ramon Martinez Resano 
Senior Economist 
Operations Department 
Bank of Spain 
 
Ms. Colleen McBrien 
Manager 
Policy Development 
London Stock Exchange 
 
Mrs. Arianna Mellini Sforza 
European Affairs Office 
San Paolo - IMI SpA 
 
Mr. Wim Mijs 
Senior Vice President 
Head of Representative Office Brussels 
ABN Amro Bank N.V. 
 
Mr. Joaquin Monells 
Deputy General Manager 
Head Representative to the EU & ECB 
BBVA 
 
Mr. Salim Nehmé 
Senior Adviser 
French Banking Federation 
 
Mr. Gregor Pozniak 
Deputy Secretary General 
Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) 
 
Mr. Fabio Recine 
Legal Counsel 
European Central Bank 
 
Mrs. Wendy Reed 
Senior Manager 
PERAS 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Mr. Donald Ricketts 
Consultant 
GPC International 
 
Ms. Sophia Saridou-Zafiropoulou 
General Director 
Association of Members of the Athens 
Stock Exchange 
 
Dr. Stephan Schuster 
Managing Director 
Capital Markets Policy 
Deutsche Bank AG 
 
Ms. Kleanthi Seimanidi 
Lawyer 
Association of Members of the Athens 
Stock Exchange 
 
Ms. Helen Stack 
European Policy Advisor 
Centrica plc. 
 
Mr. Massimo Suardi 
Economist 
DG ECFIN 
European Commission 
 
Ms Angela Teke 
Director 
Wholesale and Regulation 
British Bankers Association 
 
Mr. Henning vom Stein 
Assistant Manager 
Deutsche Bank AG 
 
Mr. Christoph Wengler 
Assistant Manager & Analyst 
Commerzbank EU-Liaison Office Brussels 
 
Mr. Georgios Zavvos 
Member of the Legal Service, former 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 
European Commission 
  101 
INVITED GUESTS AND SPEAKERS 
Mr. Manuel Altemir Mergelina 
Internal Market DG 
European Commission 
 
Dr. John Board 
London School of Economics & Political 
Science 
 
Mr. Niall Bohan 
Internal Market DG 
European Commission 
 
Mr Carlo Comporti 
Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) 
 
Dr. Carmine Di Noia 
Chief Economist 
Assonime 
 
Prof. Ian Domowitz 
Managing Director 
ITG Inc. 
 
Mr Sabino Fornies Martinez 
Internal Market DG 
European Commission 
 
Mrs. Rebecca Jones 
Permanent Representation of the United 
Kingdom to the EU 
 
Mr. Emmanuel Lacresse 
Deputy Financial Counsellor 
Permanent Representation of France to the 
EU 
 
Dr Ruben Lee 
Managing Director 
Oxford Finance Group 
 
Dr. Patrice Müller 
London Economics 
 
Dr. Giovanni Notaro 
London Economics 
Mr. Wiclef Poesiat 
Permanent Representaion of the 
Netherlands to the EU 
 
Mrs. Theresa Villiers 
MEP, Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
European Parliament 
 
Mr. Mats Walberg 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the 
EU 
 ABOUT CEPS 
ounded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute 
dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from official 
institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and national bodies), 
foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
GOALS 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events. 
ASSETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to greatly 
extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to climate change, 
justice and home affairs and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with extensive 
working experience in EU affairs. 
PROGRAMME STRUCTURE 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems and 
opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its publications and 
the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research programme is organised 
under two major headings: 
 
Economic Policy 
Macroeconomic Policy 
European Network of Economic Policy 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Trade Developments & Policy 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change  
Agricultural Policy 
Politics, Institutions and Security 
The Future of Europe 
Justice and Home Affairs 
The Wider Europe 
South East Europe 
Caucasus & Black Sea 
EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Mediterranean & Middle East 
CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities within 
the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, network 
meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training seminars, 
major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and media relations. 
 
 
F 